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Abstract

In the 2005 *International Policy Statement-A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (IPS, 2005), the Government of Canada recognized the changing nature and growing importance of failed states and established their stabilization as a top Canadian foreign policy priority. However, despite the policy prominence and growing wealth of the academic literature on failed states, the concept, itself, suffers from vagueness and a lack of definitional clarity. This thesis will answer the question “What theoretical perspective(s) inform and influence Canadian foreign policy towards failed states as expressed in the declaratory policies of the Martin Government, 2003-2006?” The analysis provided by this thesis will focus on the development of Canada’s failed state policy; in particular it will focus on the policies articulated in the *IPS* and the policies related to the specific case of Canadian engagement in Afghanistan.
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Introduction

The term “failed state” initially emerged in the early 1990s and was used to explain the rash of civil and ethnic conflicts and the related humanitarian tragedies of death, disease, and displacement that erupted at the end of the Cold War. Since that time, failed states and their consequences have made a remarkable transition from existing on the periphery of international relations to becoming one of the early twenty-first century’s most significant security concerns.

Failed states were initially characterized by the loss of governmental authority and state capacity, human rights abuses, human insecurity and were frequently seen as potential sources of regional instability. However, the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 fundamentally altered the place of failed states on the international agenda. The increasing conceptual linkages between these countries and the activities of international terrorist groups and transnational crime syndicates led many Western nations “to equate their own national security with stability and order in the world’s poorest and poorest governed nations” (Carment, Prest and Gazo, 2005, 2). No longer defined solely in terms of development and governance, failed states have become increasingly viewed as among the most significant threats to international peace and security in the post-9/11 world and in the context of the US led “Global War on Terror”. As a result, states described as failed have become the policy priority of an increasing number of national governments and international organizations, including: Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United Nations.

In the 2005 International Policy Statement-A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (IPS, 2005), the Government of Canada recognized the growing importance of failed states and established their stabilization as a top Canadian foreign policy priority. Locating these states and their consequences within the broader context of a changing global security environment, the IPS
states that "the greatest contemporary security threats are those resulting from a large number of fragile and poorly governed states" (Government of Canada, 2005a, 13). The report suggests that these countries pose a dual challenge for Canada. Firstly, the humanitarian tragedies of suffering and denial of human rights that are commonly associated with state failure challenge the most basic of Canadian international values (Government of Canada, 2005a; National Defence Canada, 2005b). Secondly, the characterization of failed states as breeding grounds for international terrorists and as havens for transnational criminal syndicates identifies a direct national security threat to Canada and Canadians (Government of Canada, 2005a). In the post 9/11 world, failed states and their consequences have become an important and integral element of contemporary Canadian foreign policy.

However, despite the growing wealth of academic literature on failed states and their inclusion into the policy decisions of many national governments and international organizations, the concept of failed states, itself, suffers from vagueness and a lack of definitional clarity. The vagueness that characterizes the concept can be traced back to the competing conceptions of the role of the modern state in contemporary international relations. With the onset of globalization that occurred in the early post-Cold War years, some analysts and scholars predicted the demise of the nation-state as the organizing unit of international relations. The increasingly porous nature of national borders to people, commerce and ideas; the rise of regionalism; and the advances of the technological revolution were thought to have the potential to render traditional conceptions of the state obsolete. In the following years, a proliferation of terms used to describe different attributes and forms of statehood arose, including narco-states and rogue states. Emerging from this broader state discourse has been the concept of failed states. The label has
grown in usage, in both academic and policy circles, and the concept has changed over time and remains subject to a wide range of theoretical and practical interpretations.

Ultimately this thesis will answer the question "What theoretical perspective(s) inform and influence Canadian foreign policy towards failed states as expressed in the declaratory policies of the Martin Government?" The analysis provided by this thesis will focus on the development of Canada's failed state policy; in particular it will focus on the policies articulated in the IPS and the policies related to the specific case of Canadian engagement in Afghanistan.

There are three main reasons this thesis question was undertaken. First, the academic literature on failed states remains a fractured body of work that is characterized by numerous perspectives and seemingly contradictory interpretations. This thesis will engage in an analysis of the competing theoretical perspectives in regards to failed states in an attempt to delineate and demarcate the differing conceptualizations and will further contribute to a clearer understanding of the conceptual issues surrounding failed states.

It will be demonstrated through this thesis that, firstly, the concept of failed states used in the broader academic and policy discourses is problematic in that it remains undefined and subject to varying interpretations. There are a number of inherent problems in conceptualizing and adequately defining what makes a failed state. These problems raise questions as to the analytical utility of the concept. In particular, the focus on the outcomes or consequences of state failure rather than its causal mechanisms produces a fundamental conceptual flaw in the operationalization of the concept in which concept becomes confused with measure. It will be further concluded that the contemporary linkages made between failed states and international terrorism are based on a superficial analysis that has direct implications for traditional notions of
sovereignty and that reinforces a world order that privileges the security concerns of Western nations, including Canada.

Second, the Paul Martin government, December 2003- January 2006, made the issues surrounding failed states an important foreign policy focus. However, despite this inclusion, the concept of failed states within Canadian foreign policy mirrors the conceptual problems at the theoretical level and remains relatively undefined. This thesis finds that Canadian declaratory policy towards failed states is influenced and informed by the Weberian and the functional perspectives. However, a deeper examination reveals that the Weberian perspective, with its focus on national security interests, is the primary perspective in influencing and informing Canadian policy and action in failed states and implicitly reflects an orientation that privileges state and security centric concerns. The presence of these two competing perspectives in Canadian declaratory policy towards failed states raises questions as to the motivations and intentions of prioritizing failed states and has potentially important implications for future policy development and direction. This thesis will contribute to a clearer understanding of how the term failed state is defined and used within Canadian policy.

The final reason for the focus here and underlying theme of this thesis is to examine the relationship between theory and practice. The case study of Afghanistan was chosen to demonstrate how the conceptualization of failed states influences the practical and operational methods of Canadian engagement in a specific case of state failure. There is a direct link between the assumptions used in conceptualizing and defining failed states and the types of policy responses adopted. In relation to Afghanistan, it is hoped a clearer understanding of the nature, direction and objectives of the Canadian involvement will emerge.
Chapter Descriptions

This thesis consists of three parts. The first section, Chapter One, examines the differing conceptualizations of failed states by reviewing the academic literature on the subject. The chapter begins by providing a broad overview of the evolution of the concept. While failed states are a relatively new focus in international relations, the concept has undergone a series of changes over time in both theory and practice. To gain a better and more holistic understanding of the concept and its usage, this section traces the development of the concept from its initial usage during 1990s to the post-9/11 linkages made between failed states and international terrorism and transnational crime syndicates.

The main purpose of Chapter One is to develop a framework for analysis. The framework will first be applied to the case of the more general Canadian declaratory policy towards failed states. Secondly, the framework will be used to analyze the more specific case of Canadian policy in Afghanistan. While competing notions of the nature and direction of Canadian action in Afghanistan exist, this work will focus on the Canadian government’s described actions in Afghanistan. This thesis will use a modified version of the framework presented by Susan L. Woodward at 2005 Workshop on State Failure: Reframing the International Economic and Political Agenda (2005) to examine the three dominant theoretical perspectives found in the literature - the functional, the Weberian and the critical perspectives. These perspectives will be analyzed across four main themes. These themes are: conception of the state; definitions of failed states; causes of state failure and policy responses. The framework helps describe and organize the range of ways failed states are conceptualized, defined and addressed and contributes to a clearer understanding of the conceptual issues and theoretical divisions of the failed state debates.
Chapters Two and Three are used to describe Canada's failed state policy. Chapter Two begins by presenting a brief overview of the evolution of Canadian failed state policy. This section of the chapter will focus on the place of failed states under Canada's human security agenda. The analysis will then move to focus on Canada's contemporary orientation towards failed states within the broader context of ongoing Canadian international contributions including its commitment to multilateralism and its contributions to the international "War on Terror". This analysis will be conducted by surveying the relevant policy statements and speeches. The International Policy Statement (2005) becomes the primary reference document as it prioritizes the place of failed states on the Canadian agenda. The IPS is divided into four sections: defence, diplomacy, development and trade. The impacts of failed states form a specific policy focus of three of the four IPS documents, with the trade statement being the exception. A brief description of how failed states are prioritized within each of the defence, diplomacy and development documents will be undertaken.

This part of the analysis will be limited to the Martin Government. The justification for limiting the scope in this manner is twofold. Firstly, it was under the Martin government, specifically through the IPS, that failed states were established as a Canadian policy priority. Secondly, as is demonstrated in the concluding section of this chapter, it was during this time that the Canadian concerns about failed states underwent a significant reorientation, moving away from the humanitarian concerns that defined failed states in the early 1990s to a more geopolitical security centric approach.

The concluding section of this chapter will compare two specific periods of Canadian foreign policy and the place and policies related to failed states in each. This work identifies the two periods for comparison as the Chrétien years, 1993-2003, and the Martin era, 2003-2006.
While it is not the purpose of this work to explain how and why a change over time has occurred in Canadian foreign policy towards failed states, the inclusion of the comparison provides valuable background information and demonstrates the dynamic nature of the failed state concept within Canadian policy.

There are also several justifications for limiting the main focus of this thesis to the developments of Martin era. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, it was under the Martin government that failed states and their consequences were given higher priority within Canadian foreign policy and there was a significant reorientation in how Canada would understand and address these states. Secondly, while Jean Chrétien was Prime Minister during the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, more significant aspects of the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in that country have occurred under the Martin government.

I have chosen, for two reasons, to end the analysis with election of the Harper government, which took office on February 6, 2006. Firstly, even after holding office for two years, the Harper government’s policy towards failed states remains undefined and no definitive policy document has been produced. However, there are indications that the often-delayed and yet to be released “Canada First” plan will build upon many of the elements identified in the IPS, particularly in reference to the strengthening of Canada’s military capabilities and a focus on national security. Secondly, analysis of the Harper government’s position is difficult if not impossible to do at present. The Harper government’s position could provide an area for future research.

Chapter Three moves from the broader declaratory policy to examining a specific example of the Canadian government’s declaratory policy and self-described action in a specific failed state. Afghanistan becomes the logical choice for such a case study for several reasons.
Firstly, Afghanistan provides an example of the justification for the contemporary association between failed states and international terrorism. Secondly, it was the site of the first intervention of the “War on Terror”, Afghanistan and is where Canada is most active in terms of concrete contributions. Specifically to be examined will be how Canada’s conceptualization of Afghanistan as a failed state influenced the policies aimed at the stabilization and reconstruction of that country.

The chapter begins with an overview of Afghanistan, focusing on its geographical position, diverse internal demography and unique history. This information has been included in order to provide some context for Canadian actions and to outline some of the larger problems and issues facing the country as a failed state. Chapter Three will then provide an assessment of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan and will examine the three pillars of action that provide the basis for engagement: stabilizing Afghanistan, strengthening and promoting governance and reducing poverty. The chapter will also examine the embodiment of Canada’s 3D strategy, the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), located in the troubled Kandahar province.

Chapter Four applies the established framework to the Canadian cases and will answer the main thesis question “What theoretical perspective(s) inform and influence Canadian foreign policy towards failed states as expressed in the declaratory policies of the Martin Government?” While Chapters Two and Three are mainly descriptive in nature, Chapter Four is more conceptual as it assesses both the declaratory policy and the Afghanistan specific policies through the previously established framework.

The concluding Chapter Five will examine some of the broader implications of the findings. This chapter will also address the conceptual and practical challenges encountered while writing this thesis and will highlight some potential areas for further study. The
concluding section will also examine some of the analytical limitations of the framework employed in this work.

The conclusions presented in this work can be divided into three categories: those relating to the conceptual and practical problems of the broader academic and policy debates surrounding failed states, those relating to the Canadian declaratory policy as articulated in the IPS, and finally those relating to the implementation of policies specific to the case of Afghanistan. Across all three categories two interrelated themes emerge. The first relates to the lack of conceptual and definitional clarity surrounding the central concept. In regards to the Canadian cases, the conceptual problems of over-aggregation and the lack of causal analysis into how and why states fail found at the broader level contribute to a sense of confusion as to the nature, direction and objectives of Canadian policy and action towards failed states. The second theme suggests that greater emphasis must be placed on the ideological assumptions that underpin the contemporary linkages between failed states and international terrorism. In the broader debates it is found that these linkages rest on several faulty assumptions. These linkages, however emphasize the Weberian perspective that is found in Canadian policy and action. In both of the Canadian cases the “faultiness” of the linkages raise questions as to the future development and direction of Canadian foreign policy.

Failed states have become an important feature of post 9/11 international relations. Despite the significant increase of academic research into the subject and its inclusion as a basis for policy decision making at the national and international level, failed states remain relatively undefined and their impacts poorly understood. Conceptually vague at the theoretical level and subject to a wide range of often seemingly contradictory responses at the practical level, failed states are an under investigated international phenomenon. This thesis will contribute to a clearer
understanding of the differing ways failed states are conceptualized and what role they play in contemporary Canadian foreign policy.
Chapter 1: Conceptualizing State Failure

The concept of state failure, while relatively new, has changed significantly over time. Since its emergence and early usage in the 1990s, definitions and characterizations of failed states have undergone a series of changes in both theory and practice. To better understand the concept and its usage, the first part of this chapter will briefly outline the evolution of the concept. The chapter will then conduct an in-depth analysis of the differing theoretical perspectives concerning state failure and will examine the impacts these perspectives have on contemporary thinking and practice in relation to failed states.

Origins and Early Practice

The term “failed state” first gained popularity in policy circles and academic discourses in the early 1990s. Its initial usage was in reference to the collapse of governmental authority and the rise of warlordism and anarchy in Somalia in 1991. Endorsed at the international level by prominent figures, such as then United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright (Gros, 1996, 455; Yannis, 2002), the term quickly grew in both usage and scope. In the immediate post-Cold War international system, state failure was broadly conceived as “an extreme disruption of the political order of a country due to protracted domestic conflicts and disintegration of public authorities” (Yannis, 2002, 818). The term was subsequently applied to a variety of other political crises, including the ethnic genocide in Rwanda and the conflict that engulfed the former Yugoslavia. Failed states came to be popularly viewed as a growing phenomenon and a defining feature of the post-Cold War international environment (Helman and Ratner, 1992, 3; Andersen, 2005; Yannis, 2002; Dorff, 1999).
During the 1990s, failed states presented the international community with three inter-related problems (Helman and Ratner, 1992; Andersen, 2005; Yannis, 2002). The primary concern was the domestic political chaos and violence that often accompanied civil war and/or large scale ethnic conflict. Secondly, the international community became concerned with the human rights abuses and the humanitarian emergencies of displacement, death and disease that were frequently associated with violence and conflict. Lastly, failed states were viewed as a potential source of regional instability. States described as failed contributed to regional instability in two ways. In some cases, the governmental capacity of neighboring states was at risk of being overwhelmed by the expansion of conflict across borders or by the sudden influx of refugees fleeing the fighting (Helman and Ratner, 1992, 3). In other cases, the internal weakness and political instability of failed states often made them targets for external interference or violent predation from stronger neighboring states (Kahler, 2002; von Einsiedel, 2005). The expansion of ethnic violence and movement of refugees from Rwanda into Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the mid-1990s could be considered an example of the first case, while the external financial and military support provided by the United States, Iran, Pakistan and others to the different warring factions in Afghanistan demonstrates the latter.

For the above reasons, failed states drew increasing attention from the international community during the 1990s. Considered primarily the domain of humanitarian, development and human rights organizations, failed states were “seen as a humanitarian and/or moral problem to the Western world. The need to ‘do something’ was driven mainly by politics” (Andersen, 2005, 2), rather than strategic interests. State failure was considered to be a function of internal strife or domestic governmental weakness. Failed states were viewed as anomalies in the international system and as distractions from the larger geopolitical issues of the time, most
notably the integrative potential of globalization. However, the impacts resulting from some cases of state failure became too large to ignore and the international community did commit to several high profile humanitarian and military interventions, most significantly in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti.

**Early Research and Theory: 1992-2001**

Despite its increasing usage amongst politicians, the media and academics alike, the concept of failed states remained definitionally vague and subject to a number of theoretical and practical interpretations. Woodward notes “no study can begin without a concept – a word or words that identify the subject to be studied, what part of the real world is included in that subject and what should not be included” (Woodward, 2006, 1). In the years following its initial usage, the label failed state would be applied to a wide variety of political circumstances, and would come to mean different things to different actors. The four international communities of development, humanitarianism, human rights and security would use the label, but in each case it had different meanings, contexts and applications (Woodward, 2006, 3). The definitional and conceptual vagueness is best exemplified by the differing terms used by academics, governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to when referring state failure, including: fragile states (Goldstone, 2000), states at risk of instability (Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2005), difficult partners (OECD, 2001), crisis states (Crisis States Research Centre, 2006) and poor performers (AUSAid, 2002).

Helman and Ratner were among the first academic researchers to use the term failed states and to attempt to provide it with a greater degree of analytical utility (Nguyen, 2005; Andersson, 2005). In their 1992 *Foreign Policy* article “Saving Failed States”, they expressed concern about a disturbing new phenomenon whereby a number of states were becoming utterly
incapable of sustaining themselves as members of the international community (Helman and Ratner, 1992, 3). From this conceptual starting point, the early academic research into failed states produced a wide range of definitions, related terms and typologies (Helman and Ratner, 1992; Gros, 1996). The most significant of these shall be outlined in the following section.

Ted Gurr (1998) and his work with the State Failure Task Force provided a definition that associated state failure primarily with the occurrence of civil war and/or violent internal conflict. The State Failure Task Force was funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Intelligence and was created “in a response to a request from senior US policy makers to identify factors associated with serious internal political crises” (Gurr, 1998, iii). The Task Force’s definition equates state failure with extreme crises of governance (Gurr, 1998). In its data-driven analysis, the Task Force identifies four types of state failure events: 1. revolutionary wars; 2. ethnic wars; 3. adverse regime changes; and 4. genocides and politicides (Gurr, 1998, 1). In defining state failure by the occurrence of any of these four conditions and measuring state failure at the domestic level as the maintenance of authority and political order, the project yielded a “single best model” for predicting state failure with three variables: openness to international trade; infant mortality; and democracy (von Einsiedel, 2005, 23). The Task Force concluded that on average 20 percent of the world’s states have failed, by its definition, with a peak of 30 percent in the early 1990s (Gurr, 1998).

Hans-Joachim Spanger, however, critiqued the Gurr definition of state failure as lacking in conceptual clarity. Spanger (2000) suggests that the project does not address the issue of state failure as distinct from violent political crises and that the two “do not necessarily go hand in

---

1 “In genocides the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal (ethnolinguistic, religious) characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups.” (Political Instability Task Force, Problem Set Codebook (2001). Available at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfcode.htm#41.
hand, neither empirically nor conceptually" (Spanger, 2000, 1). Peter Wallensteen and Sebastian von Einsiedel are also critical of the Task Force's association of state failure with civil war or internal violence. Wallensteen notes that "state failure can take place without civil war and civil war can take place without state failure" (Wallensteen, 2000, 1). Von Einsiedel describes Albania in 1997 as an example of the former and Colombia as an example of the latter (von Einsiedel, 2005, 15). Though von Einsiedel does see a relationship between state failure and civil war, he argues that state failure "should be treated as a permissive or structural cause of violent conflict, rather than as a consequence or the equivalent of conflict" (von Einsiedel, 2005, 16).

I. William Zartman, in his 1995 book *Collapsed States: the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, offered a definition of state failure that focused specifically on state collapse. In one of the most widely cited definitions based on the social contract conception of the state (von Einsiedel, 2005, 15), state collapse, for Zartman, means "that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed" (Zartman, 1995, 5). In contrast to the Gurr definition, state collapse represents "a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup or riot. It refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new" (Zartman, 1995, 5). For Zartman, a state is defined in terms of three functions: "the state as the sovereign authority—the accepted source of identity and the arena of politics; the state as an institution—and therefore a tangible organization of decision-making and as an intangible symbol of identity; and the state as the security guarantor for a populated territory" (Zartman, 1995, 5). Zartman therefore identifies a collapsed state as one "that maintains few or no functioning state institutions, has lost its power to confer identity, can no longer assure security and has lost its legitimacy" (von Einsiedel, 2005, 15; Zartman, 1995, 5). Despite its wide usage, this definition is critiqued by some as being
"unclear whether state collapse is to be conceived of as a process or rather its result" (Spanger, 2000, 3).

Like Zartman, Peter Wallensteen decouples state failure from civil war or violent conflict. Wallensteen presents a conceptually narrower and more specific definition of state failure by including the opposing ends of the spectrum of state behaviour. Wallensteen identifies the two distinct cases of state behaviour as the under-consolidated state and the over-extended/over-intrusive state (Wallensteen, 1998). In the first case, the state is not effective enough and is incapable of delivering services to all or part of the country or population, thereby failing to uphold its end of the social contract. In the case of the over-extended or over-intrusive state, “the state becomes a threat to the inhabitants it is supposed to protect” (Wallensteen, 1998, 1) Wallensteen argued that both of these extremes can be labeled as state failures as in each case “the state [is] failing to accomplish the services the inhabitants have the right to expect”. (Wallensteen, 1998, 1) In contrast to Zartman’s focus on state collapse, Wallensteen further stresses that state failure is a long term processes of deterioration whose indicators can be seen long in advance of a full state collapse. Wallensteen’s conceptions of degrees of state failure and its nature as a long term process rather than an outcome or result have become important points of consensus in the contemporary theorizing and research on failed states.

Jean-Germain Gros (1996) further advances the idea of differing degrees and types of state failure by establishing a taxonomy of failed states. Gros identifies five types of failed states and places them on a continuum. At one end of the spectrum lies the anarchic or collapsed state. In this type of failed state there is a complete vacuum of political authority. The state may have “internationally recognized borders but no centralized authority” (Gros, 1996, 457). In most collapsed states, the state is non-functioning as sub-state actors take control over regions or sub-
regions of the country. These types of failed states are frequently characterized by high levels of internal violence. Closely related to the collapsed state and next on the continuum is the phantom state. The phantom state "exhibits its efficacy in certain limited areas e.g. the protection of the presidential despot and his cronies, but in all others it is utterly invisible" (Gros, 1996, 459). In many cases, this limited political authority is used only to protect elites and is often used as a means to oppress the wider population.

The third characterization of the failed state is the anemic state. Anemic states are created in two ways. In the first case, state capacity and strength are sapped to the point of failure by insurgency groups who desire to replace the existing power structure. Secondly, a state may become anemic "because the engines of modernity were never put in place; as a result, as population growth puts increasing demands on archaic structures, state agents are in no position to assert effective control"(Gros, 1996, 460). The anemic state differs from the phantom state in that the state does attempt to provide positive political goods to citizens, however weak this effort may be, whereas in phantom states no effort is made all.

The fourth type of failed state is the captured state. These states "typically have a strong centralized authority but one that is captured by members of insecure elites to frustrate and in the extreme eradicate rival elites" (Gros, 1996, 460). The captured state fails not due to a lack of centralized authority, but rather, because the centralized authority fails to recognize or represent the population. "Here politics is unabashedly a zero-sum activity; direct control of the state is sought not only to advance the corporate interests of the dominant faction of the elite, but to undermine the capacity of rival factions to protect theirs"(Gros, 1996, 460).

The final type of failed state is the in vitro state. This type of state is usually associated with some of the former Soviet republics and members of the Eastern bloc. This type of failure
occurs before the process of state consolidation is begun. These states never “achieved control over the legitimate means of violence since they have had to fight counter insurgency groups, created and sustained by outside powers from the start of their independent existence” (Gros, 1996, 461). The communal violence that erupted in Bosnia and the civil war that occurred in post-Soviet Georgia serve as examples of the in vitro type of state failure.

Much of the early research conducted on failed states is critiqued on the basis of having two main shortcomings (Dorff, 2005; Spanger, 2000). Firstly, the early work focused too narrowly on the extreme case of state failure, the total collapse of the state. As research advanced, state failure was increasingly conceived not as an outcome but as a process by which the state lost some or all of its capacity to govern. As a result, it became “less important to focus on cases of complete failure and collapse than on the continuum that state failure proceeds” (Dorff, 2005, 22). Secondly, the early literature is critiqued for focusing too broadly on cases involving civil war or internal conflict. Zartman (1995) is an example of the former problem, and Gurr (1998) the latter (Dorff, 2005, 22).

Dorff (2005) argues that while the early research on failed states did help to “clarify some of the conceptual and related policy problems encountered in the early post-Cold War Era” (Dorff, 2005, 24), it did not completely grasp the nature and the extent of the problems and threat posed by failed states. The early research and policy-making decisions of the time failed to comprehend fully the contours of a new strategic environment that began to emerge after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and were characterized by an inability to anticipate and react to incidences of state failure. While failed states did pose problems to the international community, “strategic analysis and security policy remained dominated by searches for new ‘peer threats’ and balances of power, and the search for security was still framed largely in terms of traditional
state behavior” (Dorff, 2005, 25). The 1996 Khobar Tower bombings in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole and the 9/11 terrorist attacks would all serve as important points in the transformation of the global security environment. The 1998 embassy bombings would result in US air strikes against terror targets in Sudan and Afghanistan and evidence suggests the USS Cole bombing was carried out by Al-Qaeda operatives with support from Sudanese government officials. Identifying the linkages between non-state actors, in this case, Al-Qaeda, and governments in failed states suggests the reconceptualization of failed states and their realignment with security policy.

Contemporary Debates

The Al-Qaeda attacks in New York, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001 radically altered the position of failed states on the international agenda. Failed states gained a new international security dimension. Increasingly identified as havens for terrorist and transnational criminal networks, failed states became associated “with the emergence, within a disintegrated state, of non-state actors who are hostile to the fundamental values and interests of the international society such as peace, stability, rule of law, freedom and democracy” (Yannis, 2002, 818). Now linked to international peace and security, failed states have made a remarkable transition from existing on the periphery of global politics to becoming a central focus of national and international security policy. Engagement in pre-9/11 failed states had been primarily limited to the efforts of human rights groups and humanitarian organizations. In the post-9/11 security environment “disengagement disappeared as an option for Western nations and the US, in particular, came to equate their own national security with stability and order in the world’s poorest and poorly governed regions” (Carment, Prest and Gazo, 2005, 1). This recognition of failed states as urgent global security threats became evident in the policy
decisions made by an increasing number of national governments and international organizations. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union all identified failed states as the among the greatest contemporary threat to international peace and security (Woodward, 2006; Dorff, 2005; Carment, 2005). The issue has also been addressed at the international level, including in the UN 2004 High Level Panel Report, in the 2004 report of the General-Secretary “In Larger Freedom Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, and at the 2004 World Leaders summit in New York.

As research on and knowledge of failed states advanced in the post-9/11 security environment, the academic debates took two conceptual shifts. Firstly, the focus of the research shifted importantly from state collapse to state weakness. “Increasingly one saw references to the growing incapacity of states to govern effectively as the key characteristic deserving attention” (Dorff, 2005, 23; Rotberg, 2003; Kasfir, 2004; Chesterman et al., 2005). State failure was increasingly viewed as “a non-linear process of relative decay” (Carment, 2003, 409; von Einsiedel, 2005). Rather than a singular outcome, state failure became conceptualized as a “continuum of circumstances” (von Einsiedel, 2005, 16) that affects weak states. This continuum ranges from the inability of a state to provide positive political goods to its citizens to the complete collapse of governmental authority and political order. Secondly, a growing “body of literature identifies state failure as a national security threat rather than simply a humanitarian issue” (von Einsiedel, 2005, 13; Dorff, 1999; Ignatieff, 2002). Where earlier conceptions of failed states had limited their impacts to civil war, humanitarian disasters and regional instability, contemporary conceptions stress the growing global implications of failed states, particularly in terms of international peace and security. As Dorff argues “especially important in this regard [is] the focus on the absence of effective governance and the ability of non-state actors to exploit
that absence for their own purposes” (Dorff, 2005, 23). While a wide range of positions still exists within the failed state literature, these two conceptual shifts do provide areas of general consensus within the debates and were instrumental in identifying the contemporary challenges posed in the conceptualizing of failed states.

Establishing the Framework for Analysis

Despite the continuing research into state failure and failed states the contemporary literature remains characterized by a wide range of differing conceptions and practical implications. To understand the scope of the positions and arguments surrounding failed states, I have chosen to survey the literature through a modified version of a framework presented by Susan L. Woodward at the 2005 Workshop on State Failure: Reframing the International Economic and Political Agenda (2005). Woodward’s framework as a means of analysis is useful for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a method of categorization that highlights the relevant themes, main research questions and points of consensus and contention across the wide spectrum of differing positions within the state failure discourse. Secondly, the framework provides a useful and organized means through which to analyze Canadian policy towards failed states - a task that will be undertaken in the second section of this thesis.

The framework will be applied in the following manner. Firstly, the contemporary state failure literature will be examined using three theoretical perspectives. These are identified in this thesis as the functional, Weberian and critical perspectives. These three perspectives will then be used to explore four main conceptual themes that Woodward contends characterize the failed state literature. While I have taken the liberty of renaming and reordering these categories, the content of each remains the same as Woodward’s original framework.
These themes are:

1. **Conception of the State**: The concept of state failure implies failing against some standard of stateness. Any analysis of failed states must begin with an examination of the competing models of the state found throughout the discourse. Models of the state become important to conceptualizing failed states, as the competing visions of the roles and functions of modern states establish different criteria as to what “failed” means. The conception of the state used in the analysis of state failure has an important effect on the other three dimensions as it relates to specific definitions, causes and policy responses.

2. **Defining State Failure**: Closely related to the previous category, the second theme found in the literature involves the definition of what constitutes a failed state and the competing notions of identifying these states.

3. **Causes of State Failure**: The third theme that characterizes the failed state literature concerns the perceived and potential causes of state failure.

4. **Policy Responses**: The academic literature offers differing policy mechanisms and responses to the issues and consequences of failed states. Given that the literature on state failure has produced no unified model of what constitutes a failed state, it should come as no surprise that the three theoretical perspectives suggest a number of different policy prescriptions in regards to the most effective way to address failed states. Andersen (2005) has conveniently classified these policy prescriptions into four categories: peacebuilding, liberal imperialism, Realist, and critical. Each is each coloured by and can be related to theoretical conceptions of the state, definitions of failed states, and their causes and consequences, and each produces a different set of policy recommendations for engagement in failed states.
Woodward's original framework contains a fifth category that identifies regional variation as a major theme of the literature. The research in this category has focused on the differences between state failure in Africa and Latin America. For example, much of the African scholarship is empirical research on alternative forms of political community to the state. In contrast, Latin American scholars tend to emphasize human security rather than state security, usually in terms of criminal violence within functioning states (Woodward, 2005, 4). The research at this point has also been limited to Africa and Latin America. Little attention has been paid to other regions including, most significantly, the Middle East (Woodward, 2005). While regional variations are an important avenue of research within the broader context of conceptualizing failed states, regional analysis is beyond the scope of this project.

Theoretical Perspectives: Mainstream versus Critical

At its most basic level, the failed state literature can be divided into two main theoretical categories: mainstream and critical perspectives. It should be noted that within each of these two broad groupings differing and often competing positions exist and no one unified theory or model has emerged. However, this thesis contends a division can made based on the fundamental assumptions that underlie each category.

Two dominant variants characterize the mainstream category: the functional perspective and the Weberian perspective. Though they use different conceptual starting points for the analysis of state failure, as will be described later in this section, both views are underpinned by certain fundamental assumptions.

The central common assumption that characterizes the mainstream perspectives and that fundamentally distinguishes them from the critical approaches is the use of a Western influenced conception of statehood as the basis for analysis and the standard of measurement (Eriksen,
The use of this Western conception has two important implications for contemporary mainstream thinking on state failure.

Firstly, this assumption implies that the theories of Western states and statehood are relevant to the analysis and understanding of all states, including non-western states. As a result, mainstream scholars contend that the same conception of statehood can and should be used in all cases (Eriksen, 2006). Secondly, in using the Western experience of state building and state formation, mainstream approaches consider the establishment of a modern liberal state as the natural endpoint of the development of the state, which in turn provides the defining characteristics of what constitutes a successful state (Eriksen, 2006; Andersen, 2005).

Mainstream scholars provide three important justifications as to why these Western conceptions of statehood are relevant and useful in understanding contemporary state failure. Firstly, Western models of statehood provide the basis of all contemporary states. The formal institutions of the state, including parliaments, courts and bureaucracies, and the development of the principles of statehood, commonly identified as popular representation, separation of powers and sovereignty, are all of Western origin. Since all people in the world live in a state, at least in the formal sense, mainstream scholars regard the state as the universal form of political organization (Eriksen, 2006). Secondly, all states, western and non-western alike, are component parts of a larger global system of states in which the modern state is the universally recognized fundamental political unit. Sovereignty is assigned to all states, regardless of whether a state possesses them or not. Lastly, “at the level of social scientific analysis, one has no choice but to use the language of that science and this language happens to be western in origin” (Eriksen, 2006, 8). The state discourse has been developed around western models of statehood. While there are variations within this basic conception, there is an overarching belief amongst
mainstream thinkers that a general model of statehood must be based on the concepts developed within the social scientific discourse (Eriksen, 2006).

The critical theory approaches to state failure are also characterized by a range of perspectives. These approaches can be distinguished from the mainstream perspectives by an underlying assumption that fundamentally rejects the universal notion of statehood that dominates the mainstream perspectives. Critical authors view the state not as “the natural, default organizational structure of human community” but rather as “a distinct and particular institution with a number of historical and contemporary competitors” (Anderson, 2004, 1). Central to this position is the belief that mainstream perceptions of failed states “all employ the same Western-biased, state-centric approach and build on the same simplistic notion, that if some states do not ‘work’, it is because they have failed to adopt the formula that has worked elsewhere” (Andersen, 2005, 30). Critical perspectives also reject the mainstream belief that multiparty democracy and open economies, the hallmarks of liberal governance, are the potential endpoints of state development. This rejection is centered on the belief that reliance on neoliberal ideal forms of statehood limits the emergence of genuine alternatives to mainstream conceptions of statehood and governance.

Analysis through the Framework

The purpose of this section is to identify, describe and explain the dominant theoretical perspectives within the literature and to compare and contrast them across the previously established framework. The framework is applied in the following manner. Each of the aforementioned perspectives (functional, Weberian and critical), will be surveyed across all four dimensions of the framework. The mainstream approaches, represented by the functional and
Weberian perspectives, respectively, will be examined first, to be followed by an analysis of the critical approach.

**The Mainstream Approaches: Functional and Weberian**

The functional and Weberian perspectives may be distinguished from each other based on how their proponents understand and conceptualize the roles and functions of the modern state. The conceptions of the state in turn provide the benchmarks or standard of “stateness” against which state failure is identified and measured. The functional perspective generally conforms to neoliberal ideals, while the Weberian perspective utilizes a more realist approach.

**The Functional Perspective**

**Functional Perspective: Conception of the State**

The functional perspective, represented by the writings of authors such as Zartman (2005), Rotberg (2002; 2003; 2004) and Milliken and Krause (2002), finds its theoretical roots in the social contract tradition developed by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. This position suggests that “the authority of the state rests upon an agreement among the members of a society to acknowledge the authority of a set of rules or a political regime...implying not only the submission of all members of a society to the state but also a responsibility by the state to deliver services” (von Einsiedel, 2005, 15). The state is therefore primarily viewed as a service provider and statehood is defined in terms of the functions performed by the state.

The literature details a variety of services that states may provide. Zartman identifies the four core functions that the state should perform as: rule-making, rule enforcement, security and representation (Zartman, 2005, 274). Similarly, Milliken and Krause (2002) identify security, representation and welfare. Rotberg provides a more detailed list of state functions. He contends that “nation-states exist to deliver political goods – security, education, health services, economic
opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities – to their citizens” (Rotberg, 2002, 87). For Rotberg these services are presented in a hierarchy. The provision of security is the most important and fundamental of all services a state can supply its citizens, as it is a precondition for the provision of all other services.

Functional Perspective: Defining State Failure

Conceptualizing the state in terms of the functions it performs has important implications for defining state failure. It establishes the benchmarks against which states are measured and further delineates the way in which a given state is judged to have failed. While variations in defining state failure have emerged within the functional literature, two common themes are evident. Firstly, the failure of a state is directly related to its ability to perform the previously describe functions. Secondly, state failure is seen as a process rather than a singular event.

Robert I. Rotberg provides the most widely cited functional definition of what constitutes a failed state (Carment, 2003; Andersson, 2005; Milliken and Krause, 2002; von Einsiedel, 2005). Rotberg defines a failed state as “a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world” (Rotberg, 2003, 2). Milliken and Krause define failed states in a similar way, contending that “in the most straight forward sense, failure to perform these functions is a failure of the state” (Milliken and Krause, 2002, 756).

Zartman and Rotberg both contend that state failure should be seen as a process along a continuum rather than a singular event. Zartman uses the functional conception of the state to differentiate between incidences of state failure and state collapse, arguing that a state can fail across one or more dimensions without fully collapsing. However, as these failures accumulate, “the state weakens in its ability to perform its functions in other areas until, in the end structure,
authority (legitimate power, law and political order) have fallen apart and must be reconstituted” (Zartman, 2005, 274).

Rotberg also uses the functional conception of the state to generate a continuum or process of state failure. Rotberg suggests “states succeed or fail across all or some of these dimensions. But it is according to their performance, according to the levels of their effective delivery of the most crucial political goods, that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones and weak states from failed or collapsed” (Rotberg, 2003, 2). The end result of Rotberg’s analysis is a typology which describes state failure in terms of a declining scale, where strong states become weak or failing states; failing states become failed states and finally in the most extreme case, failed states fully collapse (Rotberg, 2003; Carment 2003; Andersson, 2005). Rotberg contend his typology provides a “clear criteria for distinguishing collapse and failure from generic weakness or apparent distress and collapse from failure” (Rotberg, 2005, 1). The idea that state failure occurs as a process or along a continuum has proven to be influential amongst scholars that support the functional perspective (Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur, 2005; Milliken and Krause, 2002; Dorff, 2005).

In Rotberg’s typology strong states are described as having unquestionable control over their territories and the capacities to deliver a full range of high quality political goods to their citizens. Strong states offer a high level of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity (Rotberg, 2004, 4).

Weak states include a wide range of states that are inherently weak because of geographical, physical or fundamental economic constraints or are temporarily weak due to internal crisis (Rotberg, 2004, 4; Andersson, 2005, 9). They are usually contested by
intercommunal, ethnic, or linguistic tensions that have not yet turned violent. The defining feature of a weak state is its diminished or diminishing capacity to provide adequate measures of political goods. Examples of this diminishing capacity include the rise of internal violence either directed at or perpetuated by the state, deterioration of physical infrastructure networks, and neglect of health and education services, declining GDP and other economic indicators, and increased levels of governmental corruption.

The next step on Rotberg's continuum of failure is the failed state. These states are described as "tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and contested by bitterly warring factions" (Rotberg, 2003, 5). Able to provide only limited quantities of essential political goods, the governments of failed states increasingly forfeit their role as the preferred suppliers of political goods to non-state actors. Often governmental forces are unable to exert authority throughout the territory, sometimes controlling only the capital city. Contemporary examples of failed states include Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire.

The collapsed state is the rare and extreme version of a failed state. A collapsed state is characterized by the complete absence of authority or governing power, resulting in political anarchy. Rotberg describes these states as "mere geographic expressions, black holes into which failed polities have fallen" (Rotberg, 2003, 4). Security is often provided through warlords or clan based units and is equated with the rule of the strong, while political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means. Somalia is consistently recognized as the only collapsed state in the international system.

The definitions of state failure and measurements of failed states based on the functional perspectives have dominated the failed state discourse. However, opponents of the approach, have critiqued it on a number of grounds, particularly those who support the Weberian
perspective. Firstly, they argue that the functional approach lacks analytical utility (Eriksen, 2006), that using a functional conception of the state provides an imprecise and excessively broad definition of failure. Most, if not all, states could be classified as failed as no modern state can fulfill all the functions assigned to it (Eriksen, 2006).

A second critique focuses on the normative implications of the functional definition of statehood. "By tying the definition of statehood directly to the provision of services to citizens, all states that do not conform to this liberal ideal are by definition failed states. In effect, this excludes the possibility of non-liberal statehood. Weberian critics further contend that the functional approach obscures the fact that the creation of the modern state system and the origins of state-building had little to do with the provision of services (Eriksen 2006; Ottaway, Herbst and Mills 2004). "The provision of services other than security through internal pacification...was established much later, after the consolidation of statehood in the sense of a monopoly of violence, territorial control and mutual recognition" (Eriksen, 2006, 4).

Functional Perspective: Causes of State Failure

The functional conception of the state and defining state failure in terms of the state's inability to perform the functions assigned to it links state failure almost entirely to the internal political, economic and social characteristics of a state (Rotberg, 2004; Kasfir, 2004). States are most likely to fail for two main reasons. In the first case, state failure is associated with a lack of democratic structure or weak or flawed internal institutions. In most failed states, only the executive arm of the government functions or exists and most cases are characterized by a noticeable lack of democratic debate. Legislative bodies, a functioning bureaucracy, and an independent judiciary are rare and if present usually exist to serve or further entrench the position of the ruling elites. (Rotberg, 2002, 87)
In the second case, a state is recognized as more likely to fail if it has a closed economy where levels of international trade are low or nonexistent. From this analysis, the economic integration that has characterized globalization does not cause state failure. Rather, a state’s inability or unwillingness to become fully integrated into the globalized market economy becomes a significant causal factor of state failure. Van de Walle (2004) contends that internal economic structural factors, such as limited extractive capacity, agrarian economies and “poor” macroeconomic policies, predispose a state towards failure or collapse (van de Walle, 2004). Prior to failure, most failed states exhibit low economic growth rates. This trend has become so prevalent that declining real national and per capita levels of gross domestic product (GDP) are often used by mainstream researchers as potential indicators of state failure.

While emphasizing the domestic sphere, mainstream authors do recognize external factors like violent predation by neighboring states, large scale environmental disasters, or sudden changes in major commodity prices, as contributing factors or catalysts to state failure (van de Walle, 2004; Kasfir, 2004).

Rotberg (2002) provides the narrowest conception of causes of state failure by declaring that “state failure is man-made, not merely accidental nor—fundamentally—caused geographically, environmentally, or externally” (Rotberg, 2002, 93). For Rotberg, state failure is primarily linked to destructive decision making by elites and individuals. The evidence for this position seems strong. In a large number of cases, state failure has been preceded by erratic and harmful decisions made by national leaders. The majority of countries listed as contemporary failed states on Foreign Policy’s Failed State Index 2006 have suffered at the hands of a ruling elite. Sudan ranks number one on the Index “because of the violent internal conflicts in the western Darfur region” (Global Policy Forum, 2006). It is commonly argued that this conflict is
sustained by the government’s continued support of the “Janjaweed” militias. The second country on the list, the Democratic People’s Republic of Congo (DRC), has suffered decades of civil war which can be directly linked to President Mobutu Sese Seko’s kleptomaniac rule where “much of the resource wealth of that country ended up in Mobutu’s or his cronies’ pockets” (Rotberg, 2002, 94). A similar condition exists in Sierra Leone and Liberia, both of which have yet to recover from the greed and self-enriching policies of their respective former rulers. The actions of President Mohammed Siad Barre in Somalia and President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe have also reduced their states’ societies to groups of warring factions that have driven their respective states to failure.

**Functional Perspectives: Policy Responses**

The functional perspective has generated two different policy responses: peacebuilding and liberal imperialism. These shall be discussed in turn below.

**Peacebuilding**

Peacebuilding is the most frequently used model of state reconstruction employed by international community (Ottaway 2003; Andersen, 2005). It should be noted that other terms used to describe this approach include “nation-building” and “state-building”. The term peacebuilding is used here because it covers a broader agenda beyond security and governmental capacity to include a wider societal and more civilian approach. It has been “enshrined in UN documents (starting with the landmark ‘Agenda for Peace’ from 1992) and policy papers and guidelines from leading donors and multilateral organizations, including the OECD, the World Bank and various UN agencies” (Andersen, 2005, 12; Barnett et al. 2007).

Frequently referred to as the “standard post-war package”, this approach was developed in the 1990s and bases its operational principles on lessons learned and best practices developed.
from earlier interventions. While a number of different opinions exist in regards to the operationalization of this approach, within the peacebuilding category there is general agreement around the framework and the normative values that underlie it.

Andersen (2005) contends that the peacebuilding approach is based on five interrelated assumptions.

1. Peacebuilding is a multidimensional enterprise which includes political, social, economic, security and legal dimensions. It also involves responses at the local, national, and international level.
2. Security is key. Establishing security is a pre-requisite for post-conflict peacebuilding.
3. Ownership. The people of a war-torn society must ‘own’ the reconstruction process. They must be involved in setting the agenda and leading the process. Building local capacity is vital for sustainability.
4. Time matters. Quick-impact interventions are critical for peacebuilding outcomes, yet reconstruction itself is a long-term process.
5. Coordination. External and internal private and public actors need to work within a coherent strategy, establish priorities and mobilize the necessary resources. (Andersen, 2005, 15)

This ‘top to bottom’ response to state failure typically revolves around institutional development and capacity building with an aim to strengthen the central government.

Ottaway (2003) notes that this approach has three main dimensions: security, political, and economic. At the top of the peacebuilding hierarchy of initiatives is the establishment of security. “Without peace nothing can be achieved. Without fundamental law and order, resuscitation and nation building are chimera” (Rotberg, 2004, 33). The primary goals of the peacebuilding approach in this area include ending the violence, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and security sector reform (SSR). While it initially only included the creation of a new national army, the concept of security sector reform has been expanded in recent years to include transformation and/or creation of police forces; intelligence
services; customs enforcement bodies; civil oversight bodies such as the ministries of defence and justice; and the judicial and correction system (Ottaway, 2003).

Once order and security have been achieved, the peacebuilding approach further advocates a package of political reform initiatives aimed at the creation of new democratic institutions. This process frequently begins with constitution making and the development of new election laws and infrastructure. The political package includes the retraining of bureaucrats, parliamentarians and teachers; funding for civil society; and further state institution building (Andersen, 2005; Rotberg, 2004). The creation of a functioning and independent judiciary and court system is considered integral in establishing and entrenching the rule of law and is often given high political priority (Rotberg, 2004).

In the economic realm, the peacebuilding approach initially advocates “relief measures to assist the war affected population, internally displaced persons and returning refugees” (Ottaway, 2003, 251). During the reconstruction phase, the primary economic imperatives include establishing and maintaining fiscal and macroeconomic stability, controlling the money supply, paying civil servants and police officers and creating new employment (Rotberg, 2004; Snodgrass, 2004). The end point of this institutional and economic reform package advocated by the peacebuilding approach is the holding of democratic multiparty elections and the emergence of a market oriented economy.

While often presented in technical terms, in that the approach can be applied to any state regardless of circumstances, peacebuilding is not ideologically neutral and can be linked to the functional perspective in that both actively advocate the neoliberal ideals of liberal democracy and market economy. At its core, the peacebuilding approach is based on the implicit assumption
that political and economic liberalization are the most effective means of achieving a lasting peace and preventing countries from relapsing into violent conflict.

Though the peacekeeping approach is the most frequently employed policy response towards state failure it is subject to a number of critiques. Firstly, questions arise regarding the effectiveness of the approach. Nearly 50 percent of all countries receiving this type of assistance relapse back into conflict within five years (Barnett et al, 2007) and “of the 18 single countries that experienced a UN peacekeeping mission with a political institution-building component between 1988 and 2002, 13 (72 percent) were classified as some form of authoritarian regimes in 2002” (Call and Cook, 2003, 2).

Critics also challenge the underlying assumption that political and economic liberalization will lead to a sustainable peace. They argue that the promotion of this liberal vision can in fact lead to more conflict within a society. Brett suggests that the liberal agenda “demands such radical changes in institutions, culture and knowledge systems, and therefore all of the factors that sustain the social order” (Brett, 2002, 2) that the reoccurrence of state failure should hardly be surprising. There is also evidence that states in democratic transition are highly susceptible to the outbreak of violent conflict (von Einsiedel, 2005, 27). The holding of democratic elections does not guarantee an end to state failure. Iraq and Afghanistan serve as contemporary examples. Both states have had democratic elections while civil violence and insurgency continue on seemingly unabated, despite the presence of foreign militaries in their territory.

The peacebuilding approach to addressing failed states is subject to a number of criticisms and contains some inherent contradictions. Regardless, it is an important policy mechanism for the international community. Not only does it stand as the most fully developed
of all the responses, peacebuilding also enjoys a high degree of institutionalization. "An impressive number of organizations contribute to the cause of ending and preventing deadly conflict and use the concept to frame and organize their post-conflict activities" (Barnett et al, 2007, 35). UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's announcement at the 2005 World Summit of the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission will serve to further entrench peacebuilding as the international community's primary policy response in addressing state failure.

Liberal Imperialism

The second functional prescription to addressing state failure, liberal imperialism, is represented by arguments made by Krasner (2004), Mallaby (2002), Chesterman (2004) and Cooper (2002). While liberal imperialism "is not as fully developed, coherent and operational an approach as peacebuilding" (Andersen, 2005, 21), the approach shares the same liberal values of democracy, market economy and human rights as the peacebuilding approach. The main difference between the two approaches comes in the form of who should control the reconstruction process. While local ownership, governmental assistance and transitional administration are integral elements of peacebuilding, liberal imperialism suggests that these policy options are inadequate and unsuitable to deal with problems confronting and caused by state failure. It is argued that "left to their own devices, collapsed and badly governed states will not fix themselves because they have limited administrative capacity, not least with regard to maintaining internal security" (Krasner, 2004, 86). Rather, the approach contends that "executive authority must rest primarily in the hands of external actors, if a failed state is to be successfully turned around" (Andersen, 2005, 22). At its core, the liberal imperialism approach advocates for longer and stronger international engagement in failed states, with a set of institutional
arrangements to confer both legitimacy and efficiency to actions undertaken by the international community in failed states.

Within the literature two alternative policy options to conventional sovereignty have emerged and have tended to dominate this debate. The first of these is the revival of the idea of United Nations Trusteeships (Helman and Ratner, 1993; Krasner 2004), and the second is the idea of shared sovereignty (Krasner, 2004; Chesterman, 2004).

The revival of UN trusteeships has gained ground in recent years at the international level, most notably in the 2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report *The Responsibility to Protect*. In addressing the necessary conditions for coercive or military action against a sovereign state for the purpose of protecting people, the report challenges conventional notions of sovereignty in two ways. Firstly, the report conceives sovereignty as responsibility or the "idea that the obligation to protect civilians is inherent in state sovereignty." (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006a) Secondly, the report charges the responsibility to protect to the international community. "Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." (ICISS, 2001, xi)

Despite widespread support for the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, developing this particular alternative to conventional sovereignty, which allows for the withdrawal of international sovereignty and for external actors to control aspects of domestic sovereignty, will be difficult. Firstly, the reestablishment of the UN Trusteeship Council would require an amendment to the UN Charter. Under Article 78, the Charter recognizes that "The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations,"
relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality”
(www.un.org). Such an amendment is deemed to be unlikely for two reasons. Krasner argues
“the major powers, those with the capacity to create a trusteeship, want to be able to pick and
choose not only where they intervene but also the policies they would follow... For states in the
third world, any successor to the mandate system of the League of Nations, or the trusteeship
system of the UN, would smell if not look too much like colonialism” (Krasner, 2004, 107).

The concept of shared sovereignty offers a slightly different set of policy options than
does the idea of trusteeships. Krasner and Pascual characterize shared-sovereignty agreements as
“a voluntary agreement between recognized national political authorities and an external actor
such as another state or a regional or international organization” (Krasner and Pascual, 2005, 70).
Often conceived as a “partnership” arrangement, it is argued shared sovereignty has an
advantage over trusteeship in that it upholds the target state’s international sovereignty by
allowing it to legitimize the agreement, even though the principle of domestic sovereignty would
be fundamentally violated. It is suggested that shared-sovereignty arrangements could be
particularly useful in the reconstruction of failed states. In particular, the open ended nature of
shared sovereignty arrangements may limit the role of potential spoilers to the reconstruction
process. Rather than simply waiting for foreigners to leave, local actors wanting to maximize
their interest may “see cooperation as more likely to enhance their long-term prospects”
(Krasner, 2004, 115).

The liberal imperialism approaches are critiqued on two primary grounds. Firstly, critics
argue that the responses reflect “traditional Western Realpolitik under the influence of a new
balance of power; not a moral shift in their foreign policy towards ensuring the quality of life and
equity for all human beings” (Andersen, 2005, 24). Despite the liberal imperialist attempts for
legitimacy through new institutional arrangements and redefinitions of sovereignty, for many
developing states these approaches too closely resemble the instruments of colonialism and are
viewed with suspicion. Secondly, critics, particularly those of the Weberian persuasion, contend
that the liberal imperialism approaches fundamentally jeopardize stability and international
order by violating the norms of sovereignty that provide the basis for modern international
relations.

Proponents of the liberal imperialism approaches suggest that not only are there historical
precedents for such arrangements but trusteeships and shared sovereignty “would offer political
leaders a better chance of bringing peace and prosperity to the populations of badly governed
states and reduce the threat that such polities present to the wider international community”
(Krasner, 2004, 120). The liberal imperialists do not contend that the approaches outlined above
are useful in all cases of state failure; rather, they argue the above approaches constitute
important alternative policy mechanisms in the international community’s toolkit for addressing
failed states.

As seen above, the functional perspective produces a range of policy responses to the
problems associated with failed states, from the internationally accepted and entrenched tenets of
the peace-building approach to the less developed liberal imperialism ideas of trusteeship and
shared sovereignty. Despite their operational differences, these policy responses share certain
commonalities. The functional policy responses are all premised on the functional conception of
the state that views the state as a service provider and as a result define statehood in terms of the
functions the state performs. Further, in contrast to the policy responses produced by the
Weberian perspective, which shall be discussed in the next section, the functional policy
responses promotes a wider understanding of the concept of sovereignty, particularly in relation to the principle of non-interference.

The Weberian Perspective

Weberian Perspective: Conception of the State

The second mainstream approach critiques the liberal values and ideals of the functional perspective and uses a more Realist and concrete conception of the state that finds its theoretical roots in the work of Max Weber. Through the lens of Weber’s influential definition, the state is conceptualized as “as an impersonal authority controlled by legislation, which controls a territory and possess a monopolistic right to use means of coercion against citizens” (Larsson, 2004, 9).

Defining the state as an institution with a monopoly of the means of violence in a given territory has several important implications that differentiate the Weberian position from the functional perspective. Unlike the functional perspective which locates state failure almost entirely within the domestic conditions of a given state, the Weberian perspective places a greater emphasis on the place of the state within international relations and on the institution of sovereignty. As mentioned earlier, Weberian proponents argue that the functional perspective obscures the fact that the emergence of the modern state had little to do with its functional roles. As a result, the Weberian conception of the state produces a different list of potential causes of state failure.

Weberian Perspective: Defining State Failure

Using the Weberian conception of the state as a basis for analysis produces a much narrower and arguably more analytically and practically useful definition of state failure (Eriksen, 2006; The African Studies Center, 2003; Ottaway and Mair, 2004). State failure from
the Weberian perspective “does not refer simply to a state’s inability to perform the functions assigned to it. Instead… it concerns a specific type of failure namely the failure [of the state] to pacify its society and monopolize the use of violence” (Eriksen, 2006, 4).

The African Studies Centre (2003) outlines several fundamental characteristics of a failed state from this perspective.

What is central to failed state is that the state apparatus is unable to uphold an effective monopoly on violence over its whole territory, lacks an effective judicial system to guard the rule of law and promulgate judgments that are internationally regarded as legitimate and sound, is unable or unwilling to fulfill international obligations and cannot prevent various forms of transnational economic crime or the use of its territory for the perpetration of violence against other states in the international system (African Studies Center, 2003, 3).

Ottaway and Mair (2004) provide a similar definition and identify the breakdown of internal security and the increasing inability of the state to control its borders and territory and to exert its monopoly on the use of force as the most important manifestations of state failure. Even Michael Ignatieff, a liberal scholar, notes that a common denominator in all of the cases is the loss of the monopoly on internal violence (Ignatieff, 2002, 117).

Krasner (2004) combines the Weberian conception of the state with a focus on international relations and the institutions of sovereignty. In Krasner’s analysis there are three mutually reinforcing components of modern sovereignty. Firstly, legal sovereignty references the recognition of one state by others in the international system. Secondly, Westphalian sovereignty can be understood as the right of a sovereign state to undertake political decisions without interference from external sources, commonly referred to as the principle of non-intervention. Lastly, domestic sovereignty refers to the state’s position as the highest political authority within its territory. To achieve domestic sovereignty at its most basic level, a state must maintain a monopoly over the means of violence and control over its territory.
Krasner and Pascual define state failure as the absence of one or more of these conditions (Krasner and Pascual, 2005). However, given that recognition and the principle of non-intervention are formally accepted norms of the current international system, state failure becomes defined in terms of the breakdown of domestic sovereignty, as the loss of the monopoly of violence over given territory.

The term failed state, in the Weberian sense, “does not imply that something like an ideal-typical state existed prior to the collapse or that failure to perform any of the functions assigned to it would imply that a state has failed” (Eriksen, 2006, 6). This definition has several conceptual and analytically advantages over the functional view. Firstly, it sharpens the conceptual definition of what constitutes a failed state and limits the number of cases considered state failure. Secondly, as shall be seen in the policy response section, the Weberian perspective suggests a far more specific and focused set of policy options in addressing failed states.

**Weberian Perspective: Causes of State Failure**

The Weberian perspective contends that the causes of contemporary state failure lie in the incompleteness of the initial state building process, and suggests that state failure is intimately related to three complementary and reinforcing historical processes: the post-colonial state building process; the effects of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the superpower overlay; and the dynamic socio-economic dimensions of globalization (The African Studies Centre, 2003). Weberians argue that this analysis provides a broader historical, political and economic context to state failure. An examination of how these processes contribute to state failure is undertaken below.
1. Post-Colonial State Building

The Weberian perspective contends state failure is not a new phenomenon and that its theoretical and practical roots can be traced back to the processes of post-colonial state building (The African Studies Center, 2003; Anderson, 2005; Mayall, 2005; Milliken and Krause, 2002).

In the post-World War II years, the world witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of states in the international system. Many former colonies throughout Asia and Africa "gained independence, were recognized as sovereign states and became equal members of the international society with full membership of the UN and authority to issue passports, postage stamps and currencies" (Anderson, 2005, 4). However, the sovereignty granted to these newly independent post-colonial states existed only as a 'legal' fiction, in that it was "created from the outside and based on nothing but international recognition" (Spanger, 2000, 4).

While many of these newly independent states were desperately poor and dependent on aid from their former colonial rulers, it was thought that they could succeed as states in the international system simply by having obtained statehood. "The idea, then that states could fail was anathema to the raison d’etre of decolonization and offensive to the notion of self-determination. New states might be poor, it was thought, but they would hold their own by virtue of being independent" (Helman and Ratner, 1992, 4).

Clapham (2000) argues that the imposition of a European model of the state on post-colonial states "resulted in the creation of a kind of state radically different than any other state that had existed before: a state derived from a territory whose boundaries and structure of government and to a large extent whose economy and sometimes even whose population were imposed from outside" (Clapham, 2000, 2). Due to the arbitrary nature of the way borders had been created by the colonial powers, many post-colonial governments lacked the "loyalty of their
populations and therefore their domestic or internal authority and power are not only weak but also most often based on dominance rather than legitimacy” (The African Studies Center, 2003, 4). In line with the dominant development theories of the day, many post-colonial states tried to become strong states by establishing a strong centralized political authority. However, “the process of the accumulation of centralized power in these countries [had] consisted of strategies of subordination and assimilation, which tend to maximize the resentment of subordinate groups (ethnic, religious, etc.)” (The African Studies Center, 2003, 4). This process is often seen as providing the beginnings of a societal polarization that would later manifest itself as religious, communal and ethnic tensions that characterize many of the failed states of today.

The imposition of Western based notions of statehood often disorganized the local social and political structures, and the new arrangements often failed to take root effectively, leaving many populations with neither authoritative local institutions nor robust Weberian-style states (Anderson, 2004, 9). The incompleteness of this initial state building process would be further exacerbated by the Cold War and the resulting superpower overlay.

2. The Cold War

“The Cold War succeeded the era of formal European imperialism in imposing and upholding international norms of state sovereignty” (Anderson, 2004, 9). The bi-polar structure of the Cold War years prolonged the economic and political viability of many weak and newly independent states as the capitalist west and the communist east competed for allies (Anderson, 2004; Andersen, 2005; The African Studies Center, 2003). Economic aid, technical assistance and access to markets, along with the provision of defensive military technology from the superpowers were instrumental in offsetting the effects of the underdeveloped economies and weak state capacity of many newly developing states. “During this period the internal
weaknesses of certain member states, aggravated by irrational economic policies that led to low levels of economic growth, political corruption and dismal human rights records, were, to put things mildly, overlooked by the major powers in order to keep the weaker states within their spheres of influence” (Helman and Ratner, 1992, 3). Rulers of client states were often held more accountable to the international patrons who constructed and sustained these states rather than to their domestic constituencies. As a result, the incentives to develop the classic attributes of states, such as professional militaries, strong fiscal systems and other administrative bureaucracies, were weak while inducements to maintain the appearance of stability were strong (Anderson, 2004,).

As the Cold War fizzled to an end in the early 1990s and the superpower overlay was withdrawn, many developing countries, stripped of strategic aid, experienced a revival of ethnic and religious hatred that had been previously frozen by the superpower confrontation and many fell into political violence and turmoil. It is argued that the surge of violence and the loss of state authority that characterized state failure in the 1990s can be directly related to the fact that after 40 years of post-colonialism and a protracted Cold War, an entire class of countries existed with only marginal capacities to function politically and economically (Dorff, 1996, 16).

3. Globalization

The Weberian perspective holds that contemporary failed states are the products of a long-term degeneration of political, economic and social institutions that began with the unsuccessful state-building policies of the post-colonial era, that were further maintained during the Cold War years, and that continue today under the conditions of what is usually dubbed neoliberal globalization (Ignatieff, 2002; Woodward, 1999; The African Studies Center, 2003; Brett, 2002; Clapham, 2002). While the functional perspective contends that increased global
economic integration and the development of domestic neoliberal institutions are the best ways to strengthen states against failure, the Weberian perspective argues that globalization has fundamentally altered traditional notions of both sovereignty and statehood and have transformed the role of the state within international relations. These transformations have negatively affected the capacity of the weakest states in the system and have further created conditions of state failure.

At the heart of this argument lies a critique of the neoliberal policies that drive globalization. Firstly, critics argue that the neoliberal ideology, “with its increased integration of markets, the swift and free flow of capital and its implications for de-regulation and the mandatory character of radically market-oriented polices imposed by structural adjustment plans on the poorest countries, has tended to reinforce the general frailty of regulatory state functions and state abilities to supply basic goods” (The African Studies Center, 2003, 4). Deregulation, liberalization, and privatization and the creation of conditions favorable to foreign direct investment effectively remove the state from managing the economy, limiting both its authority and resources, and reducing state functions to adjusting the national economy to the needs of the global market. Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur suggest that for weak or failing states the vulnerability of these exposed markets “may provide a flashpoint for political opposition or a more prolonged decay in support of the state” (Chesterman et al, 2005, 373).

From this perspective, the causes of state failure are not limited to the domestic realm. Rather, state failure begins with an inability to establish the necessary conditions for statehood. It is argued that “Western (to some extent post-Cold War) visions of the world have imposed an obligation to accomplish the task of state-building on post-colonial states not only within an extremely short timeframe but also within a context of compliance with fixed international
standards which were met by Western countries only after centuries of state-building" (The African Studies Center, 2003, 4).

In recognition of the incomplete nature of the post-colonial state building processes, the policy responses to failed states proposed by the Weberian perspective generally focus on the fundamental element or defining feature of statehood and necessary precondition for other state building activities - the ability of the state to maintain the monopoly of use of legitimate force.

**Weberian Perspective: Policy Responses**

1. **Realism**

The Weberian perspectives grouping of policy responses towards failed states have been labeled realism by Andersen (2005). These approaches can be directly related to the Weberian perspective and are subscribed to by such authors as Jackson (2000), Ottaway (2003), Cramer and Goodhand (2003), and Ottaway and Mair (2004). They have produced a wide range of arguments ranging from conservative defences of traditional notions of state sovereignty, and adherence to the principle of non-intervention, to ‘putting security first’ in cases where interventions have already occurred (Andersen, 2005; Ottaway and Mair, 2004). Despite this range of opinions, the Realist approaches are united by two central beliefs. The first of these is “the notion that order and stability are more important than human rights and democracy - both in international politics and with regard to the inner workings of states” (Andersen, 2005, 26).

The second belief is that, despite the recent importance assigned to non-state actors within contemporary international relations, the state remains the central unit of organization and primary actor in the global system (Ottaway and Mair, 2004).

The Realist policy responses fundamentally reject the notion of humanitarian interventions and stress that intervention by the international community into failed states should
only be considered when the target state poses a direct threat to international peace and stability. Further, where and when interventions do occur, Realist responses more narrowly focus on achieving state stability, primarily through developing or restoring a state’s ability to maintain security by achieving a monopoly on violence, rather than promoting a particular form of governance.

The Weberian/Realist position critiques the liberal policy responses, particularly the dominant peacebuilding approach, on several grounds. Firstly, it argues that functional responses to state failure produce interventions which are too ambitious, too comprehensive and unfocused (Andersen, 2005; Ottaway and Mair, 2004). Ottaway and Mair (2004) suggest that while the comprehensive socio-economic and political reforms advocated by the peacebuilding approach are commendable in theory, the international community lacks the capacity, both in terms of resources and political will, to implement such reforms in practice. Time also becomes an important factor in the Weberian/Realist approach. The comprehensive reforms that form the basis of the peacebuilding approach are long term processes that in themselves may prove to have destabilizing effects. The Weberian/Realist position suggests that state failure demands immediate action and should be aimed directly at reinforcing the state’s capacity to maintain security.

The Weberian/Realist orientation also charges that functional responses have obscured the core fundamental functions of a state and takes issue with the association of democratization and state building that is inherent in the peacebuilding approach. Realists contend that to create effective institutions, security first needs to be created or maintained. It is further argued that the "liberal emphasis on the legislative and judicial branches of government, on decentralization and on civil society has more to do with redistribution of state power than with state-building. To
hard-core Realists, state-building is first and foremost a matter of bolstering the capacity of the executive branch of government - of (re)building the state’s monopoly of violence and as a consequence (re)establishing law, order and stability” (Andersen, 2005, 29).

While the Weberian/Realist approach advocates a short term response to state failure that focuses on state security as the most effective way for the international community to deploy its limited resources, it also suggests that a longer term commitment must be made by richer nations towards developing countries if cases of state failure are to be prevented.

**Critical Theory Perspective**

**Conception of the State**

The third and final perspective on state failure, the critical theory perspective, is reflected in arguments of authors such as Duffield (2001; 2004), Pureza et al. (2006), Anderson (2004), Clapham (2000; 2002) and Bilgin and Morton (2002). Frequently characterized as a fragmented body of work that lacks the coherence of the mainstream perspectives, the critical theorists are unified in that they generally view the notion of the territorially defined state as problematic (Clapham, 2000, 2002; Andersen, 2005).

The mainstream debates on failed states revolve around the territorial, institutional and functional expressions of the modern state, it is the state itself and “not some other form of political organization that has been promoted as the answer to addressing social and economic upheaval, conflict and war” (Milliken and Krause, 2002, 762). Critical theorists challenge the assumption of the state as the solution by rejecting the universal vision of statehood promoted by both of the mainstream perspectives. Critical theorists do not view the state as “the natural, default organizational structure of human community” but rather as “a distinct and particular institution with a number of historical and contemporary competitors” (Andersen, 2004, 1). Even
the label “failed state” carries embedded within it the assumption that the state, as an institutional form, is the most appropriate, effective and desired form of political organization (Clapham, 2000; Andersen, 2005; Woodward, 1999).

Critical theorists believe that privileging the state as the only form of acceptable governance limits the emergence of genuine alternative approaches to statehood that are more in tune with local practices and that reflect existing institutions and social practices (Anderson, 2005; Milliken and Krause, 2002). Critical theory suggests that at the core of the problem of failed states is the failed universalism of the one-size-fits all state model. Clapham (2000), for instance, argues that the modern state represents an ideal of sovereign territoriality that has been seldom achieved even by Western nations and that the idea of the state as a universal form of governance rests on assumptions that can no longer be met.

**Critical Theory Perspectives: Defining State Failure**

Critical theory argues mainstream perspectives equate state failure with the condition of domestic anarchy (Rotberg, 2004; Kasfir, 2004) and suggest that this characterization of state failure as anarchy is highly misleading (Andersson, 2005; Anderson, 2004; Yannis, 2002). Even in the extreme case of violent state collapse, the absence of an effective central government cannot be identified with the Hobbesian condition of perennial "warre, where every man is Enemy to every man" (Anderson, 2004, 15). Using the term anarchy to characterize state failure obscures the fact that even in the absence of central authority there are real and organized forces pursuing collective interests and that these different non-state forms and patterns of authority and organization may reveal the outlines of alternatives to the state (Anderson, 2004, 12; Woodward, 1999).
Jose Manuel Pureza (2006) suggests that the concept of a failed state is in itself a direct product of the neoliberal doctrine that dominates the mainstream failed state discourses. Pureza argues “this concept is in itself an expression of power: the power in defining what is the purpose of the state” (Pureza et al., 2006, 2). In labeling a state as failed, successful states are effectively creating an international hierarchy that perpetuates the idea that deviations from the Western ideal state, in either its functional or Weberian form, should be seen as defective and in need of fixing. For Susan Woodward, the term failed state acts as a threatening label potentially to be “wielded by the powerful states as a new pretext for intervention into the domestic order of sovereign states” (Woodward, 2006, 3). In both cases, mainstream conceptualizations of a failed state identify what a particular state is not, rather than what it is. Thus, state failure becomes “a challenge that calls for a reversal that can in turn be characterized as ‘success’, and a successful global order is one that is regulated through the norms of statehood” (Clapham, 2000, 1).

**Critical Theory Perspectives: Causes**

In contrast to the functional perspective that highlights internal mechanisms as the causes of state failure, critical theory suggests there is an important external dimension to the growing problem of failed states. Woodward (2005) and Pureza et al. (2006) contend that the rising incidence of state failure since the end of the Cold War is a product of the emergence and growing international institutionalization of what they refer to as the *responsible state model*. “This expression synthesizes a common standard of external demand towards all states, but mainly towards those that are institutionally more fragile including the requirement to rigorously fulfill a huge set of tasks in respect to human rights, minority rights, refugee protection, border control, arms control, debt repayment, international trade obligations, rule of law and so on” (Pureza et al., 2006, 4). The causal mechanisms of state failure are not a matter of failure or
collapse within a given state, but rather a function of external perception; state failure is caused by the inability of the state to meet demands placed on it by outside forces, mainly by those who perpetuate the demands of the neoliberal agenda. In defining the causes of state failure “the specific governance failures of the individual leadership of failed states are of less concern to Critical Theory than the interplay between external and local factors and the manner in which it produces and reproduces differing forms of order, authority and control” (Andersen, 2005, 30).

**Critical Theory Perspectives: Policy Responses**

A common criticism of the critical theory perspective is that it does little in the way of providing policy makers and practitioners any actionable recommendations to address state failure and failed states. This is in part due the fact that ‘problem solving’ does not explicitly exist as a part of the critical theory research agenda. Rather, the focus of critical theory is exposing the ideological basis of mainstream perspectives and the interests they serve (Andersen, 2005; Bilgin and Morton, 2002). While the critical perspectives suggest little in the way of concrete actions, “what they do offer is a broad variety of arguments for looking beyond and below the level of the state and focusing on the structural features of the global system and its real-life consequences for actual human beings living on the ground” (Andersen, 2005, 30). Concepts such as returning to humanitarian basics and developing alternatives to the nation-state model are explored at the theoretical level, but there is a noticeable silence on making these ideas actionable.

**Summary of Perspectives**

To facilitate comparison of how these differing perspectives influence contemporary thinking on failed states, Table 1 summarizes the chapter discussion. It should be noted that while the table provides a useful and convenient model, it is by no means comprehensive and the
categories should not be seen as mutually exclusive. The table does emphasize the key elements that differentiate the perspectives from each other and provides a tool for the analysis of Canadian failed state policy that will be undertaken in the next chapters.

Table 1: Summary of Perspectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Functional</th>
<th>Weberian</th>
<th>Critical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conception of the State</td>
<td>Social Contract Model</td>
<td>Weberian Model</td>
<td>Universal notion of the territorially defined state as problematic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Failed State</td>
<td>Inability to provide positive political goods</td>
<td>Loss of sovereign control/monopoly on violence</td>
<td>Label “failed state” problematic, potentially threatening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes of State Failure</td>
<td>Institutional – Non-viability of internal political, economic and social structures of a state Individual/Group - Destructive decision making power of elites and individuals</td>
<td>Incompleteness of initial state-building process due to: a. Colonialism b. Cold War c. Globalization</td>
<td>External perception, related to responsible state model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Responses</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Realist, security first</td>
<td>No concrete policy recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal Imperialism</td>
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</table>

**Conclusion**

The academic literature on failed states can be categorized into three broad theoretical perspectives: functional, Weberian and critical. These perspectives were examined across the four dimensions of Woodward’s framework. As can be seen from the above presentation of the differing perspectives, the term failed state remains contentious and definitionally and conceptually elusive. While contradictions and tensions can be found within each of the perspectives, the debates surrounding failed states can be broadly characterized by two controversies. Firstly, there is a disagreement as to the nature and role of the modern state or what constitutes ‘stateness’. The functional perspective focuses on the functions of the state, the Weberian on the ability of the state to maintain the monopoly on violence, and the critical
perspectives on problematic nature of the state. The second controversy involves the causes or manifestations of state failure. The functional perspective locates state failure at the domestic or internal level, the Weberian focuses on the place of the state within the larger system of states, and the critical perspective views failed states as a structural or systemic issue. The next sections of this thesis will analyze the Canadian declaratory policy and the policies specific to Afghanistan, respectively.
Chapter 2: Canadian Failed State Policy

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this chapter of the thesis is to describe and explain the nature and the development of Canada’s declaratory policy on failed states. Since the concept of failed states emerged in the early 1990s, the Canadian policy establishment has devoted increased attention and resources towards the consequences of these states. However, over time there has been a significant change in how Canada both understands and addresses failed states. This chapter traces the evolution of Canada’s changing policies related to failed states from their initial inclusion in the human security agenda under the Chrétien government (1993-2000) to their post-9/11 characterization and prioritization as significant threats to national security and international peace and stability under the Martin government (2003-2006).


Under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, failed states and their consequences were defined and addressed primarily through the promotion of the human security agenda. Influenced by the conception of human security that was first introduced at the international level by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in the 1994 Human Development Report, Canada adopted human security as an integral part of its foreign policy in its 1995 foreign policy review, Canada and the World (1995). In reaction to what was seen as the growing inability of traditional state-centric notions of security to explain the increasingly complex and interconnected nature of the emerging global threats of the post-Cold War world, the review advocated “a broadening of the focus of security policy from its narrow orientation of managing
state-to-state relationships, to one that recognizes the importance of the individual and society for our shared security” (DFAIT, 1995). Using the individual as the primary referent of security rather than the state, the Government of Canada expanded the definition of security to include the economic, political and social needs of the individual with an emphasis on a variety of non-traditional security threats including human rights abuses, social inequity, and lack of economic opportunity, over-population and environmental degradation (DFAIT, 1995). Many of the human security priorities established by Canada, including the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons, the proliferation of small arms and the protection of women and children in conflict, could reflect human insecurity problems often created by state failure.

Under the leadership of Lloyd Axworthy, who became Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 1996, the promotion of human security would become Canada’s primary international objective and the guiding principle and defining feature of its foreign policy (Copeland, 2001; Smith, 2006; Bernard, 2006; Black, 2006). In a 1999 statement Axworthy defined the scope of the Canadian human security agenda:

The human security agenda is an effort to construct a global society in which the safety of people is an international priority and a motivating force for international action; where international humanitarian standards and the rule of law are advanced and woven into a coherent web protecting the individual; where those who violate these standards are held fully accountable; and where our global, regional, bilateral institutions are designed and equipped to enhance and enforce these standards. (DFAIT, 1999)

In articulating his vision of human security, Axworthy sought to realign Canadian foreign policy with what he saw as the changing nature of post-Cold War international relations. Axworthy maintained that the demise of the bipolar system had ushered in a new era of global transformation. This transformation, which was characterized by increasingly porous national borders, the emergence of a global marketplace, the rise of intra-state violence and increasing
incidences of state failure, the multiplication of international actors, and the information technology revolution, blurred the distinction between the international and domestic realms and required a new approach to international relations (DFAIT, 1996b; 1996c; 1997b; 1998b; 1998c).

In privileging the security of the individual over traditional state-centric notions of security, Axworthy advanced the idea that in the post-Cold War world the duties of the modern state go beyond merely maintaining territorial sovereignty to include the protection and the promotion of the welfare of its own citizens (a theme that would become of particular relevance to the later failed states discourse). This shift in the primary referent of security, from the state to the individual became a central element of the Axworthy doctrine (DFAIT, 1998a; 1998c). Defining and promoting human security as an international norm also gave “rise to idea that the international community should be committed to ensuring the well-being of its citizens anywhere in the world if their own governments fail to do so” (Bernard, 2006, 238). These two principles would become the basis of the 2001 Canadian-led Responsibility to Protect agenda and combined they represented a significant movement in the conceptualization and advancement of the Canadian human security agenda.

With the Canadian human security agenda, Axworthy would introduce a foreign policy that emphasized certain themes and principles that differed from those that had defined previous generations of Canadian foreign policy. The central elements of this new foreign policy would be a focus on the use of soft power; a belief in the ability of middle power states to shape the international agenda; the inclusion of non-governmental organizations and global civil society actors into the policy process; and the emergence of a norm-centered global system (Bernard, 2006; Hillmer and Chapnick, 2001; Van Rooy, 2001).
Axworthy’s foreign policy model was rooted in the belief “that international leadership in a post-Cold War system [was] best provided using “soft” power or cooptive power rather than hard power” (Bernard, 2006, 240; DFAIT, 1996b; 1997b; 1998c; 1998d). In a April 25, 1998 article published in the Ottawa Citizen entitled “Why Soft Power is the Right Policy for Canada”, Axworthy outlined the reasons for his policy’s focus on soft power, maintaining that it “exemplifies the Canadian talent for drawing upon our skills in negotiating, building coalitions and presenting diplomatic initiatives; in other words, for influencing the behaviour of other nations not through military intimidation but through a variety of diplomatic and political tools” (Ottawa Citizen, April 25, 1998). Drawing on Canada’s history of bilingualism and multiculturalism, its vibrant civil society and its comparative advantages in coalition-building, norm promotion, agenda setting and information technology, Axworthy believed Canada was the ideal nation to lead other countries in supporting and advancing human security on the international stage (DFAIT 1996b, 1996c; 1998d).

It should be noted that while Axworthy’s foreign policy stressed the use of soft power as a means of projecting Canadian values internationally, it did not exclude the possibility of employing hard power assets. Canada contributed military and financial resources to many of the international humanitarian interventions that took place during the 1990s, the majority of which took place in what are now often classified as failed states. Canada was involved in almost all interventions in the 1990s conducted under the auspices of the UN, including missions in East Timor and Haiti, and taking leadership roles in non-UN led interventions, including the NATO operation to protect the civilian population of Kosovo.

Another important element in Axworthy’s vision of human security, and one directly related to both the use of soft power and the transformation of state-society relations in the post-
Cold War international system, was the inclusion of non-governmental organizations into the policy process (DFAIT, 1996a; 1997b; 1998c; 1998d). Axworthy maintained that the growing power and influence of NGOs and civil society groups was redefining the terms of state sovereignty as “state leaders were increasingly accepting the idea of entrusting NGOs with particular decision-making powers in specific issue areas” (Bernard, 2006, 239). In defining the role these groups had in advancing the human security agenda, Axworthy stated “one can no longer relegate NGOs to simple advisory or advocacy roles in this process. They are now part of the way decisions have to be made. They have been the voice saying that governments belong to the people, and must respond to the people’s hopes, demands and ideals (DFAIT, 1997a). Canada was among the first nations “to hold extensive consultations with NGOs prior to each session of the UN Commission on Human Rights” (DFAIT, 1997b) and NGOs and civil society groups would play important parts in the development of several human security initiatives, including the Landmines Ban and the establishment of the ICC.

Axworthy also believed that the end of the bipolar rivalry that characterized the Cold War era gave middle powers, such as Canada, greater leverage and latitude in defining and shaping the international agenda (Hillmer and Chapwick, 2001; Bernard, 2006). Believing that “the combined and growing political clout of the Human Security Network (the collection of thirteen middle power states) and non-governmental organizations alone was sufficient to mobilize support for and ensure success in human security initiatives” (Bernard, 2006, 243), Axworthy showed a willingness to promote the human security agenda without explicit great power support and outside of Canada’s traditional multilateral associations (Hillmer and Chapwick, 2001; Keating, 2002). This is evidenced in the Ottawa Process to ban anti-personnel landmines. Once it became evident that the United States, Russia and China would not agree to the terms of the
process, the treaty was “moved outside of the UN and undertaken outside of any formal institution (Keating, 2002, 224). The shift away from traditional multilateral associations, this shift suggests a greater concern with establishing a normative human security regime than with the traditional Canadian focus on multilateral co-operation through international institutions.

While Axworthy’s foreign policy claimed a number of successes, by 2000 the broad vision of human security was gradually replaced by a narrower conception and a decline the usage of the language of human security. DFAIT’s *Freedom from Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security* (2000) focused specifically on non-military means to mitigate the effects of violent conflict often associated with state failure and identified five policy priorities for the advancement of the “freedom from fear” agenda: the protection of civilians; peace support operations, conflict prevention measures; governance and accountability; and maintenance of public safety (DFAIT, 2000, 3). Human security now had a different emphasis, one that reintroduced and reemphasized the role of state. The phrase “soft power” was no longer used and “change was best effected through a combination of intelligent negotiation and more forceful means of persuasion” (Hillmer and Chapnick, 2001, 83).

The appointment of John Manley as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2000 marked a distinct shift away from the policies that defined the Axworthy era with an emphasis on economic policy and the bilateral Canadian-American relationship (Smith, 2006; Hampson, Hillmer and Molot, 2001; Hillmer and Chapnick, 2001). When Bill Graham became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2001, human security returned to Canadian foreign policy although in an even narrower conception. In the post-9/11 international environment a greater emphasis was placed on traditional state-based notions of security and human security became viewed as complementary to national security. In 2002, Graham noted that “Canada’s human security
agenda recognizes that the security of governments and the security of people are inseparable, that is, they depend on each other. It is also based on an understanding that the security of Canadians is inextricably linked with the security of others beyond our borders. Thus, foreign policy initiatives that enhance the security of the person also enhance national security” (DFAIT, 2002c). Early in the post-9/11 era, Canada’s involvement in the global campaign against terrorism, specifically its role in the invasion and subsequent reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, was consistently framed in terms of human security, stressing human rights, democracy, the rule of law and issues of individual security (DFAIT, 2002a; 2002b; 2003b).

The promotion of this version of human security was also evident in the early months of the Martin government. In Bill Graham’s January 2003 A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians, failed states are mentioned in the section pertaining to non-military threats to Canada and are framed in terms of the new human security approach to foreign policy (DFAIT, 2003a, 9). However, shortly after taking power, Prime Minister Martin began to embark upon a significant reorientation and realignment of Canadian foreign policy that would change the place and focus of failed states within the Canadian agenda.

The Martin Years: Canada’s Failed State Policy

The post-9/11 era saw dramatic changes to the dynamics of the international security environment and fundamentally altered the way in which Canada conceptualized and addressed the issues of failed states. Beginning with release of the 2004 Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (NSP) and continuing with the 2005 The International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (IPS), failed states were no longer specifically framed in terms of human security and they became increasingly prioritized as significant threats to Canada’s national security.
Introduced as a first-of-its-kind comprehensive national security strategy, *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (NSP)* (2004) advanced three core national security interests: protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; contributing to international security (Government of Canada, 2004a, 5). The NSP established assisting failed states as a Canadian security priority (Government of Canada, 2004a; Department of National Defence, 2004) and demonstrated a significant change in Canadian policy towards these states in two ways. Firstly, it moved away from the language of the human security agenda by framing failed states as direct and serious threats to both Canadian national security and to international peace and stability, specifically placing an emphasis on the linkages between failed states and international terrorism and transnational criminal activity. Secondly, in addressing failed states the NSP advocated greater integration of defence, development and diplomatic policy, and of traditional hard power assets, a theme that would later become a central element of the 2005 *International Policy Statement*. While the NSP refrained from providing a detailed account of future Canadian policy towards failed states, it did set the stage for many of the policies that would be announced in the 2005 *International Policy Statement*.

**The International Policy Statement**

In early 2005 the Martin Government released *The International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. Described as “the most extensive Canadian Foreign Policy review ever undertaken” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005a), the *IPS* was designed to readjust Canadian foreign policy to reflect the changing global circumstances of the post-9/11 international environment (Government of Canada, 2005a; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005a; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005b) and “to ensure that [Canada’s] foreign, defence, trade and
development policies form the basis of a single, coherent and effective international strategy” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005a).

Consistent with the changing policies of many of its allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, Canada was making failed states a top Canadian policy priority. The IPS suggests that these states pose a “dual challenge” for Canadian policy (Government of Canada, 2005a; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005b; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e; National Defence Canada, 2005b). Firstly, they represented direct security threats to Canada and Canadians, specifically through the linkages made to international terrorism and trans-national crime networks (Government of Canada, 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005b; National Defence Canada, 2005a). Secondly, the humanitarian impacts often associated with state failure challenged Canadian international morals and values and therefore demand action.

In a 2005 speech, then Minister of Defence Bill Graham stated; “Dealing with situations in failed or failing states is not simply about waging war “over there”. Rather, it requires a sophisticated set of skills and instruments, including combat capabilities, negotiation and diplomatic skills, and a willingness to help others rebuild their institutions in a way that is culturally sensitive to their distinct local needs” (National Defence Canada, 2005b). Drawing on the history, experience and capabilities of the Canadian military and the Canadian values of tolerance and respect and its direct experience in development and reconstruction work, “Canada is well placed to provide knowledge-based skills that will allow these societies to develop and engage their own capital in the tasks related to social, economic and political reconstruction” (Hillmer et al., 2004, 14). Canada’s tradition of peacekeeping and multilateralism give it a comparative advantage over other nations in addressing the issues surrounding failed and fragile states.
The IPS argued greater integration of Canada’s foreign policy objectives would make Canada a more effective actor on the world stage. The Government of Canada sought to implement the ‘whole-of-government’ approach as the most effective way to respond to the issues and problems arising from failed and fragile states. In operationalizing this approach, Canada has designed what is commonly referred to as the 3D (Diplomacy, Defence and Development) framework. This approach focuses on more tightly integrating Canada’s traditional foreign policy instruments and includes “undertaking Defence efforts to strengthen security and stability, pursuing Diplomacy to enhance prospects for nation-building and reconstruction, and making certain that development contributions are brought to bear in a coordinated and effective way” (Government of Canada, 2005a, vi).

The IPS was divided into four sections: defence, diplomacy, development and trade. The impacts of failed states form a specific policy focus of three of the four IPS documents, with the trade statement being the exception. A brief description of how failed states are prioritized within each of the defence, diplomacy and development documents will be undertaken below.

**The International Policy Statement: Defence**

The IPS recognizes that the Canadian Forces “are a vital instrument of Canada’s foreign policy” (Government of Canada, 2005b, i). The Defence section of the IPS emphasizes three broad and interrelated roles for the Canadian Forces: “protecting Canadians, defending North America in cooperation with the United States, and contributing to international peace and security.” (Government of Canada, 2005b, 2) While two of these roles reflect national security concerns, there is a recognition that “security in Canada ultimately begins with stability abroad” (Government of Canada, 2005b, 1). To this end, the IPS-Defence identifies effectively restoring stability in failed states as an organizing principle for Canada’s future foreign military operations.
Defence Minister Bill Graham noted “the ability to respond to the challenge of failed and failing states will serve as the benchmark for the Canadian Forces” (Government of Canada, 2005b, 11; National Defence Canada, 2005e; National Defence Canada, 2005d).

The *IPS-Defence* argued that failed states present a number of serious challenges to the Canadian Forces. Experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Haiti have shown Canadian Forces missions in failed states are far removed from traditional peacekeeping roles. Through the 3D approach to stabilizing and reconstructing failed states, the Canadian military will increasingly be called upon to perform a variety of traditional and non-traditional functions. The *IPS-Defence* referred to this overlap in the types of missions to be carried by the Canadian Forces as a “three-block” war, consisting of traditional combat operations; stabilization operations; and reconstruction and humanitarian relief operations (Government of Canada, 2005b, 8).

In order for the Canadian Forces to become more effective, relevant and responsive in the complex and dangerous situations generated by failed states, the *IPS-Defence* recognizes the need for an increase in the capabilities related to stabilization and reconstruction activities, including personnel, equipment and technology, new and more effective command and operational structures designed to increase integration with other governmental departments, and increased funding for military assistance training to foreign armed services (Government of Canada, 2005b). The *IPS-Defence* also placed an emphasis on multilateralism and coordination with international organizations, stressing interoperability with other forces as an important element in the stabilization and reconstruction of failed states.

The Canadian defence establishment believes that the Canadian Forces have developed and “demonstrated a particular advantage over many other advanced countries in assisting such
troubled states and peoples” (National Defence Canada, 2005a). Under the IPS, the Canadian Forces were identified as an integral element in the whole-of-government approach towards stabilizing failed and failing states. While there is a recognition that “[t]he challenges involved in rebuilding countries devastated by war or internal strife are enormous and cannot be handled by military forces alone”(Government of Canada, 2005b, 9), establishing democracy and beginning economic development in failed states is dependent on the establishment of security and stability that only military force can provide.

**The International Policy Statement: Diplomacy**

The Diplomacy section of IPS outlined policies towards failed states under the heading of *Building a More Secure World*. It announced the creation of two new governmental policy mechanisms designed to co-ordinate and increase Canadian resources for more effective responses to incidences of state failure and fragility: the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF); and the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START).

The GPSF aimed to “provide security assistance to failed and fragile states, as well as resources for post-conflict stabilization and recovery (Government of Canada, 2005a, 14). Located under the authority of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and supported by an annual commitment of $100 million over the next five years as outlined in the 2005 Federal Budget, the GPSF financed three main programs: The Human Security Program, the Global Peace Operations Program and the Global Peace and Security Program from which the START will be financed (Simpson, 2005).

The IPS stated that START,

will provide an integrated, whole-of-government approach to international crises and the problems of failed and fragile states. START will provide the institutional memory, analytical capacity, forward planning capability and coordinating function to make Canadian responses to crises and failed
and failing states, more coherent and ultimately more effective in achieving [foreign policy] objectives. (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e)

Located within the International Security Branch at Foreign Affair Canada, START's administrative structure consisted of an inter-departmental advisory board and a secretariat and acts as a platform for increased inter-departmental coordination and integration. The advisory board "will consist minimally of officials from CIDA, Department of National Defence, Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada, the RCMP and the PCO; other departments will be brought in as needed" (Simpson, 2005, 7). The secretariat is tasked with managing peace and security funds, developing and delivering country-specific conflict prevention and peace-building programs, coordinating peace support operations and coordinating humanitarian policy and crisis response (Simpson, 2005).

The 2005 programming for the START and the GPSF includes coordination of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the Kandahar province of Afghanistan, management of elections in Haiti, controlling borders in the Palestinian Territories and commitments to the Darfur region of Sudan.

Other specific initiatives aimed at failed states included the continued promotion of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine at the international level and the establishment of a civilian Peacebuilding Commission under the auspices of the UN. "Reporting to the UN Security Council, this Commission would lead in the re-establishment of order and governance in post-conflict and failed states, allowing the UN to rapidly draw together relevant expertise from across the UN system" (Government of Canada, 2005d, 12). A further initiative reinforces Canada's commitment to multilateralism and committed Foreign Affairs to continuing to work with regional organizations such as NATO, the European Union, the African Union and the Organization of American States, to assist failed states.
The International Policy Statement: Development

The development section of the IPS outlined a new whole-of-government approach for Canadian development cooperation and explicitly recognized that "security and development are inextricably linked" (Government of Canada, 2005c, 1). Former Minister for International Cooperation Aileen Carroll noted that while poverty offends basic Canadian values, there are increasing linkages to be made between poverty and state failure, and state failure and global security. The relationships are two-way with poverty as being a major contributor to insecurity and insecurity providing a major roadblock to the employment and effectiveness of poverty reduction strategies. A November 26, 2005 paper released in support of the IPS outlined three reasons why failed states are important to CIDA: 1. Canada's largest bilateral aid programs are in failed states; 2. failed states present some of the world's greatest development challenges; 3. failed states present security challenges, which impact on development/poverty reduction (Singh and Jiwa, 2005).

As a means of achieving Canada's development goals, the 2005 Budget restructured the international assistance envelope into five distinct categories for action: development; international financial institutions, peace and security; crisis; and development research. While the bulk of funds were earmarked for the development stream, approximately one-third of the aid budget was allocated to promote security with a particular emphasis on failed states. This included an emphasis on prevention, providing development funds to failed states and helping to build the institutional capacity to use those funds effectively.

Conclusion

The evolution of Canada's failed state policy from Axworthy's human security agenda in the mid 1990s to prioritization as national and international security threats in the Martin...
government’s 2005 *IPS*, shows a significant change occurred in how Canada identifies and addresses these states. To demonstrate the nature of the changes it is useful to compare two specific points in Canadian foreign policy and the place of and policies related to failed states in each. Though the changes in Canadian policy have occurred incrementally, I have chosen to limit this comparison to the initial Axworthy vision of human security and the introduction of the *IPS* under the Martin government. The justification for selecting these two points is that they represent a beginning and an endpoint of Canada’s failed state policy respectively within the scope of this thesis.

Under Axworthy, the individual was seen as the primary referent of security and issues related to state failure were thus defined by the impacts they had on citizens of those states. The *IPS*, however, offers a more traditional state-centric conceptualization of security which identifies failed states as direct threats to national and international security.

Differences can be seen in the way Canada would promote these opposing conceptions of security. Where the Axworthy model focused on the promotion of the human security through the elements of soft power, including negotiation, coalition building and agenda setting, the *IPS*, reinvests in Canadian hard power assets and the traditional means of statecraft. For example, the Martin government committed to expanding and integrating Canadian military, diplomatic and development capabilities. The most significant of these commitments has been the increase in defence spending. The 2005 Budget committed $13 (CAN) billion over five years to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the Canadian Armed Forces, the largest investment made in the Canadian military in two decades.

Further, where Axworthy sought to expand Canada’s international influence through a perceived increase in middle power and NGO capacity, non-traditional multilateral associations
and without explicit great power support, the IPS focuses on revitalizing bilateral relations with the United States and specifically identifies interoperability with traditional multilateral associations such as NATO and the UN as effective and necessary measures in addressing the contemporary issues associated with failed states.

The IPS takes a different approach and identifies and promotes state-building as the most effective means of establishing security in failed states. Prime Minister Martin remarked in 2004 that, “we would be deluding ourselves if we thought that military intervention, indispensable though it may be, was enough to restore long-term security to a country. Without public institutions...the stability brought by peacekeeping forces can be fleeting at best” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2004). Bernard argues that “by making state-building a priority, the Martin government endorsed the view that the attainment of other human security goals rests squarely on building institutions that are accountable and effective” (Bernard, 2006, 250).

While the changes to the international security environment brought about after the 9/11 terror attacks undoubtedly had an effect on Canada’s foreign policy realignment, a number of domestic factors were also influential, most notably Canada’s fiscal condition. During the early 1990s the federal government was running substantial budget deficits. A program of deficit reduction was introduced which led to significant cuts to the budgets of the traditional elements of statecraft, defence, diplomacy and development. Critics contended that Axworthy’s human security agenda lacked any real substance and was merely an attempt to do “foreign policy on the cheap” and was referred to by Kim Nossal in his seminal 1998 article as “pinchpenny diplomacy” (Nossal, 1998).

By the early twenty-first century, Canada’s financial house was once again in order, which subsequently allowed Ottawa to reinvest in the foreign policy capabilities that had been
left to atrophy under the previous government. In to the foreword the IPS, Prime Minister Martin stated that “for decades, there was a slow erosion in Canada’s commitment to its military, to international assistance and to our diplomatic presence around the world” (Government of Canada, 2005a, Foreword). The restoration of Canadian international capabilities became a driving purpose behind the IPS.

Much as Axworthy’s vision of human security was influenced by global transformations brought about by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of globalization, the foreign policy realignment advocated by the IPS reflects the changing nature of international relations of the post-9/11 world. Prime Minister Martin outlined the scope of these changes and necessity of adapting Canadian foreign policy to meet these new and emerging challenges by stating that “the world is changing, quickly and radically, and these changes matter to Canada… It is through our foreign policy that Canada must and will act to ensure that we as a nation overcome the trials and embrace the opportunities of the 21st century” (Government of Canada, 2005a, Foreword). It is within this emerging global context that failed states became an important feature and a central policy priority in the realignment of Canada’s foreign policy.
Chapter 3: Canadian Failed State Policy: Afghanistan

A case study of Afghanistan provides an opportunity to move the analysis from declaratory policy on failed states to a specific example. Afghanistan becomes a logical, if not obvious choice, for this analysis for several reasons. Firstly, Afghanistan represents an example of the changing conception of failed states and provides the justification for the contemporary association between failed states and threats to international peace and security, primarily through its linkages to international terrorism and transnational crime. Secondly, Afghanistan is where Canada has been most active in terms of concrete actions. Canada played an important role in the initial 2001 US-led combat operations that led to the fall of the Taliban government and in the subsequent stabilization and reconstruction efforts that continue today. Afghanistan represents the site of the first real implementation of the integrated whole-of-government approach towards stabilizing failed states established as a Canadian policy priority in the 2005 IPS. Lastly, the situation in Afghanistan represents the realities and challenges of reconstructing a failed state. These challenges include: a continuing insurgency, a national infrastructure which is seriously degraded or non-existent, a society which remains heavily militarized, a near total disruption of legitimate economic activity, large-scale dislocation of the population both internally and outside the country, a lack of human skills capacity, and widespread and persistent poverty (Government of Canada, 2005g).

A change in government leadership, from Chrétien to Martin, and a significant foreign policy review and reorientation, occurred after Canada’s initial involvement in Afghanistan. The 2005 Government of Canada report Canadians Making a Difference: Afghanistan states that Canada’s ultimate objective was “to help Afghanistan become a secure and self sufficient democratic state that never again serves as a terrorist haven” (Government of Canada, 2005e, 3).
To this end, Canada contributed significant financial and human resources to the task of stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan. Since 2001, over 14,000 members of the Canadian Forces have been deployed, in rotation, to the country at the request of the Afghan government (Government of Canada, 2005e). Close to $1 billion in development aid was pledged over 2001-2011, making Afghanistan the single largest recipient of Canadian aid and placing Canada among the top five bilateral donors to the country (Government of Canada, 2005g). In terms of diplomatic capacity, over 70 Foreign Service officers were active in Afghanistan lending political support and advice to the Afghan government “to ensure the strategic coordination of Canadian involvement in Afghanistan” (Government of Canada, 2005e, 5).

Though Afghanistan, prior to the 2001 intervention, could be considered a failed state due to the inability of the then-ruling Taliban to maintain control over the entire country and the predatory actions of its regime towards Afghan citizens, Afghanistan during the Martin era was identified as a failed state for two main reasons. Firstly, despite having a democratically elected government, the government in Kabul was unable to extend its authority throughout the whole of the country. Secondly, despite the presence of Canadian and other ISAF troops, Afghanistan was unable to control its territorial borders and could not stop the Taliban and foreign fighters from exiting and re-entering Afghanistan from neighbouring Pakistan.

**Afghanistan: Background**

Any analysis of Afghanistan must take into account its geographical position, diverse internal demography and unique history. Officially named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, it is a largely mountainous, landlocked nation located in Southern Asia “at the Western edge of the Himalayan massif” (Barakat, 2002, 804). Covering some 652,100 square kilometers, it is roughly the size of the province of Manitoba (Government of Canada, 2005e, 1) and ranks as the
The most recent July 2006 estimate puts the population of Afghanistan at approximately 31 million, which is slightly less than population of Canada (Government of Canada, 2005e, 1), with an estimated population growth of 2.67% (CIA, 2006). The Afghan population consists of seven major ethnic groups: Pashtun (42%), Tajik (27%), Uzbek (9%), Hazara (9%), Aimak (4%), Turkmen (3%), and Baluch (2%). Other ethnic groups make up the remaining 4% (CIA, 2006). The majority of Afghans (80%) “follow the Sunni faith and Islam has been regarded as a
unifying factor, particularly during times of conflict against external aggressors. However, there have been tensions between the Sunni majority and the roughly 15%, mainly Hazara, Shia minority” (Barakat, 2002, 804). Afghanistan has two official languages Afghan Persian or Dari (50%) and Pashtu (35%). Turkic languages (Uzbek and Turkmen) are spoken by approximately 11% of the population. Thirty minority languages are also spoken, mainly Balochi and Pashtai dialects (4%), and many Afghans are bilingual (CIA, 2006).

Many of the challenges and dilemmas facing the international community in the contemporary stabilization and reconstruction efforts can be found in Afghanistan’s unique and turbulent history. Generally characterized as the scene of continuous internal unrest and foreign invasion, Afghanistan has a long history of what, by contemporary conceptualizations, can be considered state failure. “To be accurate, any analysis of the Afghan conflict [and post-conflict reconstruction] needs to be underpinned by an understanding of the history of state formation and of societal-state relations” (Barakat, 2002, 803). Considering Afghanistan in an historical context reveals that despite its internationally recognized borders and its vague attributes of sovereignty, the legitimacy of the Afghan state has been in crisis since its emergence as a politically identifiable entity (Barakat, 2002; Cramer, 2003; Saikal, 2005). From its demarcation as a colonial buffer state between the ‘Great Powers’ of Great Britain and Tsarist Russia (Rubin, 1995) through its strategic Cold War importance to the Mujahedin civil war era and the site of the first intervention of the War on Terror, Afghanistan “has experienced a series of contests over the locus of power, the distributional structure of violence, sources of political legitimacy, and state-building enterprises” (Cramer, 2003, 137).
The Canadian Mission in Afghanistan

The Canadian engagement in Afghanistan to 2006 was guided by three overarching principles: to defend Canadian national interests; to ensure Canadian leadership in world affairs; and to help Afghanistan rebuild (Government of Canada, 2006a). Despite the continuing insurgency in Afghanistan, and the country’s slower than predicted economic growth, the Government of Canada maintains that remarkable progress has been made in Afghanistan since the initial 2001 military intervention. Most importantly, the successful implementation of the provisions laid out in the 2001 Bonn Agreement, including the introduction of a new constitution and successful presidential, provincial and parliamentary elections, suggests the “Afghan population understands and has embraced the democratic process” (Government of Canada, 2005g). Other positive developments include the doubling of Afghanistan’s GDP; the repatriation of 4.7 million refugees; a marked improvement in the status and participation of women in Afghan life; and the enrollment of nearly 5 million children in school, a third of which are girls (Government of Canada, 2005e; Government of Canada, 2005g). Despite these successes, a number of serious challenges still exist in assisting Afghanistan and in preventing it from relapsing into a failed state. It is important to note that within competing analyses of Canadian action there is some disagreement as to the effectiveness of the policies pursued in Afghanistan. This thesis focuses specifically on how the Canadian government described the Afghan operation and as such the analysis presented here examines the Canadian declaratory policy towards Afghanistan and does not include any external evaluations.

Canada employed an integrated coordinated response in addressing the challenges it faces in Afghanistan, the most significant of which have been identified as “security sector reform, reducing narcotics production and trafficking, promoting human rights and gender equality, good
governance and economic reconstruction” (Government of Canada, 2005e, 4). This response, based on the whole-of government 3D platform, involved “leveraging resources and expertise across all levels of government, along with complementary engagement of military and Canadian civilians” (Government of Canada, 2005e, 4). In defining the Canadian policy responses to these challenges, reconstruction efforts coalesced around three pillars of action: stabilizing the country; promoting good governance; and poverty reduction (Government of Canada, 2005e).

**Stabilizing Afghanistan**

Canada has made significant commitments to the stabilization of post-invasion Afghanistan. While Afghanistan has entered the post-conflict reconstruction stage, security remains a primary issue. Tasked with the goal of “contributing to the creation of a more secure environment within which the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country can take place,” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006c) more than 2,500 members of the Canadian Forces have been deployed to Kabul, Kandahar and other areas within Afghanistan. Referred to as Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF AFG) (National Defence Canada, 2005c) Canadian operations in theatre from 2003 to early 2006 comprised three missions: Operation Athena, Operation Archer and Operation Argus.

From August 2003 to December 2005, the bulk of the Canadian military commitment to Afghanistan was as a part the NATO led, UN authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The Canadian contribution saw, at its peak, some 1,900 Canadian Forces members based in the capital, Kabul. Named Operation Athena, the Canadian mission was tasked with ensuring freedom of movement in Kabul and the region surrounding the city; providing force protection; providing advice to the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) on security structures and issues;
assisting in the operation of Kabul airport; and assisting in the reconstruction of the Afghan National Army (ANA).

Operation Archer, from 2005 to February 2006, was the Canadian contribution to the US led operation Enduring Freedom. Consisting of some 30 personnel, the mission contributed to the building of Afghanistan’s security infrastructure. It included 15 personnel to “act as instructors involved in the training of the Afghan National Army at the Canadian Afghan National Training Centre Detachment” (National Defence Canada, 2005c). As of August 2005, Operation Archer also included the Provincial Reconstruction Team located in the Kandahar province.

Since 2005, Operation Argus provided some 15 personnel to act as advisors and strategic military planners in support of the Afghan National Government. “The team includes a small command and support element, two teams of strategic planners, a defence analyst and strategic communications advisors” (National Defence Canada, 2005c).

In helping to stabilize Afghanistan, security sector reform (SSR) has become a primary focus for both Canada and its international partners. SSR is relatively new concept, initially emerging out the conflicts in Balkans during the 1990s. It can be generally defined as the process of reconstructing the security architecture of a state. “Over the past decade it [SSR] has come to be viewed as an indispensable element of the state-building project in post-conflict societies, as it confers one of the core prerequisites for statehood, a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force” (Sedra, 2005, 3).

The SSR program is an important part of the stabilization process in Afghanistan. It consists of five pillars, each with a different lead donor nation. The five pillars and their donor nations are identified as: military reform (USA); police reform (Germany); the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program (Japan); judicial reform (Italy); and the counter-narcotics program (UK) (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006d). While Canada was not a lead donor nation for any of the five SSR pillars, it did make significant contributions to the process and can claim a number of successes.

After almost thirty years of continuous civil war, Afghanistan is a heavily militarized society. While the Taliban regime was removed from power in 2001, armed militia groups and Mujahedin factions remain some of the most powerful political actors in Afghanistan and continue to pose significant security threats within the country. Reducing the military power and political influence of these groups became an integral part of maintaining security and extending the influence of the Afghan government. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Program played a key role in eroding the power of these factions. Canada played a leadership role as the second largest donor in the development and funding of the DDR program. Through the CIDA funded New Beginnings Program, Canada disbursed close to $21 million in support of the process since its inception in October 2003” (CIDA, 2006a). Since the completion of the first two phases of the program in July 2005, some 63,000 former combatants have been demobilized and 35,000 weapons collected (CIDA, 2006a; Government of Canada, 2005e). Further, Canada remained “committed to the final phase of the process, reintegration, which involves providing ex-combatants with education, training and/or job opportunities” (Government of Canada, 2005e, 7).

Canada played an important role in negotiating and implementing a heavy weapons cantonment project. The project was aimed at assisting the Afghan national government to collect and decommission the large number of tanks and other heavy weapons systems left over from decades of war, in particular, those located in and around the Kabul area. Over a thousand
pieces of artillery were moved to a secure area outside of Kabul and the process is 100 percent complete in the city. Based on the success of the Kabul initiative, the weapons cantonment program has been expanded to all parts of Afghanistan and has resulted in the collection of 12,000 pieces of artillery, tanks, and rocket launchers and is 80 percent complete (Government of Canada, 2005e; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006c). Securing heavy weaponry and by extension reducing the power of militias and warlords are seen as integral parts of strengthening the Afghan government, establishing the rule of law and further stabilizing Afghanistan.

Afghanistan’s illegal drug trade remains “the biggest challenge to its long-term security, development and governance” (Government of Canada, 2006b) by those involved in the stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Afghan opium poppy production in 2004 amounted to an estimated 4,200 metric tons, which equals 87% of global opium poppy cultivation (United Nations Information Service, 2004). The UN estimates that Afghan poppies produce some 92% of the world’s heroin. This trade generates revenue of around $30 billion annually, an amount equal to 60% of Afghanistan’s 2003 non-drug related GDP. The profits from the illicit drug business are used to corrupt government officials and finance regional warlords and terrorist groups, including the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda forces.

Canada made significant contributions towards reducing opium trafficking and production in Afghanistan. “Through the Counter Narcotics Capacity Building project in Afghanistan and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Canada [has supported] the efforts of the Afghan government to strengthen its capacity to curtail trafficking” (Government of Canada, 2005e, 8). Canada’s most significant contribution in support of the counter-narcotics campaign came through its funding of the Government of Afghanistan’s Alternative Livelihoods Investment Program. CIDA’s $1.2 million contribution to the program was designed to support
“a number of initiatives to help Afghan farmers sustain their families, while giving up the illegal cultivation of poppies. These initiatives assist in the development of alternative livelihoods through rural infrastructure, assistance with better agricultural practices and crop diversification” (Government of Canada, 2005e, 8).

Canada also committed to building and reinforcing “the physical infrastructure required to detain and try alleged drug offenders” (Government of Canada, 2005e, 6). This infrastructure included providing specialized training to key legal professionals, such as judges, prosecutors and investigators, as well as building and repairing courthouses and detention centers.

Canada viewed a dependable civilian police force as an essential element in providing security and maintaining the rule of law in Afghanistan. Since June 2003, as part of the integrated Canadian approach and in cooperation with the Government of Germany, the lead donor to the police reform pillar of SSR, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) International Peacekeeping Branch, along with other Canadian civilian police forces, have been employed in providing training and advice to the Afghan National Police. Specific duties include “advising on logistics support, reviewing and making recommendations on police standard operating procedures, advising on the command and control structure of the local Afghan police forces, advising on the relationship between local police and their communities, and conducting police training” (Government of Canada, 2006c).

In what can be seen as an extension of the Canadian involvement in the Ottawa Treaty to Ban Landmines, Canada played a key funding and operational role in the demining of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is one of the most heavily mined countries with an estimated 10-15 million mines covering some 850 square kilometers of the country (Government of Canada, 2005e, 8; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006e). “The presence of mines represents a huge constraint
to the recovery of the country because the minefields tend to be clustered around settled areas; the mines tend to affect arable fertile land, which is a tiny percentage of the country’s overall territory” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006e). In coordination with the United Nations Mine Action Centre in Afghanistan (UNMACA), Canada has become one of the lead donors in mine action. Its efforts included “mine clearance, mine risk education, and rehabilitation of victims — a prerequisite for resuming economic and social life in contaminated areas” (Government of Canada, 2005e, 8). As of 2005/2006 Canada was involved in clearing almost 1/3 of Afghanistan’s 10-15 million landmines and continues to take a lead role “in a project to collect and destroy all stockpiled anti-personnel mines and unsafe, unserviceable and surplus ammunition” (Government of Canada, 2005e, 8; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006e.).

The stabilization of Afghanistan remains the key priority in creating the conditions for successful reconstruction of the country. Building and maintaining security are seen by Ottawa and its international reconstruction partners as necessary pre-conditions for other development efforts, including the expansion of the authority of the Afghan national government and efforts directed at poverty reduction.

**Strengthening and Promoting Governance**

The second pillar of the continued Canadian engagement in Afghanistan focuses on strengthening governance, particularly in terms of legitimacy and participation. Afghanistan has suffered from a crisis of governance for over thirty years. “Every governing entity in Afghanistan since 1978 has committed grave human rights abuses with impunity and wielded control at great cost to the people of the country. The very concept of government in Afghanistan’s recent history is embodied by the desire of factions and warlords to rule at all costs, rather than to serve the needs of the population” (Thier and Chopra, 2002, 900). Canada
firmly believes that building democratic institutions and promoting human rights and the rule of law are crucial to the long term security, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan.

The promotion of good governance was recognized by Ottawa as an area in which Canada has a comparative advantage in making positive contributions to the Afghan reconstruction process. Canada’s efforts in strengthening and promoting governance in Afghanistan are evidenced in the five pronged approach outlined in the 2005 IPS (Development).

These five areas for action are identified as:

- **Democratization** with an emphasis on electoral democracy and enhanced engagement of civil society in the political process;
- **Human rights** with an emphasis on the rights of women and children affected by conflicts, gender-based violence and natural disasters;
- **Rule of law** focusing on stronger judiciary, bar and legal aid systems;
- **Public sector institution and capacity building** with an emphasis on reducing corruption, increasing accountability, responsiveness and managerial capacities;
- **Conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security-sector reform** focusing on integration of conflict indicators and early warning systems, demobilization of former combatants and small arms collection, truth and reconciliation commissions; and transparency in policing and security agencies. (CIDA, 2005, 6)

The Government of Canada contends that since 2001, Afghanistan has made remarkable strides to becoming a democratic nation. The Loya Jirga passed a new constitution that emphasizes the protection of both civil and human rights. As outlined in the Bonn Agreement, presidential elections were conducted in the fall of 2004 with a record 8 million Afghans voting, 40% of whom were women. Further parliamentary and provincial elections were held in September 2005 with over 12 million Afghans registering to vote. “In December 2005, the Afghan parliament sat for the first time in over 30 years, giving Afghans a voice and laying the foundation for a stable and prosperous Afghanistan” (Government of Canada, 2005e,10). Canada fully supported the evolving democratic process in Afghanistan and contributed to civic
education, screening at polling stations and voter registration as well as conducting monitoring and security duties during the elections (Government of Canada, 2005e, 10).

In supporting the democratic process in Afghanistan, the Government of Canada believed the keys to success lie in strengthening governance institutions and further extending the central government’s authority beyond Kabul. The most significant Canadian contribution to this evolving process comes in the funding of the Afghan Stabilization Project (ASP). The five year project, 2004-2009, is valued at US $239 million, with a CIDA contribution of close to US $45 million, US $33 million of which has already been distributed. The ASP “is a vehicle by which the government seeks to extend its administrative presence into the provinces by building up the government infrastructure, government buildings and courthouses, training civil servants and building their capacity to develop and design provincial development plans down the road” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006f).

Other Canadian funded initiatives aimed at strengthening and promoting governance in Afghanistan included a $1.2 (CAD) million CIDA contribution the UNDP’s Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL) project (CIDA, 2006d) and a $6 (CAD) million commitment to International Development Law Organization Strengthening the Rule of Law project (CIDA, 2006b).

The promotion of democracy and participation are integral elements in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and rebuilding the institutional basis and strengthening the legitimacy and authority of the Afghan government is an important step.

Reducing Poverty

Poverty reduction was the third pillar of Canada’s continuing reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. After years of conflict, poverty and development issues are paramount in
Afghanistan. "Even the most cursory glance at the list of development indicators for Afghanistan confirms the scale of the challenge to be addressed" (Barakat, 2002, 807; Sedra, 2004, 4). The United Nations Development Program’s 2004 Human Development Index lists Afghanistan 173rd out of 178 countries. An estimated 70 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, with Millennium Development Goal indicators below the majority of sub-Saharan African countries (UNDP, 2004). Roughly 23 percent of the population has access to a safe drinking source, while only 12 percent have access to adequate sanitation. With an estimated non-drug-related GDP of $4 billion, current per capita income averages around a mere $200 (Sedra, 2004, 4). Overall life expectancy of Afghans is forty-two, one of the lowest in the world. The overall under-5 mortality rate is also one of the highest in the world at 257 per 1,000 (UNDP, 2004).

In partnership with the Afghan Government, other national donors, international organizations and non-governmental organizations, Canada has made significant financial contributions to poverty reduction in Afghanistan. Canada’s specific contributions include support of the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) and the Afghan Government’s National Solidarity Program (NSP). Each will be described in brief below.

**Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA)**

As of 2003, Canada had become the lead donor to MISFA, a national microfinance program created by the Afghan Government. “The MISFA provides investment funds to a wide range of microfinance institutions that, in turn, provide money loans and financial services to the poor and vulnerable of Afghanistan” (CIDA, 2006c). The loans are designed to help fund small-scale entrepreneurial projects aimed at helping the poor work their way out of poverty by establishing small businesses. Administered through the World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Canada’s contribution to the program is approaching $40 million. To
date the program has benefited some 200,000 people, 75% of whom are women, often
considered Afghanistan most vulnerable population (CIDA, 2006c).

**National Solidarity Program (NSP)**

The National Solidarity Program (NSP) was created by the Government of Afghanistan
and was designed to develop the ability of Afghan communities to identify, plan, manage and
monitor their own development projects (NSP, 2006). The NSP promotes a new development
paradigm whereby communities are encouraged to make decisions and manage resources during
all stages of the project cycle. “The program will lay the foundation for a sustainable form of
inclusive local governance, rural reconstruction, and poverty alleviation” (NSP, 2006). The
program empowers communities through the creation of locally elected community development
councils who then determine the need and nature of reconstruction projects. Projects include the
building of physical infrastructure, providing access to services, training and public participation.
By 2006, “80% of projects involve infrastructure such as rural transportation, safe drinking water
and irrigation, schools or rural energy. The remaining 20% involve livelihood skills training and
education” (CIDA, 2006e). As of 2006, Canada has contributed $44 million, a sizeable share of
the $372 million provided by all donors. The program has reached more than 11.5 million
Afghans and more than 15,000 communities have elected community development councils.
Over 21,000 community projects have been approved and 8,400 community projects have
already been completed (CIDA, 2006e).

**Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar**

In early 2005 Canada announced its intention to take on a larger leadership role in
Afghanistan by expanding its security and reconstruction efforts through the deployment of a
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to the troubled Kandahar province. Since 2002, PRTs
have become the essential vehicle of the international community's reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. It is important to note that though the Martin Government accepted the current PRT role in Kandahar, the mission did not become operational until after the Harper Government came to power. The current role played by the PRT represents a significant departure from the role discussed below.

These small teams, consisting of both civilian and military elements, were designed to help the democratically-elected government of Afghanistan extend its authority and ability to govern; to improve the security situation; and to facilitate reconstruction in priority provinces. The teams operate in conjunction with the Afghan National Government, local communities, international organizations and NGOs. “The exact composition of each team is tailored to the specific requirements of each region, in accordance with local reconstruction requirements as well as the local threat and tactical risks” (Government of Canada, 2005h). The first PRTs were deployed by international forces in 2003 and were located in the southern and northern provinces of Afghanistan. As of March 2006 there were 23 PRTs operating in all Afghan provinces.

In August 2005, Canada took over command of PRT operations in Kandahar, one of the most unstable provinces in Afghanistan. “Kandahar was chosen as the ideal location for [Canada’s PRT] due to its strategic significance to peace and stability in Afghanistan” (Government of Canada, 2005h). The province’s capital, Kandahar City, home to an estimated 475,000 people (2003 estimate) is the second largest city in Afghanistan and is the historic capital of Afghanistan and the former seat of Taliban power (Government of Canada, 2006d).

The Canadian PRT conducts operations out of Camp Nathan Smith, named in honor of Private Nathan Smith of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) (PMFRC) who was killed while serving in Afghanistan. The camp is located on the outskirts of
Kandahar City. The Canadian PRT has three specific objectives: security sector reform; good governance and the promotion of the rule of law and human rights; reconstruction and development, (Government of Canada, 2006d). The PRT is designed to help extend the authority of the democratically elected Government of Afghanistan and to assist local authorities in providing governance, security, and services to its citizens (Government of Canada, 2006g). In 2006, the team consisted of approximately 330 members of the Canadian Forces, 5 civilian police representatives, 3 development officers (CIDA) and a diplomatic representative (FAC).

Due to the volatile security situation in Kandahar, including continuing low level insurgency by remaining pockets of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, security sector reform is given high priority within Canadian PRT operations. Security duties in the region include the provision of security and defence of Camp Nathan Smith and PRT personnel, responding to emergencies in Kandahar City and training and supporting the Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan National Police. Other Canadian-led PRT initiatives include: building networks between Canadian officials, local and national authorities, tribal and village leaders and local communities; reforming and building justice institutions; and strengthening local governance by providing funding and expertise to village/district development councils (Government of Canada, 2006g). Specific PRT operations also include: the providing basic needs, including emergency food aid; providing healthcare and equipment; supporting infrastructure development such as agriculture and irrigation, transportation networks and rural development; and providing funding and oversight to community led development programs through the NSP.

The Canadian PRT is designed to implement the whole-of government approach outlined in the 2005 IPS. Though progress has been incremental, the PRT continues to act as an effective
vehicle for cooperation between Canada, local communities, the Afghan government and various
development actors that will allow Afghanistan to continue on the road to a more stable country.

**Canada and Failed States: Afghanistan**

In relation to Canada’s policies towards failed states, Afghanistan provides a logical and
interesting case study. Canada has invested significant financial, military and personnel
resources into the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan. The current Canadian
engagement represents the first concrete implementation of Canada’s failed state policies. To
date, Canada’s engagement has been based on the peace-building approach with a particular
emphasis on expanding security and aiding in the development of accountable and effective
governance and institutional structures. However, Canada and its international partners face an
increasing fluid and highly complex situation in attempting stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan.
Chapter 4: Analysis through the Framework

The purpose of this chapter is to apply the framework developed in Chapter Two to the cases of the Canadian declaratory policy, specifically the IPS, and Canadian policy in Afghanistan, respectively. Each case will be surveyed across all four dimensions of the framework, with a particular emphasis on the policy response aspect. It will be demonstrated that Canadian policies at both the declaratory level and in the Afghanistan specific case are influenced by both the Weberian and functional perspectives. At this point, it may be helpful to the reader to reintroduce the framework that was developed in Chapter Two.

<table>
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<th>Table 1a: Summary of Perspectives</th>
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<td><strong>Conception of the State</strong></td>
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<td>Social Contract Model</td>
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<td><strong>Definition of Failed State</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Causes of State Failure</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Policy Responses</strong></td>
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</table>
Canadian Declaratory Policy

Conception of the State

As established in Chapter Two, conceptions of the state are important in defining state failure and prescribing policy responses to these states. While Canadian policy accepts the state as the primary actor in international relations, there is a recognition that the traditional legal, Westphalian and domestic components of modern sovereignty can no longer "serve as an excuse for tolerating actions that contravene human security or contribute to global instability" (Government of Canada, 2005a, 11; 2004b; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005b). As noted earlier, the Weberian definition of statehood is based on the maintenance of the monopoly on violence within a given territory. The functional conception of the state, used in the Canadian declaratory policy, identifies governmental legitimacy and the delivery of positive political goods to citizens as essential elements of statehood (Government of Canada, 2005a; 2005b).

The inclusion of the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine in many of the policies outlined by IPS further highlighted the use of the functional conception of the state within the Canadian declaratory policy (Government of Canada, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2005d; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006a; National Defence Canada, 2005b, 2005f). Emerging from Canadian sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine offers a substantial normative shift in the conception and responsibilities of the modern state. The doctrine reflects a functional conception of the state in that it conceives of sovereignty as responsibility and explicitly recognizes the "idea that the obligation to protect civilians is inherent in state sovereignty" (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006a). Further, in contrast to the Weberian conception of the state which upholds the principle of non-intervention in the international system, the doctrine specifically charges the international community with the right
to override the principle of non-intervention in cases where a state cannot or will not provide adequate positive political goods to its citizenry.

Within the IPS, the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine formed an important part of Canadian declaratory policy in two ways. Firstly, in regards to failed states, the doctrine outlines the appropriate circumstances and conditions necessary for international intervention into failed states. Secondly, the “Responsibility to Protect” became a focal point of Canada’s international agenda for action. The promotion of the doctrine at the international level was a policy priority in the IPS and the Government of Canada was committed to campaigning actively for its acceptance among other nations and international institutions (Government of Canada, 2005a, 26).

The functional conception of the state can also be seen in Canadian ideas of the post-conflict reconstruction activities that should take place in failed states. The reconstruction process itself is “conceptualized as a process to forge a new social contract with populace. The viability of this social contract and by extension, the legitimacy of the state is dependent in many ways on its ability to deliver public goods” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e).

While Canadian declaratory policy recognizes the state as the fundamental actor in international relations, there is a growing recognition of the need to readjust notions of sovereignty to reflect changing global circumstances, especially in those areas involving the role and duties of the modern state in a globalized world. Canada has taken a leadership role in promoting a functional conception of the state and a wider understanding of the concept of sovereignty arguably suited to the 21st century world. Such rethinking increasingly encompasses responsibilities to the international community as well as to a state’s own citizens and “combines
rights with responsibilities, and autonomy with collective action” (Government of Canada, 2005a, 4).

**Canadian Declaratory Policy: Defining State Failure**

The definitional problems that characterize the failed states discourse at the theoretical level can be found in inconstancies within Canadian declaratory policy. While the IPS was meant to outline a more integrated and coordinated Canadian foreign policy platform, no singular or precise definition of a failed state emerged. Within the IPS documents, there are subtle but important differences in how failed states are referenced. The Diplomacy and Development statements used the terms “failed and fragile states”, where the Defence statement used the terms “failed and failing” to describe, presumably, the same phenomenon.

In a 2005 speech, then Minister of Defence Bill Graham readily recognized that there is no precise definition of the term for “failed state”, nor is there any consensus as to the number of countries which could be characterized as such (National Defence Canada, 2005a). Given this lack of a precise definition and the difference in semantics of declaratory policy, Canadian definitions of failed states appear to contain elements of both the functional and Weberian approaches. With respect to the functional approach, Canadian policy suggested that:

> Fundamentally what distinguishes states that are strong from those that fragile or failed is the effectiveness (and willingness) of the state to meet the basic needs of its citizens and the legitimacy and credibility of the government in the eyes of its citizens. By basic needs, we refer to essential public goods, such as physical security, the rule of law, a stable economic environment etc. The government’s legitimacy is measure by its willingness to be held accountable through regular, free and fair elections. (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e)

This functional definition implicitly recognized state failure as process rather than a singular event. “The less able or willing a state is to meet the basic needs of its citizens, including the
right to freely choose their government, the more fragile the state” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e).

Despite elements of the functional approach in defining failed states within the Canadian declaratory policy, the increasing linkages made between failed states and international terrorism and trans-national crime networks suggest the Weberian approach. Former Assistant Deputy Minister of Foreign Affair’s International Security Branch and Political Directorate, James R. Wright, defined failed states as “those that are unable to effectively control their territory, to exert the rule of law and to comply with their international legal obligations” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e, 2). Defining failed states in this way implies a loss of the monopoly of violence and an inability of the state to control its sovereign borders. As a result, the state “cannot [or will not] prevent various forms of transnational economic crime or the use of its territory for the perpetration of violence against other states in the international system (The African Studies Center, 2003, 3). This loss of internal control is the central element of the Weberian definition of a failed state.

Interestingly, the IPS recognized this use of these two perspectives by suggesting that failed states present a “dual challenge” to Canadian policy. As mentioned earlier, the first challenge stems from the potential threats to Canada and international stability that emerge from the associations between failed states and terrorism and trans-national crime. Canada’s primary concern in regards to this challenge is to protecting its own citizens and sovereignty, a concern that clearly reflects the Weberian definition. The second challenge, that to the morals and values that Canada wishes to project internationally, reflects the more the functional view. However, as will be discussed in the analysis of Canadian policy in Afghanistan, the impetus for Canadian
involvement in failed states was directly related to threats to Canadian security rather than to Canadian morals and values.

**Canadian Declaratory Policy: Causes of State Failure**

In identifying the causes of state failure, Canadian declaratory policy was informed by the Weberian approach in that it does not explicitly locate the potential causes of state failure solely in the internal or domestic realm of the state. While there was recognition in the *IPS* of the importance of weak or flawed internal institutions and of the actions of corrupt rulers or elites in causing state failure, these conditions were viewed as consequences rather than causes of state failure. The Canadian position uses a more historically based analysis and suggests that failed states are a direct result of the incompleteness of the state-building process that can be related to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of globalization.

The global transformations ushered in by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar structure that had dominated international relations after the Second World War are identified as having a primary role in creating the conditions for state failure (Government of Canada, 2005a; 2005b; National Defence Canada, 2005a; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005b; 2005e).

The end of the superpower rivalry in the early 1990s brought with it the withdrawal of superpower benefactors from numerous states in the developing world that lacked the capacity to provide political goods on their own. The result was a decentralization of power within these states, escalating competition between non-state actors and a renewed appetite to re-open longstanding historical disputes. Cycles of poverty, uncontrolled resource exploitation, crime, corruption, authoritarianism and kleptocracy ensued as groups fought for control over valuable resources and for the apparatus of the state itself. (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e)

While the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the superpower rivalry may have initially provided the conditions of state failure, these conditions were further exacerbated by the
forces of globalization that came to define the immediate post-Cold War years. The IPS recognized globalization as the key driver of change in the early 21st Century (Government of Canada, 2005a; 2005d; 2005c). These global transformations included growing transnational linkages and increased economic integration and were frequently characterized by the increasingly porous nature of national borders to flows of information, technology, people, goods and services and knowledge. The Canadian government believed that the processes of globalization would facilitate greater communication and would foster interdependence, global prosperity and a growing sense of global community (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005b; Government of Canada, 2005a).

In spite of its real and potential benefits of globalization, a darker side began to emerge in the late 1990s, bringing with it new challenges and threats. The security challenges of this new world order “go far beyond the military forces of nation states waging war against each other” (Government of Canada, 2005a, 11), to encompass threats from non-state actors. Incidences of civil war or internal strife have become the most common type of conflict seen in the world, often having direct and serious impacts on innocent civilians. Transnational networks, the dominant social and economic aspects of globalization, have been exploited by both international terrorist and crime syndicates, such as the September 11, 2001 attacks, with devastating impacts. The greater international interdependence created by globalization also means that “the collapse of state capacity in one region can make all of us more vulnerable to transnational terrorist and criminal groups” (Government of Canada, 2005a, 11).

Where the end of the Cold War provided the initial conditions for state failure to occur, Canadian declaratory policy explicitly recognized the uneven, unequal and unforeseen impacts of
globalization as a primary causal mechanism in the rise and frequency of state failure in the modern international system.

**Canadian Declaratory Policy: Policy Responses**

The functional perspective influences and informs Canadian policy responses and decision-making towards failed states. The Canadian declaratory policy to 2006 explicitly promotes the internationally institutionalized peacebuilding approach, as supported by the UN and other national governments, as the most effective means of addressing failed states. Canada’s tradition of peacekeeping and its “commitment to tolerance and multiculturalism, to a federal system that accommodates diversity, to strong public institutions and to a vibrant civil society” (Government of Canada, 2005c, 12; National Defence Canada, 2005a; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e) leave Canada well placed contribute to peacebuilding operations.

Canada’s support of the peacebuilding approach was also evident at the multilateral level. The *IPS* made the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission at the United Nations a key priority of Canadian foreign policy (Government of Canada, 2005a, 26). Agreed to in principle at the 2005 World Leaders Summit, “this new international body, linked to Security Council, will focus high-level political attention on the failed and fragile states problem” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e; Government of Canada 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d;) The primary elements of peacebuilding - stability creation, restoration of state institutions and addressing the socio-economic dimensions of conflict - form the basis for Canadian policy responses towards state failure both in terms of preventative measures as well as in cases of intervention.

The *IPS* stated that Canada’s primary and most effective policy to address failed and fragile states was one of prevention (Government of Canada, 2005a, 2005b; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e). As suggested by the recent Canadian experiences in Afghanistan and Haiti,
strengthening fragile states before they reach the point of political, social or economic collapse is likely far easier and much less expensive than rebuilding and reconstructing states after they have already failed (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005e; Government of Canada, 2005a; 2005c). The IPS states that preventative action has the potential to take many forms “but clearly includes long-term development assistance that helps to build a set of institutions, civil society and political culture that is conducive to security and prosperity” (Government of Canada, 2005a, 13).

In cases where state failure has already occurred, the Government of Canada advocated a peacebuilding approach that stressed the whole-of-government approach. While the IPS did not deliver an explicit or specific plan of action it does outline a more general framework that reflects the fundamental elements of the peacebuilding approach. This approach involves “undertaking Defence efforts to strengthen security and stability, pursuing Diplomacy to enhance prospects for nation-building and reconstruction, and making certain that Development contributions are brought to bear in a coordinated and effective way” (Government of Canada, 2005a, vi). This 3D whole-of-government design follows the hierarchical or ‘top to bottom’ structure of the peacebuilding approach that places stabilization and security as the top priorities in engaging failed states, to be followed by institution building and then socio-economic reforms.

Model Matrix: Canadian Failed State Policy

The framework developed in the previous chapters becomes an important tool in locating the theoretical perspectives that inform and influence Canadian failed state policy. In applying the framework to Canadian declaratory policy, it can be seen that the Canadian position, 2003-2006, reflects elements of both the Weberian and functional perspectives.
Table 2: Canadian Declaratory Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conception of the State</th>
<th>Promotion of functional perspective – Responsibility to Protect Doctrine challenges principle of non-intervention and promotes wider understanding of sovereignty.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Failed State</td>
<td>No single definition prevails. Promotes functional perspectives in terms of the states inability to provide of political goods. Reflects a Weberian perspective in characterizing failed states as threats to security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes of State Failure</td>
<td>Reflects Weberian perspective – causes of state failure linked to incomplete state building. Specifically refers to Cold War and inequalities created by globalization.</td>
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**Canadian Policy in Afghanistan**

**Canadian Policy in Afghanistan: Conception of the State**

The conception of the state is a vital element in recognizing the dimensions of and addressing state failure. The conception of the state becomes important to Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan as it provides a potential guideline for policies for the stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The conception of the state used by Canada in the case of Afghanistan is informed by elements of both the functional and Weberian perspectives.

The Weberian perspective acts as a starting point for Canadian policy and action in Afghanistan. A successful Weberian state, by definition, must possess a central government capable of exerting territorial control by achieving and maintaining a monopoly on violence. It can be argued that historically, “territorial sovereignty has been an ideal to which Afghan rulers aspired, but rarely, if ever, achieved in practice” (Cramer, 2003, 144). This inability to maintain sovereign control is directly related to the failure of Afghan rulers to achieve a monopoly on violence (Cramer, 2003). The result of the decentralization of the means of violence in the Afghan state, most recently to regional warlords and Mujahedin factions, has been fragmentation.
of political authority. Canada recognized the establishment of a strong central government that possesses the necessary monopoly on violence to allow for extension of governmental authority throughout the country as one of the fundamental challenges in rebuilding the country.

Canadian efforts in Afghanistan were guided by two interrelated objectives based on the Weberian conception of a successful state: stabilizing the Afghan security environment; and extending the authority of the democratically elected Afghan Government (Government of Canada, 2005e; 2005i; National Defence Canada, 2005a; 2005b; 2005e). Canadian participation in and support for SSR programs are ultimately aimed at establishing the Afghan government, through the Afghan National Army, as the only legitimate source lawfully allowed or able to employ physical force. Among Canada and its international partners, it is widely held that securing the state’s monopoly on violence is an essential requirement in Afghan reconstruction. Centralizing the means of violence reduces the military and therefore political power of dissenting groups and is an integral part of re-establishing law and order and further establishing the sovereign authority of the Afghan government.

While the Weberian perspective forms the conceptual starting point for reconstruction efforts, it is the functional perspective that provides the potential endpoints for the Canadian mission. Canada’s ultimate goal, during 2003-2006, and perhaps since, of reforming Afghanistan into a stable, democratic society, capable of sustaining as a contributing member of the international community (Government of Canada, 2006a; 2005e; 2005i) reflects a functional conception of the state. From this perspective, a successful and enduring state is defined by its ability to provide its population with positive political goods. Historically, the “capacity of the Afghan state to mobilize and redistribute resources has always been limited” (Cramer, 2003, 145). This inability of the state to deliver positive political goods to its citizens is related to the
fragmentation and decentralization of power that has come to characterize contemporary Afghanistan. The Canadian mandate in Afghanistan has focused on building citizen confidence in national institutions, facilitating progress towards basic services and poverty reduction, and creating a transparent, accountable and functioning democratic state for delivery of basic services nation-wide (Government of Canada, 2006g; Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006g).

The Canadian conception of the state in regards to policy in Afghanistan contains an implicit recognition of the link between a strong central government and the ability of the state to provide its citizens with basic services and positive political goods. While Canadian efforts in Afghanistan include a functional conception of the state, elements of the Weberian perspective are also evident. There is a realization that a strong centralized Afghan government with the ability to maintain a monopoly on legitimate violence and extend its authority throughout its territory is needed in order to achieve the larger goal of creating a stable and democratic state.

Canadian Policy in Afghanistan: Defining State Failure

Given that no unified or precise definition of a failed state was evident in Canadian declaratory policy, it should come as no surprise that the Canadian position is noticeably vague on whether Afghanistan is a failed state. While the IPS makes a reference to the loss of state capacity as a defining feature of state failure in Afghanistan (Government of Canada, 2005a, 11) the policy does not elaborate. Rather, the Canadian position, in regards to Afghanistan, focuses less on the definitional aspects of a failed state and more on the related consequences of state failure. Canadian policy on Afghanistan is primarily informed by the dominant post 9/11 perspective that identifies failed states as potential breeding grounds for international terrorist organizations. After the 9/11 attacks, the Government of Canada characterized Afghanistan as a failed state that created a national and international security problem.
Canada’s initial involvement in Afghanistan was motivated by the threats posed by Afghanistan, as a failed state, to the safety and security of Canada and Canadians, both at home and abroad, as well as to larger international peace and security. These security threats provided the initial impetus behind Canada’s military contributions to and participation in the US-led coalition invasion of Afghanistan. The stated purposes of the invasion were to destroy the Al-Qaeda camps that trained the terrorists who carried out the 9/11 attacks, to deny Al-Qaeda sanctuary and freedom of movement within Afghanistan and to remove the Taliban regime which had provided support and safe haven to al-Qaeda (International Affairs and Defence Section, 2001).

Canada’s focus on the consequences of state failure is also evident in the stated goals for its continuing stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Canada’s main objective was “to help Afghanistan become a secure and self-sufficient democratic state that never again serves as a terrorist haven” (Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006g, 1). While the first part of statement reflects both the Weberian and functional perspectives, the latter clearly focuses on the threats posed to Canada and the international community in allowing Afghanistan to relapse into a failed state.

While offering no precise definition, Canadian declaratory policy defines state failure in terms of both the Weberian and functional perspectives. In contrast, Canadian policy towards Afghanistan does not reflect a definition in terms of loss of sovereign control or the inability to provide basic public goods. Rather it focuses on the consequences and the perceived impacts of state failure, in this case, the threats caused by international terrorism. Canadian intervention was not based on the human rights abuses or conditions of human insecurity created by the predatory and oppressive nature of the Taliban regime, but rather on the clear strategic interests of protecting Canada and Canadians within the context of the global “War on Terror”.

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Canadian Policy in Afghanistan: Causes of State Failure

Understanding the causes of state failure in Afghanistan is essential to effective stabilization and reconstruction efforts. As established in the previous section, Canadian declaratory policy on failed states during the Martin era did not identify the causes of state failure as solely located in the domestic realm. Rather, there are allusions to the effects that global transformations, in particular the end of the Cold War and globalization, have had on contributing to the rise in the prevalence of state failure. However, in regards to Afghanistan, Canadian policy reflected a functional perspective as it largely attributes the causes of state failure to the institutional and individual levels of analysis. From this perspective it was not the unequal and uneven impacts of globalization that caused state failure, but rather the unwillingness of the Taliban regime to participate in the new globalized world.

At the institutional level, Canadian policy emphasized the role of civil war, communal fragmentation, external predation, a closed economy and the lack of viable political institutions as possible causes of state failure in Afghanistan. These problems, especially, Afghanistan’s lack of a strong institutional basis and its lack of democracy and open market economy can be directly related to the functional view which emphasizes the roles and actions of state leadership as causal mechanisms in contributing to state failure. At the individual level, the predatory nature of the Taliban leadership and their role as the ruling elite which systematically dismantled and/or abandoned the few institutions that did exist in Afghanistan is recognized as major contributor to state failure in Afghanistan.

Canadian Policy in Afghanistan: Policy Responses

The Canadian policy responses to state failure in Afghanistan are heavily informed by the functional perspective’s peacebuilding approach. Emphasizing institutional development and
capacity building in support of the central government, this perspective provides a hierarchy of initiatives on which Canada based its reconstruction efforts.

Firstly, at the pinnacle of the hierarchy is the establishment of security. It was a fundamental premise of Canadian stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan that security, in the form of maintaining a state based monopoly on the legitimate use of force, is a precondition for further development. Providing security and stabilizing the country through military force are seen as integral parts of extending and reinforcing the authority of the Afghan national government. This security-first mandate was evidenced both in policy documents and concrete actions. Stabilizing Afghanistan was clearly established as the top Canadian priority and formed the first pillar of action of the Canadian engagement in Afghanistan. Further, security sector reform was the primary mandate of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team. While Canada employed an integrated 3D strategy in Afghanistan, the Defence portion was the dominant component of the Canadian commitment both in terms of budget allocations and in the deployment of human resources.

Given a degree of security, the peacebuilding approach advocates political reforms aimed at increasing the institutional capacity of the central government. Canada followed this strategy by promoting the principles of good governance, supporting the constitution-making and the formal presidential, parliamentary and provincial electoral processes and strengthening the institutional legitimacy and formal authority of the Afghan national government through mechanisms such as the Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL) project and the IDLO Strengthening the Rule of Law project.

The peacebuilding approach advocates security, governance and development as mutually reinforcing objectives. Canada was active in a number of development programs aimed
at improving the lives of every-day Afghans. These programs include broad based support for sustainable employment, the construction of rural infrastructure, and literacy and education programs directed at the most vulnerable of Afghanistan population, women and children.

In sum, Canada's engagement in Afghanistan follows the peacebuilding approach. The three focus areas of the approach - security, representation and welfare - can be clearly referenced in the three pillars that still guide Canadian reconstruction efforts in the country: stabilizing Afghanistan, strengthening governance and poverty reduction. The desired endpoints of these efforts also reflect an adherence to the peacebuilding approach. Canada's stated goal, as previously noted, was to help Afghanistan become a "secure and self-sufficient democratic state that never again serves as a terrorist haven" (Government of Canada, 2005e, 3). It should be noted that while the functional perspective underlies reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, the current focus is on the provision of security and providing the Afghan National Government with means to achieve and maintain the monopoly on violence. It could be argued that the Canadian emphasis on the defence element of the 3D framework highlighted the Weberian perspective.

**Canadian Policy in Afghanistan: Findings**

In applying the framework to Canada's declaratory policy and self-described action in Afghanistan, results similar to those of the analysis of the declaratory policy emerge. Again, elements of both the functional and Weberian perspectives are found to inform and influence Canadian policy and action in Afghanistan.
Table 3: Canadian Policy (Afghanistan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conception of the State</th>
<th>Reflects Weberian and functional perspectives. The establishment of a strong central government with a monopoly on violence is seen as a precondition for the creation of stable and democratic society.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Failed State</td>
<td>No single definition prevails. Focus is on consequences (international terrorism and trans-national crime) rather than definitional aspects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes of State Failure</td>
<td>Reflects functional perspective at individual and institutional level. Corrupt and predatory nature of Taliban regime identified as cause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Responses</td>
<td>Reflects functional perspective – peacebuilding best way to address and help Afghanistan. Though current emphasis is on achieving Weberian monopoly on violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

The framework utilized in this work provides a useful and organized way through which to analyze Canadian policy towards failed states - both the more general declaratory policy and the policies relating to Canadian action in Afghanistan. In both cases the functional and the Weberian perspectives influence Canadian policy. While the framework is effective in revealing what perspectives influence and inform Canadian foreign policy and action in failed states, it cannot explain why these perspectives are used. The following and concluding chapter will expand upon on the findings and discuss some of the larger implications of the research.
Chapter 5: Analysis of Findings and Conclusion

Applying the framework developed in Chapter Two to Canadian declaratory policy and the case of Canadian policy in Afghanistan, this thesis finds that Canadian policy towards failed states under the Martin government was informed and influenced by both the Weberian and the functional perspectives. The use of these two differing, and at times competing, perspectives in conceptualizing, and defining the problem, and developing policy responses aimed at addressing failed states suggests some important implications in practical policy directions and in areas for future research. The purpose of this chapter is to expand upon on the initial findings, address the implications and consider areas for future research. In particular, it will explore the question of why these perspectives were used.

The findings presented in this work can be divided into three categories: those relating to the conceptual and practical problems of the academic and policy debates surrounding failed states, those relating to Canadian declaratory policy as articulated in the IPS, and finally those relating to the implementation of policies specific to the case of Afghanistan.

The Failed State Debates

Despite its featured usage amongst academics, policy-makers and journalists, the concept of a “failed state” remains vague and subject to varying interpretations and differing practical actions. In an attempt to delineate and demarcate the differing conceptualizations that characterize the failed state debates, this thesis adopted a framework in which three competing theoretical perspectives - functional, Weberian and critical - are surveyed across four dimensions. These perspectives are analyzed through a modified version of a framework originally proposed by Woodward (2005), which identifies the dimensions of the framework as: conception of the state, definition of state failure, causal mechanisms and policy responses. The
framework is useful to gain a clearer understanding of the conceptual issues and theoretical divisions of the failed state debates.

The framework used in this work is a useful conceptual tool in that it allows us to see the points of consensus and contention between the competing perspectives that make up the failed state debates. However, it does not necessarily help us understand why a particular perspective is or is not used in a particular instance by a particular government. The framework is able to show the assumptions that underpin each of the perspectives but it cannot account for the choice of assumptions or the political motivations of a government or international organization in labeling a state as “failed” or directing action towards such a state. Further, the framework is static. It is descriptive rather than explanatory in nature and, as a result, it cannot explain the changes over time that have occurred within the academic and policy discourses regarding failed states. Unlike the framework, the term “failed state” and its application, particularly in the context of the global “War on Terror”, is dynamic and seems to have different connotations and applications to differing groups at different times.

The framework does provide insight into some of the problems encountered in effectively conceptualizing failed states. Many of the conceptual issues in the failed state literature can be related to larger debates within contemporary international relations, particularly the different ideas of the place and role of the modern state and the concept of sovereignty in an increasingly globalized world. Analysis of the competing perspectives through the framework reveals far more questions than answers. Rather than outlining a single unifying theory, the framework indicates a number of inconsistencies and tensions between and within the three dominant perspectives concerning the best way to conceptualize, define and address these states.
The concept of failed states, itself, suffers from some serious shortcomings, which brings into question its analytical utility. The term “failed state”, particularly in its mainstream usage, has become little more than “an overaggregated catch-all category” (Call, 2008, 4), which assumes a common condition amongst a variety of states with diverse sets of circumstances.

This over aggregation becomes evident when comparing the lists of recognized failed states or states likely to fail as generated by the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index, the Canadian Indicators for Foreign Policy Country (CIFP) Rankings and the Brookings Institution Weak State Index. Different though occasionally overlapping set of criteria and indicators are used, which in turn produces differing lists of countries which are considered to have failed or are likely to fail. The Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index focuses primarily on conflict analysis and uses twelve social, economic and political indicators which are for the most part limited to the domestic sphere. The CIFP rankings are based a wider set of indicators and include such issue areas as environmental stress and international linkages. The Brookings Institution Weak State Index includes indicators grouped into political, economic, security and social welfare baskets.
Table 4: Comparison of Failed States Lists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Sudan</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Iraq</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Somalia</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chad</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Democratic Republic Of Congo</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Afghanistan</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Guinea</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Central African Republic</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the lists have numerous countries in common, the wide range of differing contexts and circumstances that affect the listed states becomes apparent.

Some are at war, others are not. Some are authoritarian regimes, others democracies. Some are poor, others upper middle income, and still others wealthy with oil. Some have armed conflicts in one corner, others throughout the territory. Some have less corrupt governments, others wholly corrupt. Wars afflicting places like Iraq, Cote d'Ivoire and Indonesia diverge greatly in their scope, intensity and causes. The historic role of the state vis-à-vis tribal or traditional authorities differ greatly as well. The idea that these states have more shared traits than distinguishing traits is questionable. (Call, 2008, 4)

Much of the research and policy towards failed states confuses concept with measures. The result is a circular logic where the same measures are used for both cause and outcome. For example, this is akin to stating that Somalia is a failed state because it lacks a central government and that it lacks a central government because it is a failed state. Iqbal and Starr note this confusion between concept and measures and the difficulties it creates in research design and the ability of researchers to analyze failed states empirically. They state that “the analyses or reports use the results of the analyses (which are based on the independent variables used) to describe the concept under investigation – that is, the dependent variable (Iqbal and Starr 2007, 6).
It is clear that more research, both conceptually and empirically, is needed in the continuing efforts to refine the concept of failed states. States do not follow the same path to failure. Greater consideration must be given to the circumstances that generate state failure. Rather than use of a catchall term, a more specific terminology that identifies specific causes rather than general conditions of state failure may provide a starting point in generating more useful and context-specific policy alternatives for addressing failed states.

Another problematic area is the post-9/11 conceptualization of failed states as direct threats to national and international security. Firstly, linking of failed states to international terrorism is based on a convenient but somewhat superficial analysis that reflects the highly politicized application of the concept within the context of the global ‘War on Terror’. While it is true in specific cases, such as Sudan, Algeria and Afghanistan, that these linkages existed, it is inaccurate to suggest that all failed states are potential breeding grounds for terrorist activity (Patrick, 2006; CCIC, 2006a). This faulty assumption obscures the fact that terrorist activity can originate in strong states as well. The fact that 19 of the 21 terrorist involved in the 9/11 attacks were of Saudi nationality is a particularly alarming piece of evidence in support of this position.

Secondly, while the functional perspective produces the dominant conception of a failed state, one that focuses on the lack of governmental capacity to provide basic services to its population, the actual application of the label to specific countries, particularly within the context of the global ‘War on Terror’, reflects a more Weberian influence that places the security needs of the West over the humanitarian concerns of those living in failed states. “In other words, the military security needs of the West are conflated with the security needs of civilians suffering violence and injustice, the latter being used to justify the former” (CCIC, 2006a, 2).
This movement away from the humanitarian concerns that defined early conceptions of failed states to the contemporary focus on failed states as potential havens and breeding grounds for international terrorism has been influenced by the underlying structural changes of the post 9/11 international security environment where “the safety of states is placed above the benefits associated with human rights and even economic liberalism” (Cooper and Rowlands, 2005, 4). With the emergence of terrorism as the most significant of global threats perceived by Western states and the vulnerability of all nations to its consequences, “the treatment of ‘failed states’ became driven by national security agendas and the fissure separating the varied definitions of failed states was erased, with poverty reduction, development and the rights-based approach officially being subordinated to wider strategic imperatives” (Cornish, 2007, 18). As a result, the normative justifications and precedents for humanitarian interventions that justified failed state interventions during the 1990s have become, through the development of threat based interventions, appropriated by the security agenda of the West and, as demonstrated in the case of Afghanistan, have been used a justification for pre-emptive and defensive war (Cornish, 2007).

More consideration must be given to the political motivations and implications of labeling a state as failed. In the post-9/11 international security environment the term “failed state” has become highly politicized and its usage within the context of the US-led global ‘War on Terror’ has direct implications for conceptions of sovereignty and international order. The linkages made between failed states and the threat of global terrorism have resulted in an emphasis on a state’s right to pre-emptive self-defence at the expense of the principle of non-intervention, a fundamental element of traditional notions of sovereignty. Hehir states that this “new understanding of sovereignty and intervention is predicated on a belief in the cultural and
political eminence of the West and the ensuing conviction that Western states must be afforded
greater leeway in the conduct of their international affairs" (Hehir, 2007, 3). It can be argued that
in prioritizing the security interests of the West, “the proposed sanctioning of pre-emption to deal
with the menace posed by failed states can be seen as constituting a further stage in the creation
of a sovereign hierarchy” (Glennon, 1999, 4; Hehir 2007, 4). Such a hierarchy privileges the
position of Western nations and subjugates the traditional notions of sovereignty to the Western
defined interests of international peace and security.

The conclusions of this thesis can be broadly divided into two themes. Firstly, this thesis
finds that the inherent problems in adequately conceptualizing failed states and the lack of
articulation around the central concept contributes to vagueness and confusion in how the term is
applied and in the nature of actions towards a particular failed state. The over aggregation of the
concept, the confusion between concept and measure, and the focus on consequences more than
causal mechanisms raises questions about the concept’s analytical utility. Greater efforts must be
made to refine the concept and develop better ways of identifying and measuring and
understanding incidences of state failure.

The second theme questions the ideological assumptions underlying the concept and “the
use of the concept as means of advancing power and hegemony” (Call, 2008, 18). The
application of the term “failed state”, particularly in the context of the ‘War on Terror’, has direct
implications for traditional notions of sovereignty and produces a world order which privileges
the place of the system’s more powerful nations, including Canada, and may provide a greater
degree of legitimacy in the use of pre-emptive force against those states which are deemed to
pose threats to Western interests. Greater research is needed into the potential consequences of
any reinterpretation of the traditional concept of sovereignty. Portraying failed states primarily
as security threats to the West and privileging the right to self defence over the notion of sovereign equality “constitutes a regression to an international order based on power and patronage where instances of warfare are likely to increase” (Hehir, 2007, 1). Doing so raises some serious questions about the implications of our concept of the state and also questions the role and place of the state in the modern world order.

As will be demonstrated in the following sections, the broader themes that emerge from the policy and academic discourses can also be found in the Canadian cases of the declaratory policy and in the policy actions directed towards Afghanistan.

The Canadian Declaratory Policy

Many of the conceptual and practical problems that characterize the failed state discourses are mirrored in Canada’s usage of the term. Canadian declaratory policy is noticeably vague and offers no concrete definition of a failed state and there are no references to the measures used to determine the incidences or intensity of state failure. In relation to the second theme, more research is needed on why Canada has made failed states a policy priority and on the policy responses to these states.

Related to the specific conceptual and definitional problems of conceptualizing failed states, the over aggregation and lack of causal analysis found in the academic and policy discourses can also be found in the Canadian declaratory policy. While failed states were given a higher priority within the Canadian foreign policy agenda, little has been done in the way of differentiating causes from consequences in terms of addressing these states. In the IPS, the Government of Canada identified Afghanistan, Haiti and Somalia as examples of failed states where Canada can have a potentially positive impact. However, labeling these three distinct cases all as examples of state failure implies similarities and similar solutions. A deeper analysis
of the causal mechanisms of state failure may in fact lead to a better understanding of how and why these states failed and may be useful in designing more country specific policy responses.

Secondly, in terms of addressing the ideological assumptions that underpin Canada efforts regarding failed states, it could be argued that during the Martin era, the Weberian perspective, with its more Realist focus on traditional state and security concerns, has been emphasized over the functional perspective and its promotion of such liberal values as the rule of law, good governance and the respect for human rights, diversity and equality. This privileging of national interests over the promotion of the values can best be demonstrated through asking and answering two interrelated questions; why did the IPS make failed states a foreign policy priority; and whose interests guided Canadian policy and action in these states.

As described in Chapter Two, the IPS assumes both the Weberian and functional perspectives in outlining the challenges failed states pose to Canada and why they matter as a focus of foreign policy. In the first case, Canada characterized failed states, specifically through their linkages with global terrorism and trans-national crime, as direct threats to national and international security. As expressed in the IPS, Canada's primary concern in this regard was the protection of its own citizens and sovereignty reflecting the Weberian perspective. The humanitarian impacts often associated with state failure reflect elements of the functional perspective and a state's inability to effectively fulfill its primary role as a service provider. However, Canada's failed state policies shows that the protection and advancement of Canadian national interests, particularly in terms of national security and defence, rather than humanitarian principles, are the primary motivating factors behind Canadian foreign policy.

The emphasis on the Weberian perspective can also be seen in how the IPS conceptualized the role and place of the state in the modern world. The IPS clearly stated "that
there can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens" (IPS, Overview, 2005, 30). Indeed, the overarching purpose of the IPS was to realign Canadian foreign policy to reflect the changing nature of global threats in the post 9/11 era and there is an explicit recognition of the duty of the government to protect Canadian territory and maintain the welfare of Canadian citizens. Jack Granatstein comments that with introduction of the IPS and its call for a “clear-eyed understanding of our core national interests” (IPS, Overview, 2005, 30), the Martin government “looked realistically at the globe and talked – for the first time in many years –of Canada as a nation with interests to advance and protect” (Granatstein, 2007, 209).

The emphasis on the position and role of the state found in the IPS reflects what Cohen (2003) refers to as the expanded role and place of the state in post 9/11 international relations as both a target and a security provider (Cohen, 2003, 15). In terms of being a target, failed states can be overtaken or controlled by non-state actors such as terrorist or criminal networks, as evidenced by the Al-Qaeda influence over the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Weberian perspective with its focus on domestic sovereignty, characterized by a strong central government with a monopoly on violence and the ability to control its territory and population, underlies the desire to preserve “the integrity of states from non-traditional ideological or ethno-religiously based movements” (Cohen, 2003, 15).

The increased role of the state as a security provider also reflects the Weberian perspective. After the 9/11 attacks, many Western countries, including Canada had to reemphasize their roles as providers of security to protect against the potential terror threats emanating from failed states. The most visible manifestations of this expanded role can be seen
in the reinvestment in Canada’s hard power assets and the traditional elements of statecraft advocated by the IPS.

Given the perceived vulnerability of all states to the threat of global terrorism and the emphasis on the state’s role as a security provider, the IPS uses a more Realist orientation that focuses on the pursuit of national interests. While the IPS presents “a broad holistic version of security” (Smith, 2005, 9), one that promotes both national and human security, the emphasis lies on the protection and advancement of Canadian national interests.

The primacy of security in determining the priority placed on failed states does not mean the complete exclusion of the functional perspective and the values and principles that Canada has traditionally wished to project at the international level. Canadian failed state policy continues to advocate values such as respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, gender equality and good governance. These are areas in which Canada believes it maintains a comparative advantage and they form the basis of the peace-building formula that Canada promotes through the 3D approach as the best way to address and help stabilize failed states. However, when attempting to answer questions about the interests that guide Canadian failed state policy, it becomes evident that the values associated with the functional perspective have become subjugated to the pursuit of national interests as associated with the Weberian perspective.

Unlike the value driven human security foreign policy agenda advocated by the Chrétien government that was motivated by humanitarian impulse and the desire to project Canada as “doing good” in international affairs, the more realist and interest driven policies of the IPS viewed the promotion of the above-mentioned values as a way to achieve greater security for Canada. In characterizing failed states as a security threats, the IPS privileged military and
security concerns over development and humanitarian concerns. In particular, the policy priority placed on failed states has been used to justify a greater role for the Canadian Forces within foreign policy, providing both purpose and context for the renewal and strengthening of Canadian military capabilities.

Much like its usage in the broader academic and policy debates, the term “failed state” has become highly politicized within the Canadian policy making establishment. Greater consideration must be given to the political motivations for its usage and its place as a policy priority within the Canadian foreign policy agenda.

The choice to make failed states a Canadian foreign policy priority was expressly political. The foreign policy reorientation of the IPS and the resulting focus on failed states may have been influenced as much by Prime Minister Paul Martin’s desire to differentiate the policies of his government from those of the previous government as by an attempt to realign Canadian foreign policy with new global realities. Martin and Chrétien were long time political rivals. In contrast to the foreign policy approach of the Chrétien government, Martin wanted Canada to have a larger role in international affairs. To achieve the desired political distance from the policies of his predecessor, “Martin realized that this would require a both a significant reinvestment in Canada’s internationally-focused departments and a revision of Ottawa’s foreign, defence and development policies” (Desroisiers, 2008, 21). The change in emphasis of failed states within Canadian foreign policy and the introduction of the 3D approach became vehicles to pursue Martin’s vision of foreign policy and to differentiate the policies of his government from the legacy of Jean Chrétien.

Further, even the decision to include elements of the both the functional and Weberian perspective in defining failed states within Canadian policy can be seen as expressly political.
The inclusion of both perspectives allows the Canadian government to apply different definitions to differing countries at different times and may provide justification for action or inaction in a particular instance. The use of the two perspectives may allow Canada to be selective about engaging failed states, rather than committing itself to every incidence of state failure. It can be argued that in using both perspectives as the basis for defining a failed state, allows Canada to be selective in choosing which failed states require responses. For example, Somalia has been a failed state for over decade, but the Canadian response has been limited at best.

The conceptual and practical problems in analyzing the place of failed states within the Canadian declaratory policy reveal the limitations of the framework used by this work. As in the case of the broader debates, the framework in this instance, demonstrates the assumptions used by the differing perspectives and possible directions for action towards, but it does not address how or why a particular choice of assumptions and resulting actions are used in a particular instance. The analysis can reveal that the Weberian perspective more heavily influences and informs Canadian foreign policy towards failed states under the Martin government but it cannot identify the political motivations or intentions behind this choice.

Further, the analysis cannot account for the changes over time that occurred in the direction of Canadian declaratory policy towards failed states. Indeed, the purpose of this work is to provide insight into the theoretical perspectives that inform and influence failed state policy under the Martin Government and not to demonstrate change over time. The analysis acts as a snapshot in time of the policies of a specific government. The information provided in Chapter Two relating to the concept within Canadian foreign policy was intended to serve only as background information; however my analysis clearly demonstrates that a change over time has occurred, a potentially important avenue for future research. A comparative analysis between the
policies and orientation of the Chrétien, Martin and Harper governments may give valuable insight into not only how Canadian foreign policy towards failed states has changed but why this change has occurred. Given that Steven Harper is now well into his term as Prime Minister, and has advocated for what appears to be an even more privileged place for the military as a tool of foreign affairs, his inclusion would make an interesting addition to such an analysis.

Despite the analytical limitations of the framework, it is hoped that the findings of this work contribute to some of the broader debates surrounding Canadian foreign policy. In particular, the use of the Weberian and functional perspectives within Canadian declaratory policy towards failed states reflects the dualistic underpinning of contemporary Canadian foreign policy. On one hand, the inclusion of the functional perspective, with its focus on such concepts as good governance, the promotion of human rights and respect for diversity, provides a link to the tenets of Pearsonian internationalism that have traditionally provided the basis for Canada’s international and self-image (Nossal, 1997). Canada’s commitment to multilateralism, its focus on human rights and the claim of “inventing” peacekeeping have arguably all been fundamental elements of the Canadian identity. The functional perspective with its focus on values speaks to the continuation of these characteristics, at least at a rhetorical level. However, the importance of the Weberian perspective in Canadian policy towards failed states reveals some fundamental tensions between the traditional international image of Canada and the realities of the post-9/11 world. “Many of the key self-images built up in Canada – either through a long historical process or through their association with the recent orders – have been challenged and overturned” (Cooper and Rowlands, 2005, 5). In the post-9/11 security environment “talk of civilizational divides clashes with the promotion of pluralism and diversity …[and] the safety of states is placed above the benefits associated with human rights and even economic liberalism” (Cooper
and Rowlands, 2005, 5). In privileging security over values, the Canadian declaratory policy towards failed states re-emphasizes the position of the sovereign state in international relations and commits the government of Canada to a reassertion of the traditional tools of statecraft not only to provide security and prosperity for its citizens in an increasingly dynamic and dangerous world order, but also to increase Canadian influence as an actor on the global stage.

**Canadian Policy in Afghanistan**

The conceptual and definitional issues and the common themes that are found in both the failed state debates and in Canadian declaratory policy are also evident in the examination of Canadian failed state policy in the specific case of Afghanistan. The lack of definitional clarity around the central concept has created a sense of confusion about the nature, direction and objectives of Canada's involvement. This confusion can be seen between governmental departments and in terms of communicating an understanding of the issues involved to the Canadian public. Further, the emphasis on the Weberian perspective and evidence of the functional perspective in influencing and informing Canadian action in Afghanistan reflects a disconnect between the words and deeds of the Martin government regarding Afghanistan which not only adds to the confusion surrounding the Canadian mission but also speaks to the broader role and image of Canada in international affairs.

Some of the confusion regarding Canada's engagement can be attributed to the imprecision in language used in referencing Afghanistan within government documents. "Sometimes Afghanistan is designated as a ‘recovering failed state’ and at other times it is labeled ‘a weak state’ (CCIC, 2006). At times, Canadian engagement in the country is characterized as contributing to ‘The War on Terror’ and Afghanistan is characterized as an active conflict zone. In other situations, Canadian actions are identified as ‘reconstruction
activities” and Afghanistan is deemed to be on the road to becoming a stable and democratic country. This lack of precision in the language used in describing Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan suggests a lack of clarity in terms of the specific objectives for Canada’s involvement (Boucher, 2008).

The subjugation of the values promoted by the functional perspective to wider strategic interests and defence and security goals of the Weberian perspective becomes particularly evident when examining the declaratory statements related to Canada’s failed state policies in Afghanistan. As utilized in the previous section regarding the Canadian declaratory policy, it becomes useful in the case of Canadian policies in Afghanistan to ask the questions: why did Canada become involved in Afghanistan and whose interests are represented?

The majority of the motivations and justifications for Canada’s intervention and involvement in Afghanistan clearly reflect the Weberian perspective. As described in Chapter One, the dominant Weberian policy response described as the Realist approach fundamentally rejects the notion of humanitarian interventions and instead advocates interventions into failed states only in cases where they pose a direct threat to national or international security. It was the links between the al-Qaeda sponsored 9/11 terror attacks and the then ruling Taliban regime and the resulting potential threats to the security of Canada and its allies that formed the basis of the Canadian intervention. The Taliban regime had been in power in Afghanistan since 1996, however, “there was no condemnation of their brutal use of force on Afghan people until the horrible events of 9/11” (Cornish, 2007, 7) Indeed, Canada’s main goal in going into Afghanistan was to prevent Afghanistan “from relapsing into a failed state that gives terrorists and terrorist organization a safe haven” (Wright, 2003). Thus the primary reason for intervention
into Afghanistan was not based on humanitarian concerns for the Afghan people, but was a direct reflection of the security threats posed by a specific failed state to Canadian national security.

The application of the framework to the specific case of Canadian policy in Afghanistan is characterized by the same limitations that were noted in the preceding sections. While useful in delineating the theoretical perspective used in this case, the analysis is unable to explain why a particular set of assumptions has been used, and again, opens up a number of potential avenues for future research. A closer examination of the role of the United States has in influencing Canadian policy and the harmonization of US-Canada security relations may shed light as to the changes that have occurred. Further, a comparative analysis of the specific policies applied to the three failed states that the IPS notes that Canada was and is active in, Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan, may provide some insight into the cohesion and clarity of Canadian action in failed states.

Despite its limitations, the findings developed through the framework do have some value as they speak to the larger debates on Canadian foreign policy, in particular the findings reveal a gap between declaratory and applied policy. While much of the declaratory policy on Afghanistan seems to adopt a functional perspective, in terms of reconstruction activities and the movement towards a stable and democratic country, the reality of the situation presents a different picture. The Canadian mission was and remains heavily militarized, with Canadian Forces participating in counter-insurgency and war fighting operations as much, if not more than in development activities. The situation in Afghanistan provides an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of the dominant peacebuilding formula advocated by Canada and many of its international partners.
Conclusion

The IPS and the Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan have made failed states an important focus of Canadian foreign policy. However, despite its featured usage, the failed states concept remains under-investigated. The main contribution of this thesis is to clarify the debates and the practical implications surrounding failed states. Given the priority placed on these states by the Government of Canada, it is important to show the linkages between theory and practice in regards to failed states. Different conceptualizations of failed states have definite implications in identifying and implementing strategies to address the problem. It is important to examine how and why Canada conceptualizes and defines failed states and responds to issues concerning these states.

The concept of failed states lies at the nexus of larger, more fundamental debates involving how the international community thinks about and deals with sovereignty, statehood and security. However, even if useful advancements are made in the refinement of the concept and clarifying the practical implications of identifying and assisting failed states, it must be recognized that ultimately the decision to engage failed states is explicitly political and subject to the political objectives and motives of donor nations and international organizations. No matter how clearly defined the concept becomes; action toward and engagement in failed states ultimately depends on the political will and availability of resources of external actors.
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