NEGOTIATING
THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE
IN TL’AZT’EN TERRITORY, 1969-1984

by

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Negotiating the Production of Space in Tl’azt’en Territory, 1969-1984

Abstract

Henri Lefebvre has suggested that through social practices which visualize, administer, and use lands and resources, a society produces the space in which it operates. He emphasized the heterogeneity of social space and argued that it is a group’s political power which determines its ability to influence the production of space. Historical geographers have described the means by which Europeans created new geographies in British Columbia, but little attention has been paid to the role Native people may have played in the production of space. There is a need to recognize pre- and post-contact Native spatiality and its influence on the legal and social spaces of British Columbia.

Prior to the arrival of Europeans in central British Columbia, the territory of the Tl’azt’en people was a social and political landscape. Gradually Euro-Canadian visualization, administration and uses of land and resources were superimposed on Tl’azt’en space. Yet Tl’azt’en spatiality was never totally erased. As a result, Tl’azt’en territory can neither be viewed as a space which reflects purely the Tl’azt’en, nor purely the Euro-Canadian, production of space. Instead the territory is made up of shared spaces and hybrid spaces which resulted from the interaction of Tl’azt’en and Euro-Canadian societies. The Tl’azt’en’s ability to influence the production of space varied with their political power but never completely disappeared. The potential continued to exist for Tl’azt’en spatiality to influence the production of space in their territory if they gained more political power.

The social processes involved in the production of space are perhaps most visible when two parties are negotiating the allocation and management of lands and resources. In the 1970s the Tl’azt’en were engaged in negotiations with the Pacific Great Eastern/British Columbia Railway and the Provincial Government over the construction of a railway through their traditional territory. The Tl’azt’en used their Indian Reserve rights and threats of blockades to create a political space in which they could engage the Government in negotiations over the administration of lands and resources in their territory. The parties reached an agreement by which the Tl’azt’en acquired thirty-five new reserves and a Tree Farm License. Through these negotiations Tl’azt’en social and economic goals were inscribed to a significant degree within the spatial organization of the territory. Like current treaty negotiations, the negotiations between the Provincial Government and the Tl’azt’en in the 1970s involved compromises by both parties, and resulted in the creation of new hybrid social spaces which reflected the goals and strategies of both groups.
# Table of Contents

Abstract ..................................ii  
List of Maps ..........................v  
List of Figures ......................vi  
List of Interviews ...............vii  
Acknowledgments ...........viii  
Notes .................................ix  

**Introduction**  

**Chapter One - The Production of Space and the Geographies of B.C.**  
1.0 Introduction  
1.1 The Production of Space  
1.2 Geographies of Power  
1.3 The Space that Difference Makes  
1.4 Spaces of Negotiation and Negotiated Spaces  
1.5 The Production of Space in British Columbia  
1.6 Native Influence on British Columbian Space  
1.7 Creating Spaces of Negotiation: Native Geopolitical Action in B.C.  
1.8 Methodology  

**Chapter Two - Geographic Change in Tl'azt'ën Territory 1800-1969**  
2.0 Introduction  
2.1 Tl'azt'ën Territory  
2.2 The Fur Trade and the Omenica Gold Rush  
2.3 Indian Reserves: the First Non-native Organization of Tl'azt'ën space  
2.4 Introduction of Government Administration, 1900-1926  
2.5 1926-1969  
2.6 Conclusion  

**Chapter Three - Tl'azt'ën Negotiations with PGE/BCR 1969-1974**  
3.0 Introduction  
3.1 Native People and Railway Development in British Columbia  
3.2 The Pacific Great Eastern Railway  
3.3 Negotiations between PGE and the Tl'azt'ën, Winter 1968/69  
3.4 The January 1969 Agreement  
3.5 Relations between PGE/BCR and the Tl'azt'ën During Construction  
3.6 Concerns about the Impact of the Railway on Wildlife  
3.7 Tl'azt'ën Re-open Negotiations, August 1973  
3.8 Expanding the Scope of Negotiations  
3.9 Conclusion
Chapter Four - Tl’azt’en Negotiations with the Provincial Government, 1974-1984

4.0 Introduction 90
4.1 Native Blockades - Contesting the Production of Space 91
4.2 Tl’azt’en Exercise their Property Rights 93
4.3 Negotiations Resume Concerning Economic Development Options 101
4.4 Tl’azt’en Decide to Negotiate for Timber Rights 104
4.5 Provincial Offer/Tl’azt’en Counter Offer/Provincial Offer 107
4.6 The 1984 Agreement 113
4.7 Conclusion 118

Chapter Five - Negotiated Spaces and New Spaces of Negotiation

5.0 Negotiated Spaces: The Space Created by the 1984 Agreement 119
5.1 Spaces of Negotiation: Continuing Tl’azt’en Geopolitical Action 130
5.2 Conclusion 134

References 135
LIST OF MAPS

Map 2.1 Northern British Columbia

Map 2.2 Tl’azt’en Territory, 1800s

    sources: Traditional Territory boundary from 1998 map in Tl’azt’en NROC. Keyoh boundaries represented by contemporary Registered Trapline boundaries. Line-work obtained from Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks.

Map 2.3 Tl’azt’en Reserves, 1871-1926


Map 2.4 Development in Tl’azt’en Territory 1940s-60s


Map 2.5 Tl’azt’en Reserves, 1940s-1960s


Map 3.1 PGE Extensions in Northern B.C.


Map 3.2 Pacific Great Eastern Railway Route

Map 3.3 The January 1969 Agreement


Map 3.4 The Land Exchange in July 1973


Map 3.5 The Reconfiguration of Tl’azt’en Territory, 1974

    sources: Licensee Operating Areas provided by Prince George Regional Office, Ministry of Forests; Data on private land from Crown Land Registry, Surveyor Generals Branch, Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks, Victoria.

Map 5.1 The Final Agreement, 1984

# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.1</td>
<td>Tl’azt’en Reserves, 1871-1898</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.2</td>
<td>Tl’azt’en Reserves, 1898-1926</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.3</td>
<td>Tl’azt’en Reserves, 1949</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.1a</td>
<td>Surrender Lands, 1969</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.1b</td>
<td>Compensation Lands, 1969</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.2a</td>
<td>Surrender Lands, 1973</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.2b</td>
<td>Compensation Lands, 1973</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.3</td>
<td>Stuart Trembleur Band Council Resolutions, August 30, 1973</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.4</td>
<td>Band Strategy Meeting, October 13, 1974</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.1</td>
<td>Letters to BCR from Tl’azt’en Children, April 1975</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.2</td>
<td>Tl’azt’en Reasons for Blockading BCR, April 28, 1975</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.3</td>
<td>Tl’azt’en Remove the Blockade, August 15, 1975</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.4</td>
<td>Band Members’ Statements to the Minister, February 17, 1977</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.5</td>
<td>Stuart Trembleur Band’s Counter Offer, July 15, 1977</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.1</td>
<td>Tl’azt’en Reserves Included in TFL 42</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.2</td>
<td>Compensation Lands, 1984</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Interview Date</th>
<th>Second Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danny Alexis</td>
<td>March 27, 1998~</td>
<td>February 5, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Alexis</td>
<td>March 27, 1998~</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnny Anatole</td>
<td>June 12, 1998~</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doreen Austin</td>
<td>September 17, 1998*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Ducan</td>
<td>June 2, 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Hanson</td>
<td>June 4, 1998</td>
<td>June 8, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Hanson</td>
<td>January 13, 1999~</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Hoy</td>
<td>May 19, 1998*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Hoy</td>
<td>June 25, 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Hoy</td>
<td>February 9, 1998</td>
<td>April 8, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed John</td>
<td>June 1, 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre John</td>
<td>June 17, 1998*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Joseph</td>
<td>April 20, 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris Joseph</td>
<td>June 8, 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex C. Joseph</td>
<td>June 18, 1998*</td>
<td>January 13, 1999~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annie Mattess</td>
<td>June 12, 1998~</td>
<td>September 17, 1998^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophie Monk</td>
<td>June 16, 1998</td>
<td>February 5, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justa Monk</td>
<td>June 8, 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herman Paula</td>
<td>March 4, 1998</td>
<td>January 27, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Pierre</td>
<td>June 4, 1998*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Pierre</td>
<td>February 23, 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Pierre</td>
<td>June 19, 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Prince</td>
<td>June 24, 1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Waterland</td>
<td>January 4, 1999*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Williams</td>
<td>June 1, 1998*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unless otherwise indicated, all interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. The audio tapes and transcriptions have been deposited at the Tl'azt'en Nation Natural Resource Office, Tache Village.

* - interview was not recorded
~ - interview was audio and video recorded
^ - interview was not audio recorded, but portions were video recorded.

The author was present at all the interviews except: Morris Joseph, Danny Alexis #2 and Justa Monk #2. Annie Booth, Gail Fondahl, and Christine Callihoo assisted me in conducting the interviews shown in italics. I greatly appreciated the assistance of Cheryl Pierre in arranging the interviews.
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The Tl’azt’en Nation

In the Carrier language, ‘Tl’azt’enne’ means ‘people from the head of the lake’. This designation is shared by five related Carrier villages in the Stuart Lake region. In the late 1800s the Government considered the populations of these villages to comprise two Bands: the Tache Band, made up of the villages of Tache, Pinche and Portage, and the Trembleur Lake Band, made up of the villages of Kuzche and Middle River. Later each of the five villages were considered to be a separate Band. Then, in 1959, the five Bands were amalgamated and became known as the Stuart Trembleur Lakes Band. The Band changed its name to The Tl’azt’en Nations in 1987. (In 1993, the village of Portage left the Tl’azt’en Nation to become a separate Band - the Yecooche First Nation.) Though it was not their official name until 1987, in this thesis I will refer to the people from the head of the lake as either: ‘The Tl’azt’en’, or ‘the Band’.

Placenames

The English spellings of place names in Tl’azt’en territory have changed over time, and some Tl’azt’en villages also have several commonly used names. In the list below the village names used in this thesis are given first, followed by alternate names and spellings.

Tache - Thatce, Tachie, Tachi.
Pinche - Pintce, Pinchi, Pinche.
Portage - Nancut, Yekutce, Yecooche.
Kuzche - Grand Rapids, ‘Kuztce, Grand Rapide.
Middle River - Dzitl’ainli, Gelangle, Trembleur Village.

Abreviations

Tl’azt’en BOBC - the Tl’azt’en Band Office Basement Collections, Tache Village.
BCARS - the British Columbia Archives and Records Service, Victoria.
TTB - Timber Tenures Branch, Ministry of Forests, Victoria.
GR - National or British Columbia Archives Record Group
DIA - Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
MOF - Ministry of Forests
PGE - Pacific Great Eastern Railway Company
BCR - British Columbia Railroad Company (PGE changed its name to BCR in 1972)
TFL - Tree Farm License
IR - Indian Reserve
Introduction.

In the early 1980s the Tl'azt'en Nation was granted a 54,000 hectare Tree Farm License and thirty-five new Reserves. The acquisition of such substantial legal rights to land by a First Nation was of considerable historical significance yet, like many stories of Native geopolitical action this Century, it has not yet been told. Contrary to the assumption that the geography of British Columbia has been shaped by non-native forces alone, this thesis argues that the Tl'azt'en played a significant role in the creation of these new spaces in their territory.

Chapter One discusses ideas about the nature of social space, and provides a review of the literature on spatial change in British Columbia. The French philosopher, Henri Lefebvre, suggested that every society - whether rural or urban, agricultural or industrial - organizes the territory, or produces the space, it occupies. Differences in economic, political and social practices will result in different societies producing different spaces. However, any particular society's space is also the product of a complex internal process characterized by the mixing of different groups' spatialities. Drawing from Lefebvre's observation that power is a key variable in this process, geographers have given attention to the way dominant groups fashion social space. However, to a large extent, scholars have left unexplored the geographies created or influenced by the less empowered. Lefebvre did argue that multiple influences on the production of social space will produce a hybrid space -
hybrid in the sense that it is the combination of two or more influences, and also in the sense that it is something new created from their interaction.

Chapter Two will trace geographic change in Tl’azt’en territory between 1800 and 1968. The legal and economic spaces created in Tl’azt’en territory in this period were influenced by pre-contact Tl’azt’en social practices and by post-contact Tl’azt’en political and economic activity. Tl’azt’en power to organize and administer the land and resources of their territory decreased gradually after contact but a significant aspect of the space of the territory up to the early 1970s was the compatibility of Tl’azt’en and non-native use. This chapter contributes to our understanding of spatial change in Native territories in the mid-Twentieth Century – a period which has been neglected by historians and geographers. However, the chapter is also intended to provide the context for a more in-depth study of events in Tl’azt’en territory in the 1970s.

Chapter Three will show how, at a time when the Provincial Government’s actions were reconfiguring Tl’azt’en territory to the greatest extent since contact, the Tl’azt’en found themselves with an opportunity to participate to some degree in the production of this space. In negotiations resulting from the construction of a railway through seven of their reserves, the Tl’azt’en had the opportunity to create new legal spaces which reflected the spatiality of their community. However, as the railway and the forest industry it served brought profound change to the area, the Tl’azt’en chose to also use the power of their reserve land rights and threats of blockades to expand the scope of the negotiations in an effort to challenge and shape the Government administration of their territory.

A negotiation process between two groups in a society may provide the best opportunity to understand how social interaction produces hybrid spaces. Through the
course of negotiations the spatiality of each may be somewhat visible in what each attempts to negotiate for. The outcome of the negotiations may also clearly reveal the extent of each group's influence. Chapter Four traces the negotiations from 1975 to their completion in the early 1980s. To deal with the reconfiguration of their territory caused by the encroachment of non-native development, the Tl'azt'en decided that, in addition to securing more lands as Reserves, they should negotiate for timber rights. The Tl'azt'en struggled to keep the Provincial Government at the negotiation table, but, fifteen years after the negotiations began, a settlement was reached.

Chapter Five will describe how Tl'azt'en spatiality was manifested in the hybrid negotiated spaces created by the final agreement. The reserves the Tl'azt'en selected clearly represent the diversity present within the Tl'azt'en community, and demonstrate the community's desire to hold on to traditional activities and to be integrated with the outside economy. Though they were constrained and influenced by the Euro-Canadian administration of space, it was the Tl'azt'en who created these reserves, and they reflect the Tl'azt'en community - a community with its own economic, social and therefore, spatial identity. The Tl'azt'en's influence on the production of space is also manifested in the Tree Farm License (TFL) they received. Their geopolitical action altered the Government's vision of their territory to the extent that the Government granted them resources normally only given only to large corporations, not communities. The negotiations also led to an unprecedented integration of Provincial land and Federal Indian Reserve land for the purpose of forest management. In both these ways the TFL is a hybrid space created through negotiation - the Tl'azt'en and the Government created the space of the TFL, and because of this it is somewhat different from other TFLs in the province. The Tl'azt'en did not get
everything they wanted from the negotiations, and the settlement was a reflection of their political power at the time. The struggle over the production of space in the Tl’azt’en’s territory continues however. It also continues in the territories of many First Nations in British Columbia and, whether it is manifested in reserves, a TFL, a co-management arrangement, or in treaty settlement lands, negotiations over the production of space will produce hybrid social spaces.
One. The Production of Space and the Geographies of British Columbia

1.0 Introduction

This chapter begins with a review of ideas about the social practices and social processes which make and re-make the space of a society. I then discuss the work of geographers who have been concerned with the history of spatial change in British Columbia. It is clear that European constructions of space were imposed on Native territories, but the literature has not adequately portrayed the complexity of this process. In particular, there is a need to account for the continuing existence and influence of Native visualizations, administrations, and uses of their territories. A more complex reading of the space of British Columbia is possible if we consider the heterogeneous nature of social space, and recognize that through economic and geopolitical actions, and through assertions of their own spatiality, Native people have influenced the geography of British Columbia.

1.1 The Production of Space

Until the middle of this century it was often assumed that space and society were separate entities which may have influenced each other in various ways, but which could be examined and analyzed independently.¹ More recently, however, scholars have argued that “[a]n understanding of space in all its complexity depends upon an appreciation of social processes... [and] an understanding of the social process in all its complexity depends upon

an appreciation of spatial form.”2 Awareness of this interdependence has informed inquiry into the nature of space by turning attention to social practices.3 As David Harvey suggests, “[t]here are no philosophical answers to philosophical questions that arise over the nature of space – the answers lie in human practice.”4 One of the key social practices that has been examined by scholars has been how societies engage in territorial organization.5 A Marxist philosopher, Henri Lefebvre, has perhaps most influenced this scholarship by suggesting that “(social) space is a social product.”6

Lefebvre argued that a society produces space just as it produces identity, law or art. His analysis focused principally on the development of urban form under Twentieth Century capitalism. However, Lefebvre contributed what are considered foundational concepts, and his work remains indispensable to understanding the politics of space in a variety of contexts.7 His central point is that the cultural, political and economic practices of a society shape the territory it occupies.

Social practices are generally categorized as being material or discursive. Discursive social practices are those that invest meaning in space through the way it is perceived,

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4 Harvey, *Social Justice and the City,* 444.


named and defined. The construction of a space’s image and identity is called visualization by Lefebvre. Material social practices, on the other hand, are those that involve physical interaction with spaces – what Shields calls “interventions in the landscape.”8 These would include the use of nature, alteration of natural features, and the creation of “the built environment.”9 I would suggest that a third category of social practices should be defined so that attention is given to the important activities which are the interface between the discursive and the material. This intermediary category includes those social practices that translate discursive codes into a physical expression of social order. These include the organization, allocation, and regulation of spaces, and what Lefebvre called ‘planning’ and ‘surveillance’. I will refer to these kind of practices as administration. The social production of space, therefore, involves three basic social practices: visualization, administration, and use of land and resources.

Three other points made by Lefebvre are of interest here. Societies differ in their forces of production (i.e. natural resources, labour, technology, and knowledge) and in their relations of production (i.e. the class relations which determine who controls the forces of production). Because these differences would mean that lands and resources are defined, organized, allocated and used differently, Lefebvre points out that different societies produce different spaces. Secondly, he also notes that since every society or “mode of production has its own particular space, the shift from one mode to another must entail the production of a new space.”10 These points suggest that the production of space is a complex process

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9 Shields, “Spatial Stress and Resistance,” 188.

10 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 46 (emphasis added).
which is influenced by multiple actors and processes, and that social space is impermanent and subject to continual reworking by social forces. Another point made by Lefebvre is that if the production of space is inextricably social, it must be explored with questions about the capacity of different sectors of society to influence the process. Thus, the inquiry into "productive capacity or creative process leads us in many cases to political power."\(^{11}\)

### 1.2 Geographies of Power

Geographers first found application for Lefebvre's concepts in their studies of the economy of the capitalist city.\(^ {12}\) However, more recently geographers have begun to specifically explore the path opened up by Lefebvre into questions about power and agency in the production of space. Many scholars now hold that "[g]eography is about power... [T]he geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of the histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy and administer space."\(^ {13}\)

In part due to a recent "worldwide interest in contact processes, and in the strategies and tactics of colonization," geographers have given more attention to the geographies of domination and exploitation.\(^ {14}\)

Power discrepancies in a society often result in the less empowered "living within the world as constructed by the dominant group."\(^ {15}\) The dominant group in a society may exert its power through the "monopolization of space and the relegation of weaker groups to

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\(^ {11}\) Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 116.


These landscapes of exclusion, whether they be in South Africa or in the capitalist city, support the basic premise that “the exercise of power over people necessarily involves the creation of geographies.”

However, critics have accused some geographers of being “preoccupied” with the discourses and practices of dominant groups. Scholars studying power relations of many kinds have been guilty of representing social encounters with simplistic and stereotypical dichotomies such as ‘powerful subject/disempowered other’. A simplistic view of social relations has meant that in many cases scholars have written “imperial history” rather than “spatial history.” By concentrating on the capacity of the more powerful, geographers have failed to adequately consider the role of the less empowered in the production of space.

Analyses which oversimplify the power relations involved in the production of space will distort the complexity of the social experience and, therefore, oversimplify and inaccurately portray the nature of the space produced. In particular, there is a danger that spaces produced in the midst of power discrepancies will be falsely portrayed as homogenous and devoid of any internal difference, ambivalence, or contradiction. Accounts

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which emphasize the homogeneity of space also leave little room for the potential existence and influence of resistance. Alternatively, a recognition of ‘difference’ leads to a more complex and accurate reading of space.

1.3 The Space That Difference Makes

Lefebvre did argue for a recognition of the roles of both powerful and less powerful influences in the production of space. He suggested that every social space is the outcome of a process in which many “contributing currents” combine. He also went to great lengths to describe how space was produced through the mixing of greater and lesser influences.

Recognition of the role of relatively smaller influences can result in insights not generated by simplified representations of power. For example, Lefebvre was particularly concerned with the influence of previous social practices on the present production of space. He stated that “no space ever vanishes utterly, leaving no trace,” and that some within a society would “continue to experience space in the traditional manner.”

The existence of multiple actors and influences, Lefebvre argued, would result in the “intertwinement” and simultaneous existence of multiple social spaces that “interpenetrate one another and/or

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21 I borrow this phrase from Edward Soja, 1996. *Third Space: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagine Places*. Oxford: Blackwell. Page v. It should be noted that the concept of ‘difference’ owes its origin to the tactics of dominance and exclusion. To create and maintain the social divisions that are advantageous to its continued empowerment and authority, the dominant group must first recognize and construct the ‘Other.’ Yet, Homi Bhabha also views this recognition of ‘difference’ as one of the contradictory and ambivalent moments of colonial power. For this reason ‘difference’ is often seen by scholars as the origin point of counter-hegemonic struggle. See Blunt and Rose, “Women’s Colonial and Postcolonial Geographies,” 12.

22 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 109.

23 He elaborated on this point by saying that “a fruitful analogy, it seems to me, may be found in hydrodynamics, where the principle of the superimposition of small movements teaches us the importance of the roles played by scale, dimension, and rhythm. Great movements, vast rhythms, immense waves – these all collide and ‘interfere’ with one another; lesser movements, on the other hand, ‘interpenetrate’...social locus could only be properly understood by taking [these] two kinds of determinations into account. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 87.

24 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 164 and 79.
superimpose themselves upon one another." Picking up on these ideas Edward Casey states that even in the most hegemonic space, "[t]he heterogeneous in space is present as the trace of historical as well as the prospect of the differential." Difference, therefore, will often result in the production of a hybrid space – one that reflects the influence of multiple sectors of a society.

Recent criticism of their overemphasis of the power of the dominant group to produce space has prompted scholars to attempt balance the existing literature on the 'geographies of dominance' with increased attention to the 'geographies of resistance.' Critiques of Eurocentric perspectives have played a role in the development of this literature. However, as Matthew Sparke has noted, its development has largely been due to a redefinition of the nature and location of power. A more complex view of social relations has led to a recognition that power is not only present in the hands of the dominant, but exists at many sites, scales and levels within social relations. Geographers have thus begun to give more attention to the intrinsic heterogeneity of space and to the ambiguity and weakness present in a hegemonically produced space.

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25 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 86.
According to J.M. Jacobs, the purpose of detailing stories of resistance has been to give attention to the “previously repressed narratives” of the marginalized and less powerful.30 Lefebvre himself also recognized the potential existence and impact of deliberate efforts of the subordinate against the dominant group in the production of space.31 Yet how have geographers suggested resistance and struggle occur within space or influence the production of space? Steve Pile and Michael Keith argue that if the practices of the dominant seek to produce spaces that reinforce their power, then “resistance seeks to occupy new spaces, to create new geographies, to make its own place on the map.”32 This is manifested in the way various social actors manipulate spaces to overcome scalar or spatial barriers and constraints.33 However, scholars have paid the most attention to how weaker groups attempt to find or create “a terrain of struggle” in which to encounter the dominant group.34

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31 “Pressure from below must therefore also confront the State in its role as organizer of space, ...and its ability to intervene in space can and must be turned back against it, by grass-roots opposition, in the form of counter-plans and counter-projects designed to thwart strategies, plans and programmes imposed from above” (Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 383). According to Gregory, Lefebvre was sensitive to the role of resistance because part of the project of The Production of Space was to provide a critique of capitalism in support of the 1968 popular uprising and student protests in France. His concern was that ‘concrete space’ (a spatiality historically more connected to the body and ‘everyday life’) had been ‘colonized’ and replaced with ‘abstract space.’ The twentieth century capitalist economy and state had colonized everyday life through the practices of ‘commodification and bureaucratization, planning, architecture, spectacle and surveillance’. Lefebvre envisioned, and hoped for, a campaign of resistance to emerge which would be informed by counter-discourses based in his ‘metaphilosophy’, and which would take the form of counter-social practices (‘festivals’) more sensitive to the essential connection between human spatiality and the human body. See Derek Gregory, 1993. Geographical Imaginations. Oxford: Blackwell. Page 395; and The Dictionary of Human Geography, 482.
32 Pile and Keith, Geographies of Resistance, xi.
34 Staeheli, “Empowering political struggle,” 387.
Drawing from cultural theorist Homi Bhabha, geographers have theorized the potential existence of a site of resistance within the dominant group’s discourse and production of space. This site of resistance has been called ‘third space’ in a deliberate attempt to oppose the reduction of social relations to binary categories. Third space is seen as a “fissure” in the dominant group’s production of space where contradictory social meanings from the past can “erupt into the present.” Third space is, therefore, “a space of inbetweenness” in imposed spatial formations, where neither group is totally dominant and social relations can be re-negotiated. The concepts of hybridity and third space suggest the same conclusion: space produced under hegemonic conditions is complex, ambivalent and unstable, and it “must be seen as both oppressive and enabling, filled not only with authoritarian perils but also with possibilities for community, resistance, and emancipatory change.”

The production of space is a social process and it should be conceptualized as more complex than as being simply the work of the dominant. Difference within a society, whether through its mere presence or its overt resistance to hegemonic conditions, may influence a society’s visualization, administration, and use of space. This would result in the creation of a hybrid social space.

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1.4 Spaces of Negotiation and Negotiated Spaces

One area where the role of difference in the production of a hybrid space may be most recognizable is where two parties are engaged in negotiations over the administration and use of land and resources. If one of the parties is relatively less powerful, it will employ various political strategies to attempt to create a forum, or ‘space of negotiation’, where it will have the opportunity to make its voice heard. Much of the literature has focused on the creation of such political spaces of resistance, yet surprisingly few authors give any account of how space is reconfigured as a result of these efforts. This is partly attributable to the fact that many authors are consciously more concerned with discourse than with material space. It is also true that not all social struggles are over land, but it does appear that analyses have become preoccupied with abstract social processes and have been side-tracked from documenting actual spatial forms. As Katharyne Mitchell states,

“the contemporary celebration of the disruptive qualities of diasporic identity, hybridity, and third spaces is premature...it is the fetishization of these terms that allows for their quick appropriation; in order to ensure more progressive meanings the concepts must be historically and geographically located. This type of theorizing, one which is embedded in specific histories and maps, enables a richer comparative understanding of processes and events, and avoids the kinds of slippages and abstract spatial metaphors so common to literary criticism and cultural studies.”

39 There are some accounts which show ‘the space resistance makes’ but they appear to be the exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., Hanham and Banasick, “Japanese Labor and the Production of the Space-Economy in an Era of Globalization.” Though more concerned with the struggle itself, Ripmeester mentions spaces chosen and created by Ontario Indians in resistance to the prospects of life within the constructed world of a Catholic mission. Those who chose not to live at the mission chose lands that would become their Indian Reserves. See Michael Ripmeester, 1995. “It is scarcely to be believed...”: The Mississauga Indians and the Grape Island Mission, 1826-1836.” The Canadian Geographer 39(2):157-168.

40 For an argument against this trend see Don Mitchell, 1996. The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers and the California Landscape. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Pages 4-5.

More attention should be paid to the spaces produced as outcomes of social relations, rather than just to the spatial dimension of social interaction. Negotiations between groups in a society give us an opportunity to identify and understand both the social relations and the spatial outcomes. In negotiations over the production of space the values and goals of each group are made visible in what each attempts to negotiate for. Differences in the relative power of the groups may exist, but a negotiated agreement would produce a hybrid ‘negotiated space’ that reflects to some degree the modes of production and spatial strategies of both groups.

There is a need to recognize that one group’s ability to impose its spatial organization on another is not as absolute as Ken Brealey or Cole Harris have suggested. Instead social space is more often heterogeneous, and multiple influences ‘intertwine’ and ‘interpénétrate’ to produce a hybrid space. At certain times, the power of one group to influence the production of space may be limited, but their spatiality may continue to exist and to have the potential to re-emerge if the group gains enough political power. This may be most visible where a typically less empowered group is able through political efforts to engage the dominant group in negotiations over the definition, the administration or the use of lands and resources.

Lefebvre’s concept of the Production of Space emphasizes the social practices and social relations that create social space. It calls attention to the significance of political power and encourages a recognition of the heterogeneity of space. The Production of Space,

therefore, appears to be a useful tool for understanding the spatial history of British
Columbia and providing insight into: pre-contact Native spatiality and its persistence into
the modern era; colonial and post-colonial constructions of Native territories; Native
geopolitical action and contemporary spatiality; and, negotiations over the production of
space.

1.5 The Production of Space in British Columbia

The space now known as British Columbia was Native space—a space defined,
administered, and used by Native societies. The works of Cole Harris, Ken Brealey and
Daniel Clayton have explored the practices by which Europeans re-produced the geography
of this part of North America. These authors trace how European spatial imagination was
introduced into Native spaces, first through discourse and cartography, later through the
institution of a new land administration, and also through European settlement and use of
lands and resources. By emphasizing the tactics by which geographic change was imposed
on, and negatively affected, Native people, this literature has made an important contribution
to our understanding of the construction of British Columbian spaces.

Yet these works often do not consider the possibly of Native influence on the
European production of space. Harris’ The Resettlement of British Columbia has been
criticized for not exploring how Native people “might have appropriated, transformed, or

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45 See, especially, Cole Harris, 1995. "Towards a Geography of White Power; and Brealey, "Peter O’Reilly."
subverted the culture of the colonizers for their own purposes”, and for not including more
“Native voices.” Similar omissions can be seen in the work of Ken Brealey.

The approach of these works stands in contrast to the recognition that historians
have given to Native agency. A scarcity of sources which contain data on Native action for
earlier periods of British Columbian history are partly responsible for the lack of accounts of
Native influence on the production of space. However, it must be noted that the goal of
both Brealey and Harris has been to deconstruct readers’ perspectives, and replace them
with a view of British Columbia as a space of injustice. To do this, they have emphasized
European power and suggested that Native power was insufficient to challenge and influence
geographic change.

Over-reliance on “official sources of data” is one of the principle reasons that authors
have discounted the actions and potential influence of less empowered groups in society. Harris
tends to infer, with limited information from Native sources, that European imposed
geographic change caused widespread dislocation and disruption to Native societies in
British Columbia. In a more recent work, however, he admits that the lack of data has meant
that representations of the contact period are “preliminary and inconclusive.”

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Harris and Brealey have done much to bring to our attention the European influence on British Columbia's spatial form. Yet, as recognized elsewhere in the discipline, geographers should do more to represent the complexity and ambiguity present in social relations and, therefore, in the production of space. At a time when Native people are re-asserting traditional territorial ownership, organization and place-names, accounts of Native influence on and resistance to the European production of space are informative.

1.6 Native Influence on British Columbian Space

Consideration of the influence of Native people in the production of British Columbian space must begin with an appreciation of the pre-contact Native production of space. The anthropologist E.N. Wilmsen has noted that Aboriginal peoples often "face an obstacle uniquely applied to that classificatory status -- the claim that they, alone among the peoples of the earth, have no institutions in land." What we must recognize instead is that, as Bruce Willems-Braun has pointed out, "long before the contact period (from time immemorial), First Nations peoples had clear conceptions of ownership, political authority, and social and ecological responsibilities...[a First Nation's territory was] a fully social and political landscape." It is even more important to recognize that Native visualization, administration and use of spaces did not disappear after contact. Recent assertions of traditional family and Nation territories by Native people also give credence to Lefebvre's

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statement that "[n]othing disappears completely... In space, what came earlier continues to underpin what follows. The preconditions of social space have their own particular way of enduring and remaining actual within that space." Accounts of how this has been true in British Columbia are greatly needed.

Another step forward in our understanding of the production of space is to deconstruct the assumption that European power to re-make the life-world of Native people was absolute, and that Native people were always negatively effected by European generated change. For example, Harris makes an important observation when he points out that, at first, the "geopolitical games" of mapping and re-inscribing Native space as European space "took place elsewhere and, [prior to extensive settlement] had a negligible impact on the people of the region." Susan Marsden and Robert Galois's remarkably detailed account of a Tsimshian Chief's efforts to organize his fur trading territories is evidence that in some areas of British Columbia, Native organization of space continued to be the organization of space for some time after contact. We need to recognize that there was great diversity in the nature and timing of contact and geographic change experienced by different Native groups. More research into the experience of single Native groups is needed to develop a fuller understanding of the actual impact of European imposed production of space, and the way in which Native and European spatiality interacted in the period since contact to produce the space of British Columbia.

52 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 229.
1.7 Creating Spaces of Negotiation: Native Geopolitical Action in B.C.

Marsden and Galois' account of the Tsimshian fur trade was successful in stripping away some of the invisibility of Native politics and strategies. Their work provided some recognition of the potential for Native geopolitical action in the contact period, and showed how Native goals were inscribed on the social landscape. Bruce Stadfeld, an historian, has made a contribution to our understanding of Native geopolitical action by detailing encounters between Natives and non-natives over the definition and use of land in Nineteenth Century British Columbia. He found that "the definition that resulted was often dictated and shaped by these individual negotiations and conflicts; the land itself was recreated to reflect these power struggles." Yet, Stadfeld was more concerned with the Native power to create spaces of negotiation, rather than with the actual physical spaces which resulted from these encounters.

As Ken Coates and Robin Fisher have pointed out, very little has been written on the experience of Native people in the mid-Twentieth Century. Perhaps scholars have the impression that what transpired in this period was only a 'playing out' of histories and geographies determined in the previous period. Paul Tennant's work has certainly shown that Native people continued to make history this Century (and I would argue that they also continued to make geography). Yet a significant gap still exists in our understanding of what happened in the spaces of Native territories between the settlement period and the

period of modern Native political activism (i.e. 1975). The power discrepancy that was often present this Century between Native people and the Provincial Government and industry is obvious in the experiences of the Cheslatta or the Tsay Keh Dene with hydro-electric developments. In cases such as these, Native groups were unable to create a space of negotiation where their influence could be incorporated into planning, and thus Euro-Canadian constructions of space were imposed on Native people and their territories. In the 1970s, Aboriginal land use and occupancy mapping projects began making Native spatiality more visible and, therefore, influential. These type of studies, and the history of Tl'azt'en territory described in Chapter Two, should help us recognize that the re-emergence of Native spatiality as a shaping force in British Columbian geography in the 1980s and 1990s is not that surprising, given that Native visualization, administration, and use of space was never totally dispatched or destroyed by the Euro-Canadian production of space.

Political power is the key variable which determines the ability of groups to influence the production of space and, as Native political power has increased, Native resistance to the Euro-Canadian production of space has grown significantly in British Columbia. Two recent articles by geographers have dealt with this subject. Nicholas Blomley describes blockades in British Columbia as an action which materially and symbolically challenge Government ownership and jurisdiction and non-native use of traditional Native space. Blockades are in fact an assertion of Native space, and an effort to influence the Euro-Canadian view of

that land. Their purpose is to create a space of negotiation where two visions of the same space can be reconciled. Blomley’s article does not discuss what, if any, negotiations resulted from blockades in British Columbia, or if negotiations resulted in the production of hybrid spaces. Blomley does suggest that more research of such Native resistance on a case by case basis is required.

Matthew Sparke has discussed the 1991 Delgamuukw court case during which two representations of the same space (Euro-Canadian maps and Gixtsan and Wet’suwet’en maps) were placed in juxtaposition. Gixtsan and Wet’suwet’en spatiality, manifested in place names, House territories, and resource use sites, challenged observers to rethink British Columbia’s official geography. Sparke is particularly interested in the Native strategy of using legal action to challenge the legal system’s own foundation, and using the non-native technology of cartography against the state. In the court room, the two historical geographies stood in stark contradiction, and did not result in the negotiation of a compromise. Though he concludes that the Gixtsan and Wet’suwet’en efforts to dismantle the dominant production of British Columbian space failed, Sparke’s account captures the power relations that produced that outcome.

Through various geopolitical efforts, Native people have begun to, as Brealey puts it, “cast some doubt over the legitimacy of our own space.” Recently Native people have done this by creating some powerful spaces of negotiation: “the space of Calder v. Attorney

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63 Brealey, ‘Peter O’Reilly,” 235.
General, Nisga’a AIP, of the blockades, and Delgamuukw v. BC, ... of the Sechelt Self Government Act, and the British Columbia Treaty Commission.” 64 I would suggest that the treaty negotiations which are now taking place in British Columbia are negotiations through which Native lives and goals will be inscribed in space. Through these negotiations Native visualization, organization and use of lands will to some degree be manifested in the production of new hybrid spaces.

Yet an examination of spatial change in Tl’azt’en territory reveals that the Tl’azt’en had a significant influence on the production of space prior to the contemporary period of Native geopolitical action. As I have stated earlier, a more accurate perception of the historical geography of British Columbia must begin with an appreciation of pre-contact Native spatial organization, and its persistence outside and within the imposed Euro-Canadian productions of space. Chapter Two will describe how European constructions of space were introduced on top of Tl’azt’en space between 1800 and 1968, but remained “suspended” (as Brealey has put it) because Tl’azt’en visualization, administration and use of land continued.65 Tl’azt’en spatiality was never fully suppressed and continued to be influential in moments of political opportunity. The potential also existed for it to re-emerge to influence the Government production of space to a greater degree if Tl’azt’en political power should increase.

The social interaction involved in the production of social space is perhaps most visible when two parties are negotiating the allocation and management of lands and resources. Chapters Three, Four and Five will document the Tl’azt’en’s negotiations with

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64 Brealey, “Peter O’Reilly,” 235.
65 Brealey, “Peter O’Reilly,” 235.
the Pacific Great Eastern/British Columbia Railway and the Provincial Government between 1969 and 1984. An examination of this period shows clearly the nature and extent of the TL’aat’een’s influence on the space of the territory. Through these negotiations the Provincial Government’s administration of the territory was altered, but not to the extent the TL’aat’een had hoped for. Nonetheless, TL’aat’een social and economic goals were inscribed within the spatial organization of the territory to a significant degree, and the space of the Final Agreement was a hybrid which reflected the influence of both Euro-Canadian society and the TL’aat’een.

1.8 Methodology

I was given the opportunity to study the history of the TL’aat’een and their territory because of my involvement with a research project studying the TL’aat’een’s operation of Tree Farm License 42. That research began with the questions: why did the TL’aat’een want timber rights? and, what were their original expectations for their community forestry operation? To understand the TL’aat’een’s motivations and aspirations in the talks with the Government which led to the granting of Tree Farm License 42, it was necessary to review all available written sources on TL’aat’een history, and also to conduct interviews with many Band members. I was fortunate to be able to spend a lot of time in the community, and to even live in Tache for two months. It is apparent to me that research into the experience this Century of individual First Nations is required, rather than research done at arms length, or with too much reliance on non-native written sources, or in a manner that would not uncover inaccuracies in our assumptions of Native/Non-native interaction. While studying the process of political, economic and spatial change in TL’aat’een territory between the 1800s
and the early 1980s, I was always conscious of the current politics of space in British Columbia, and it was my desire to write a thesis which linked the two. The theoretical framework was chosen because I believed that it is applicable to any period of Native history – pre or post-contact – and because I felt that the ideas would also be well understood by the Tl’azt’en.

Written and oral data are both the products of people who have incomplete and limited powers of observation, and selective and fallible memories. The researcher must also be aware that an oral and written record was produced in a specific context, including the time it was written, the purpose, and the original intended audience of the record. The information must be evaluated for validity (degree of conformity with other sources, i.e. accuracy), and reliability (consistency with which an individual will tell the same story about the same events on a number of different occasions). Reliability is checked by doing multiple interviews of same person, accuracy checked by consulting other sources and comparing accounts. I did enough interviews to be able to check for validity. I did a few second interviews but did not feel that more comprehensive tests for reliability were needed.

The literature on conducting interviews advises the researcher to be conscious of his assumptions so that they are managed. Preconceived conclusions can result in the researcher posing leading questions which can distort a respondent’s account of the past. Researcher assumptions can also result in a narrow plan of questioning. I attempted to use open ended
questions to decrease the potential for distorted answers, and to allow each respondent the scope to develop the answers he or she chose.\textsuperscript{70} I had an interview guide but I generally asked the respondent to tell their own story, starting with their childhood. This was a deliberate effort to allow the respondent to bring up those things from Tl'azt'en history which they thought were important or interesting. Obtaining a more complete life history was also beneficial for placing specific events in context, and avoided projecting my own perspective in the interviews by overly directing the subject matter. Because of this approach, the interviews did not focus on the 1970s negotiations with the Railway and the Provincial Government. But getting detailed information on the railway negotiations from interviews was not as desirable or necessary because I had found written sources which covered the dispute with the railway. This meant that I relied less on peoples' memories to reconstruct events of the railway negotiations. Instead the interviews were used to supplement the written sources, and to provide information on the earlier history which was not recorded in either Government or Tl'azt'en written sources. The interviews also provided accounts of Tl'azt'en participation in the mining, freighting and forestry activities in their territory that is not found elsewhere. The interviews produced information about the nature and extent of the impact of non-native activities on Tl'azt'en activities.

Primary written sources were obtained from several locations. Sixteen Record Groups at the Provincial Archives were searched for information concerning the history of non-native activity in the area and relations between the Tl'azt'en and non-natives. I found little information at the Archives on the Tl'azt'en. This research primarily helped reconstruct the history of forestry activity in their territory. It was important to

supplement this information about non-native activity with Tl’azt’en views of forest
development, and with information about Tl’azt’en involvement as wage labourers.

Additional data on Crown Grants and land transactions were obtained from the Land Titles
Branch, Ministry of Lands, Environment and Parks, Victoria. Documentation on the
Tl’azt’en’s application for a TFL was obtained from the Resource Tenures Branch,
Ministry of Forests, Victoria.

A variety of contemporary and historical documentation, most notably a collection
of Department of Indian Affairs’ files, was available at the Tl’azt’en Natural Resources
Office in Tache Village. The Band’s own files were contained at the Band Office, also in
Tache. Unlike other situations where the Native people did not document their experience in
their own writing, the Tl’azt’en produced and saved a large written record of their
negotiations with the Railway and the Provincial Government.71 The most significant source
at this location was a considerable collection of the written record from the Band’s fifteen
year negotiations with the Pacific Great Eastern/British Columbia Railway and the Provincial
Government. This collection included correspondence between the Band, DIA and the
railway company. More importantly the Band Office collection contained letters between
the Band and its lawyer, between Band members, and between the Tl’azt’en and other
Bands. It also provided transcripts of Band meetings and of negotiation meetings.

The written Tl’azt’en sources, and the oral data, have allowed me to better document
how the Tl’azt’en’s perceived their experiences than would be possible with only
Government sources. I have purposefully included many quotes from these sources in my

account in an effort to not filter the Tl'azt'en's words, and to make the point that the Tl'azt'en had a voice in these negotiations. Yet I should emphasize that my purpose is not to present the events from multiple viewpoints, but rather I have used the Tl'azt'en sources to uncover the Tl'azt'en's role in the events.

I often refer to the Tl'azt'en community as it were a single entity. As I have described on Page ix, the identity of the Tl'azt'en community is complex and evolving. It is also wrong to assume that all Tl'azt'en shared the same experiences and possessed the same goals, or that the Tl'azt'en always acted in concert. I do not wish to oversimplify the nature of the Tl'azt'en community in my account. However, at many times in the events depicted here the Tl'azt'en community was unified in their experience and perceptions - the Tl'azt'en have probably never been as united in any matter as they were in their struggle with the Railway. But it should also be noted that, as with any community, there exists a diversity of interests and perspectives within the Tl'azt'en membership. This, in fact, is recognizable in the variety of types of spaces the Tl'azt'en created in the events to be described in the pages which follow.
Two. Geographic Change in Tl’azt’en Territory to 1969.

2.0 Introduction

This chapter traces how the European production of space was introduced into Tl’azt’en territory. This review of Tl’azt’en land history is intended to set the stage for a more in-depth study of the period of 1969-1984. It is not intended to be an examination of cultural and economic change of the Tl’azt’en. European modes of visualization, administration, and use of space were gradually superimposed over Tl’azt’en organizations and uses of space. Though altered and constrained, Tl’azt’en spatiality was not erased or displaced. For a long time the two geographies existed simultaneously with little conflict, and linkages between the two were created.

As the non-native mode of production was instituted in Tl’azt’en territory (i.e. a government directed property rights system), it was employed by the Tl’azt’en to gain recognition and protection for lands and resources they valued. Tl’azt’en spatiality, which also transformed somewhat along with their economy, shaped the creation of legal spaces within new production of space through various forums such as the Barricade Treaty, the Reserve Commissions, and the registration of traplines. However, we will see that an accurate portrayal

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of the history of Tl’azt’en space requires consideration of both their legal rights to land and the geographies of Tl’azt’en wage labour and continuing off-reserve bush economy. The spaces recreated in Tl’azt’en territory this century were not simply non-native spaces, and opportunity and power to produce space were not solely in the possession of non-natives. Through this period Tl’azt’en power to control the production of space in the territory diminished significantly, but it was only in the late 1960s that the Euro-Canadian production of space reconfigured the territory in such a way the Tl’azt’en’s off-reserve space was significantly reduced.

2.1 Tl’azt’en Territory

The territory of the Tl’azt’en people is located in central British Columbia (see Map 2.1). It is situated just north of present day Fort St. James in the forested uplands where the Nechako Plateau meets the Omenica Mountains. The territory is centred on Stuart and Trembleur Lakes and mostly lies within the Fraser River watershed.

Prior to the arrival of Europeans, Tl’azt’en territory was a fully social and political landscape. The boundaries of the territory were recognized by the neighbouring Carrier groups: Nak’azdli to the south and east, Takla to the north, and Babine to the west. The Tl’azt’en had named the places and features around them, and they had organized the territory in keyohs (family hunting and gathering grounds). Map 2.2 is an attempt to represent the way in which the keyoh system organized the territory and distributed resource access rights among Band
Northern British Columbia
Map 2.1

Legend

Provincial Highway
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Ti'azt' en Traditional Territory
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members. It also shows the Tl’azt’en’s five permanent village sites. The Map does not show their numerous hunting and fishing camps, their trails, their gathering sites, nor the location of their salmon weirs.

In order of importance the primary resources used by the Tl’azt’en in the 1800s were: salmon, whitefish, char, small game, and berries. Large game became a major part of the Tl’azt’en’s diet when moose moved into the area in the early 1900s. Rights to resources were controlled by two social institutions: the clan system and the balhats system. Under the clan system “resources at the local level [for example, a fish weir site or beaver hunting area] were owned by clan members in that village, but the clan system also provided a means for sharing the resources of [different] local groups.” Conflicts between resource users and changes in the ownership of keyohs or resource sites were regulated by the balhats system – a feast system concerned with community structure, reciprocity, and wealth distribution. The Tl’azt’en had sets of rules governing access and use of resources: for example, hunting or gathering on another’s keyoh without permission was a serious offense. By their administration and use of the area the Tl’azt’en produced the space known as Tl’azt’en territory.

\[^{2}\] For a discussion of Tl’azt’en keyohs see Julian Steward, 1960. “Carrier Acculturation: the Direct Historical Approach.” Culture in History: Essays in the Honour of Paul Radin. New York: Columbia University Press. Pages 733-744. On Map 2.2 the organization of Tl’azt’en territory through the keyoh system has been suggested by using contemporary trapline boundaries. Unfortunately the map therefore is not an accurate depiction of Tl’azt’en keyohs in the 1800s and it does not reflect the existence of the clan system. Steward attempted to map keyohs in the Stuart Lake region, but his research focused more on the southern end of Stuart Lake and his informants were not Tl’azt’en, but Nak’azdli. I felt I should not use Steward’s map without further research and without further consultation with the Tl’azt’en.

\[^{3}\] Hudson, “Traplines and Timber,” 58.

\[^{4}\] Hudson, “Traplines and Timber,” 58.

Tl'azt'en Territory

Map 2.2

1800's

Tl'azt'en Village
Tl'azt'en Keyoh
Hudson's Bay Freight Route
Hudson's Bay Fort

Tl'azt'en keyohs have been derived from contemporary trapline boundaries.

Scale: 1:300,000

To the Omenica gold fields

Map 2.2

Fort St. James

Map 2.2

Map 2.2

Map 2.2

Map 2.2

Map 2.2

Map 2.2

Map 2.2

Map 2.2

Map 2.2
2.2 The Fur Trade and the Omenica Gold Rush

In 1806, just south of Tl'azt'en territory at the outlet of Stuart Lake (Nak'al bun), Simon Fraser founded a fur trading post which became the administrative centre for the trading district known as New Caledonia. About the time when the Hudson's Bay Company took over the North West Company in 1821, the post at Stuart Lake was given the name Fort St. James. As the Tl'azt'en began to trade furs and obtain goods at the Fort it produced some realignment of the Tl'azt'en's yearly round and seasonal movements. This was augmented by the establishment of a Catholic mission near the Fort in 1873. Thus a pattern emerged whereby the Tl'azt'en lived in relative isolation up the lake but accessed the resources and opportunities of the Fort, the Mission, and the settlement of Fort St. James.

While the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) built forts and trading posts in the interior to introduce a new mercantile economy into Native space and to divert the flow of furs away from other European buyers on the coast, the fur traders at Fort St. James recognized the Tl'azt'en's "clear control of resources at the local level." The fur traders deliberately allowed the fur trade to operate within the Tl'azt'en's existing keyoh system. The handful of Europeans stationed at Fort St. James had neither the ability nor the reason to impose a new administrative structure as the Tl'azt'en's own socio-spatial organization could be used to produce the furs the HBC needed.

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6 Other HBC posts in New Caledonia included: Fort McLeod on McLeod Lake, Fort Fraser on Fraser Lake, Fort George on the Fraser River, Fort Kilmours/Fort Babine on Babine Lake, and Fort Connelly on Bear Lake.
9 Hudson, "Traplines and Timber," 85.
11 As Fisher has stated "fur traders occasionally contemplated modification of Indian customs, but they lacked the power and, ultimately, the will to effect such changes." Robin Fisher, 1977. Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Page 47.
However, Tl’azt’en socio-spatial organization was clearly now being influenced by external European actions and European economic forces. The HBC established some of its own infrastructure and attempted to gain power in the economy of the region. In addition, when the trapping economy became established, the harvest of summer salmon was no longer the single dominant activity in the Tl’azt’en communities. The Tl’azt’en mode of economic and spatial production was, therefore, altered as keyohs became more significant relative to fishing sites, and power structures within the communities were re-aligned. As Fisher points out “[c]learly the fur trade brought change to Indian society, and yet it was change that the Indians directed and therefore their culture remained intact.” The space of the fur trade in Tl’azt’en territory then cannot be classified as either European or Native, but rather was a hybrid product of Tl’azt’en socio-spatial organization and exogenous European influences.

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12 While there were elements of the fur trade which could be characterized as co-operation, the interaction between Native trappers and non-native fur buyers was also competitive. In particular, European Fur traders tried to tie Native trappers to particular trading posts by offering credit and gifts. However, “the Carriers were able to remain independent of both the need for trapping and the goods at the posts because of the dependence of the traders on the Carriers for fish and labour” (Hudson, “Traplines and Timber,” 89). HBC attempted to reduce the Carrier fishing monopoly by establishing its own whitefish fishery on Cunningham Lake (Yeko bun) in 1827, and by putting a Company post at the north end of Babine Lake (Nado bun) in the early 1820s to access salmon from the Skeena River system. Thereafter large amounts of salmon were transported from Babine Lake to Fort St. James (with Tl’azt’en labour). Later, in the 1880s, a paddle wheeler service began bringing provisions from the coast up the Skeena to Hazelton. From Hazelton supplies were transported with pack horses and a sloop to the head of Babine Lake. Tl’azt’en people transported the freight over a portage to Stuart Lake where another boat would take it on to Fort St. James. (See Map 2.2) With the institution of this supply link Fort St. James became “virtually independent” of local Native food production. Prior to this HBC traders had difficulty lowering fur prices because Native trappers would collectively refuse to sell them dried fish unless the fur price was acceptable to Native trappers. This occurred at least twice (1835 and 1848). Hudson, “Traplines and Timber,” 89-90.

13 Access to salmon in the Tl’azt’en communities was controlled by leaders of the matrilineal clans, but when the fur trade raised the level of importance of trapping, the power of these leaders began to diminish in favour of the patrilocal groups who came to control the trapping territories. Later, Indian Agents, the Indian Act and the teaching of missionaries further undermined the system of matrilineal inheritance of resource access rights. Hudson, “Traplines and Timber,” 85 and 152.

Omenica Gold Rush

In 1863 gold was discovered north of Tl'azt'en territory in the Omenica Mountains. Some miners reached the Omenica by traveling through the heart of Tl'azt'en territory: from Fort St. James miners went up Stuart Lake (Nak'al bun), Tache River (Duldli koh), Trembleur Lake (Dzinghu bun), Middle River (Yoono' koh) and Takla Lake to Takla Landing, where a trail led east into the Omenica watershed. By 1871, at the peak of the Omenica rush, enough miners were passing through Fort St. James to warrant opening an overland route. The new trail went directly north from Fort St. James and only briefly crossed Tl'azt'en territory near Cripple Lake (see Map 2.2). Activity began to decline after 1871 and by 1876 the gold fields were almost deserted.

Though the trading post, and the mercantile economy it introduced, were new realities in Tl'azt'en territory, and though Europeans began crossing Tl'azt'en territory, they had not yet claimed or attempted to directly administer Tl'azt'en space. The fur trade and the gold rush may have created some new transportation routes, increased access in and around Tl'azt'en territory, and resulted in economic interaction between Europeans and the Tl'azt'en. But this period saw Europeans only move through Tl'azt'en organized space – they had yet to institute a comprehensive new spatial order in the territory.

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2.3 Indian Reserves - The First Non-native Organization of Tl’azt’en Space

1871 Reserves

Indirectly however, the Omenica gold rush was the catalyst for the first articulation of an exogenous vision of Tl’azt’en space. It was often the Colonial and Provincial Government’s practice to create Indian reserves at such time as the settlement or development of an area was anticipated. The passage of miners through Fort St. James and the use of the waterways in Tl’azt’en territory suggested the need to reserve some lands for the Tl’azt’en. In 1871, en route to the Omenica to perform his duties as Gold Commissioner, Peter O’Reilly established the boundaries for three Tl’azt’en reserves at the villages of Grand Rapids, Tache and Pinche (see Map 2.3). However, the anticipated settlement of miners in the region did not materialize and instead, in the late 1870s and 1880s, the region became less, rather than more of a focus of non-native activity.

Explorations commissioned by the Provincial Government, such as that of N.B. Gauvreau in 1891, signaled the Government’s desire to see the territory brought into ‘use’. A comprehensive survey of travel routes, resources, and settlement potential was published to attract to the region settlers who could be agents for the Government in the transformation of Tl’azt’en territory into the space of British Columbia. The Provincial Government also hoped that the announcement in the late 1880s of plans to build the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway would encourage settlement and development in New Caledonia. The proposed railway renewed Government anticipation of an influx of settlement in the region, and in 1892 another allotment of Indian Reserves took place.

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18 L’Heureux, 1989. *Fort St. James*. 35. For reasons why Fort St. James lost some of its importance see Harris and Ingram, “New Caledonia and the Fur Trade,” 188.
20 Hudson, “Traplines and Timber,” 122. The Grand Trunk Pacific Railway route which connected Prince George and Prince Rupert passed well south of Tl’azt’en territory. It was constructed between 1909 and 1914.
Map 2.3

LEGEND

- 1871 Allotments
- 1898 Allotments
- 1911 Applications
- 1915-16 Applications
- 1926 Allotment
- Surveyed Crown Land
- Private Land 1926

Scale 1 : 200,000

Tl'az't'en Reserves
1871 - 1926

Map 2.3

Tl'az't'en Reserves
In 1892 O'Reilly significantly enlarged the Tl'azt'en’s three existing reserves, and granted them seven new reserves (see Figure 2.1 and Map 2.3). We do not know how much input the Tl'azt'en had in choosing the location or size of these reserves. The arbitrary and artificially straight boundary lines were products of a non-native mode of spatial organization. Yet to the extent that they contained sites already used by the Tl'azt'en, the reserves are at least a reflection of Tl'azt'en spatiality.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tl'azt'en Reserves</th>
<th>1871 Allotment</th>
<th>1892 Allotment</th>
<th>1898 Survey</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tache IR1</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>Village/Fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinche IR2</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>Village/Fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancut IR3</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>Village/Fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ucasley IR4</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>Farming/Grazing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carsoosat IR5</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>Hunting/Fishing camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelangle IR1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Hunting/Fishing camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soyandostar IR2</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>253</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hunting/Fishing camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teeslee IR3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hunting/Fishing camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevan IR4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>Village/Fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Rapids IR5</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>4,807</td>
<td>5,199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.1 Tl'azt'en Reserves 1871-1898

Note: In all cases except Pinche IR2, the differences in acreage between the 1892 allotment and the 1898 survey are due to inaccuracies in O'Reilly's field estimates. In the case of Pinche IR2 the difference resulted because the surveyor appears to not have followed the instructions O'Reilly gave in his 1892 Minutes of Decision. (See Specific Claims Documents, Tl'azt'en NROC).

Despite the fact that the reserves projected a new exogenous visualization of Tl'azt'en territory (most importantly they implied Crown ownership of the territory), their demarcation did not immediately result in actual changes in the way Tl'azt'en used the lands and resources of

21 As defined in Chapter 1, a group’s ‘spatiality’ refers to the way they visualize, administer and use space. By this time the Tl’azt’en economy was beginning to include animal husbandry and gardening. The Government encouraged and accommodated the further development of a sedentary lifestyle by providing larger tracts of land around villages, but mainly the new reserve locations reflect the fact that the Tl’azt’en’s economy was still dominated fishing, hunting and trapping.
the territory. There was little or no non-native presence in Tl’azt’en territory and little or no competition for game resources and land. The land on both sides of the reserve boundaries continued to be functional Tl’azt’en spaces. Provincial Government and Tl’azt’en visions of the territory would continue to exist simultaneously until Euro-Canadian social practices of administration and use could be introduced.

2.4 The Introduction of Government Administration, 1900-1926

Blomley states that a property regime involves two elements: “the categorization and organization of space whereby every space is known, named and positioned,” and “the establishment of rules of interaction by which space can be used, shared and appropriated.”

The Tl’azt’en’s reserves were the first building blocks of the Euro-Canadian property rights system in Tl’azt’en territory, but they did not have immediate or very significant effects on Tl’azt’en mobility or land use. However, in the early 1900s, several Euro-Canadian institutions began to extend their influence in Tl’azt’en territory, and for the first time introduced a new order into Tl’azt’en lives and space.

It was Catholic missionaries who first put in place an exogenous system of administration on the Tl’azt’en. The priests installed Band members as ‘church chiefs’ and ‘church policemen’ in each Tl’azt’en village to regulate behaviour during the absence of the priest. The priests also acted as liaisons between the Carrier of the Stuart Lake region and the Provincial and Federal

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Governments by providing information needed by the Governments and by petitioning on behalf of the Carrier concerning hunting, fishing and trapping issues.24

After the colony of British Columbia joined the Dominion of Canada in 1871 the Federal Government moved to assert its jurisdiction in British Columbia. In 1884 it brought in legislation forbidding Potlatching, one of the means through which many Native groups in British Columbia transferred title to land and resources and resolved internal resource disputes.25 In 1890, the Federal Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) established an Indian Agency in Hazelton which would be responsible for a large region which included Tl’azt’en territory. In 1910, DIA set up the Stuart Lake Agency to deal with Stuart and Fraser Lakes region. Its office was located in Fraser Lake. DIA began to assert control in the region in the administration of Indian Reserve land, Band political structure, and many other aspects of Native lives.26

**Game Laws**

Indian Agents along with the RCMP were responsible for ensuring Native compliance with laws and regulations concerning hunting, fishing and trapping. Letters written by chiefs in the region and other documents suggest that Carrier were aware of the game laws that were being put in place, and that they were concerned about some of the regulations. It is also clear that they felt they had to comply with the new administrative institutions (the motivation behind their

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24 See for example “Correspondence, 1903, with Indian Superintendent Protestin on Behalf of the Carrier Indians” and “Correspondence, 1919-1920, with Premier John Oliver, Protestin on Behalf of the Carrier Indians” by A.G. Morice. Tl’azt’en NROC.


petitions to the Government was to make compliance more tolerable). Game laws were a significant agent in turning Native space into Government space, yet the written records indicate that through petitions and protest Native people did have an influence on the way the laws were drafted and instituted. It is also clear that in the late 1800s and early 1900s priests and Indian Agents were conscious that they were dealing with the co-existence of Carrier law and Provincial law. They used Carrier law in fact on numerous occasions in their handling of resource and justice issues. In this period European administration began to touch aspects of Native lives but certainly it was not did not immediately erase Native administration.

The Barricade Treaty

In the early 1900s an increasing coastal fishing industry began putting a strain on salmon stocks. This caused the Federal Marine and Fisheries Department to prohibit the Native practice of constructing fish weirs to catch salmon on interior rivers, claiming that it prevented too many salmon from reaching the spawning grounds. In 1911 the Tl'azt'en, along with the Nak'azdli, entered into an agreement known as the Barricade Treaty with the Department to not use fish weirs in the rivers in exchange for three forms of compensation: 1) the right to fish with nets in lakes; 2) that nets, farming implements and seeds be supplied annually by the Federal Government to each Tl'azt'en family; and 3) that sites used as bases for fishing for whitefish and char be granted to them as reserves. In the agreement neither the number nor the location of the new reserves was specified. Within a year the Tl'azt'en requested three new reserves under the

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27 For letters written by Carrier chiefs in Nechako Plateau and Stuart Lake Region see RG10, Volume 6735, File 420-3. Tl'azt'en NROC. This file contains only one letter signed by a Tl'azt'en chief. See also “Correspondence, 1903, with Indian Superintendent Protesting on Behalf of the Carrier Indians” and “Correspondence, 1919-1920, with Premier John Oliver, Protesting on Behalf of the Carrier Indians” by A.G. Morice. Tl'azt'en NROC.

Treaty (see ‘1911 Applications’ on Map 2.3), but the Government postponed dealing with these requests until the McKenna-McBride Commission examined the Tl’azt’en’s reserves in 1915.29

The Barricade treaty was a significant event in the establishment of Government control and administration over Tl’azt’en resources and space. While ultimately the Tl’azt’en may not have had the power to be able to continue to use the fish weirs, the Government gave considerable recognition to the Tl’azt’en’s use of the salmon resource, and this led to the need to find a negotiated solution.30 There may have been a power discrepancy between the two groups but the process of negotiation created a new space of fishing in Tl’azt’en territory. It cannot be said that it was either entirely a Tl’azt’en space or entirely an Government imposed space – rather it was a hybrid space. First, the Barricade Treaty saw the Government agree to something it rarely allowed – fishing with nets in lakes. This agreement also considerably changed the location of Tl’azt’en fishing.

The agreement specified that the Tl’azt’en would from then on net salmon in Stuart Lake rather than catch them with weirs on rivers and streams, and the agreement also made the Tl’azt’en rely more on other species besides salmon. Now that they had nets the Tl’azt’en began spending two or three weeks in the fall fishing char on the rock shelves which surrounded

29 The same three parcels did not appear in the Tl’azt’en’s reserve applications at the 1915-16 Commission hearings, but the Tl’azt’en did request six parcels which were at least partly used as fishing bases. Five of these applications (Whitefish IR6, Eagle Creek IR6, Tezzeron IR8, Pinche IR10, and Cunningham IR11) were granted, and one (Tezzeron IR9) was granted but later ‘disallowed’ by the Dictchburn and Clark Reserve Commission in 1923. Government records and interviews with Band members indicate that the Government did not supply the promised seeds and farming implements, and only provided nets to the Tl’azt’en for one or two years after the agreement was executed. The failure of the Government to fulfill these provisions of the treaty and to grant the 1911 requests for fishing station reserves is currently the subject of a Specific Claim. “Barricade Treaty”, Documents Compiled by the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council. Tl’azt’en NROC. See also interview with Jimmy Monk (September 18, 1998).

30 Documents surrounding the negotiations clearly show that the terms of the agreement were not imposed on the Tl’azt’en, and that they held considerable power to negotiate the terms. For an argument that the Barricade Agreement was an early recognition of First Nations fishing rights see Barbara Lane, 1978. "Federal Recognition of Indian Fishing Rights in British Columbia: The Fort Fraser Agreement of June 15, 1911, and the Fort St. James Agreement of June 19, 1911." Report prepared for the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs. Tl’azt’en NROC.
the many islands in Stuart Lake. Though the government allowed this practice, the Tl’azt’en continued to control the management of fishing locations at the local level. Families or individual Band members came to ‘own’ certain islands, and this ownership was passed down by inheritance. The space of hunting, trapping and fishing was being deliberately changed by the Government during the first part of the Twentieth Century through the introduction of new laws and regulations but, to at least some degree, it was influenced by Native protests or through direct negotiations.

Crown Land Survey and Land Sales

Besides those at the HBC and the Mission, and occasional prospectors, in the early 1900s there were few whites in Stuart Lake region. The south end of Stuart Lake was one of the first places to be occupied by Euro-Canadians in Western Canada. Yet because it was mainly forest land and had a short growing season, it remained one of the last regions to be extensively settled by non-natives. Up to this time only coarse maps had described the area, but in 1911 a survey produced the first detailed map of the Stuart Lake region. The survey made Tl’azt’en space considerably more visible to the Government: it was a deliberate effort to organize and extend administrative control over the area.

The 1911 survey also superimposed a grid of lots on the parts of the territory which the Government wished to make available for pre-emption (see Map 2.3). Up to 1910, in the area

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31 Interview with Jimmy Monk and Frank Duncan (September 17, 1998).
33 Hudson, “Traplines and Timbers,” 55.
34 See British Columbia Government Department of Lands, “Pre-emptor’s Map-Stuart Lake Sheet 1913.” Tl’azt’en NROC.
shown on Map 2.3 (excepting the immediate vicinity of the village of Fort St. James), there were only 7 lots which were privately owned. However, construction of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway between 1909-1914 triggered a land boom along the rail line, and throughout the Nechako region.\(^{35}\) The 1911 survey of Crown lots facilitated a wave of pre-emptions and, by 1912, there were 125 privately owned lots in Tl’azt’en territory. Yet these alienations of Crown land were very speculative in nature – with most of the land holders never coming to use, or even to see the land they purchased – and a significant percentage of the lots reverted to the Crown within two or three years of purchase. By 1926 there were only 45 private lots in Tl’azt’en territory, some of which are shown on Map 2.3.\(^ {36}\) Actual non-native settlement and land use in the area continued to be very limited, and mostly on the fringes of Tl’azt’en territory. It appears that any disruption and dislocation of the Tl’azt’en caused by the acquisition of land in Tl’azt’en territory by non-natives was considerably less in extent than that experienced by other Bands.\(^ {37}\)

The McKenna-McBride Commission.

At the McKenna-McBride Indian Reserve Commission hearings in 1915 and 1916 the Tl’azt’en applied for nine new reserves. Six of the Tl’azt’en’s applications were granted in 1916. The

\(^{35}\) Hudson, “Traplines and Timbers,” 128.

\(^{36}\) I was not able to show all of the privately held land because in several cases the lot numbers in the Crown Land Register have been changed by re-survey and I was unable to locate them. It should be noted that some of the parcels shown on Map 2.3 are divided between several owners. I obtained the data for private land holdings from the manual registers of the Crown Lands Registry Division, Surveyor Generals Branch, Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks, Victoria.

\(^{37}\) Some of the Wet’suwet’en people, for example, experienced considerable dislocation and loss of opportunity when white settlers pre-empted land in their territory. See Maureen and Frank Cassidy, 1981. Proud Past: A History of the Wet’suwet’en of Moricetown B.C. Moricetown: Moricetown Indian Band.
seventh reserve granted by the Commission was land not desired by the Tl'atz'en, and the
de Tl'atz'en had it replaced in 1926 by a parcel in a different location (see Map 2.3 and Figure
2.2).38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tl'atz'en Reserves</th>
<th>1898 Survey</th>
<th>1916 Allotment</th>
<th>1926 Survey</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tache IR1</td>
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<td>1655</td>
<td>1655</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pinche IR2</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>728</td>
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<td>Nancut IR3</td>
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<td>Ucasalet IR4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eagle Creek IR6</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,199</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,687</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,346.52</strong></td>
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</table>

Figure 2.2  Tl'atz'en Reserves 1898-1926

Note: As the numbering of the reserves indicates, at this time the Government perceived the Tl'atz'en to be two Bands: the Tache Band and the Trembleur Lake Band.

Though encroachment was not an overwhelming issue, the Band saw value in securing recognized rights to lands, and continued to attempt to do so whenever it had the opportunity.

The Band's applications were a deliberate effort to reconcile Tl'atz'en needs with the property rights institution that had been superimposed on their own. They had to frame their requests for

38 In part, the 1916 Reserve Commission allocated the Band more land because when O'Reilly established their reserves in the 1890s the Tl'atz'en population was small due to recent epidemics: measles in 1850, smallpox in 1862, and measles in 1887 (Hudson, “Traplines and Timber,” 99). In 1923, when Ditchburn and Clark reviewed the decisions of the 1916 Commission, Tezzeron IR9 was deemed ‘not reasonably required’ and removed from the Tl'atz’en’s reserve allotments. For more information about Tl'atz'en reserve applications and allotments in the period between 1871 and 1968 see an Internet Site created by Megan Gaffney and Kris Farrell entitled “A Short History of Tl'atz'en Reserves.” (http://otaku.unbc.ca).
land within rules and lines that had been introduced into their territory, and to some extent had, therefore, adopted the view of land as a commodity. But the Tl'azt'en influenced where they would receive reserve lands, and were participants in producing those spaces. The power discrepancy between the Indian Reserve Commissions and the Band is very clear, yet the impact the Tl'azt'en had in the creation of the geography of their territory is also apparent. The Tl'azt'en's land applications in 1916 and their registration of traplines in late 1920s exemplify that, though they no longer were the principal administrative power in their territory, they participated in the production of space during this period.

A full discussion of DIA and Provincial Government administration is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is clear that the impact of these agencies increased significantly during the first half of the Twentieth Century. The Tl'azt'en lost some of their authority to administer and use their territory as new lines and laws were imposed on their space. However, it should also be noted that most of the territory remained the exclusive space of the Tl'azt'en people, and their use and traditional organization of that space was not erased or forgotten.

2.5 1926-1969.

Our view of the geographic change that took place in Tl'azt'en territory in the mid part of the Twentieth Century must begin with a recognition that Tl'azt'en visualization, administration and use of off-reserve land and resources continued. The reserve system by no means had completed the Euro-Canadian re-production of Tl'azt'en territory. Hunting, fishing and trapping continued to be viable and socially important activities for the Tl'azt'en through the mid part of this Century. Yet the community's off-reserve space also evolved as Tl'azt'en spatiality began to include wage labour in mining, forestry, and guiding. The compatibility of Tl'azt'en use and
non-native use of the territory was a significant aspect of the space of the territory from the
1940s to the 1960s. Because of these things, even as Provincial administration and non-native
use extended further into the territory, Tl’azt’en space continued to extend well beyond the
boundaries of their reserves. But, despite the fact the territory largely remained their space and
that non-native use was compatible with their own, the Tl’azt’en did continue to make efforts to
increase their legal land rights.

Registered Trapline System

As part of an effort to improve conservation and reduce conflicts the Provincial Government
introduced the Registered Trapline System in 1926. It was specifically designed “to introduce a
Government presence into the wilderness.”39 The Government began keeping careful tabs on the
productivity of trap lines, and instituted regulations which stated that a trapper had to achieve a
certain level of production or his trapline could be given to another. Though Native trappers
recognized that their traditional internal control of access to resources was being replaced by an
outside government system, it might well have been seen as necessary and “agreeable” to most
Native trappers in north-central British Columbia.40

If Native trappers found the Provincial regulations necessary it was only because of the
presence of non-native trappers who did not follow Native hunting and trapping laws. The

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39 Dimitrov, “Carrier-Sekani Registered Trapline System,” 21. In order to improve stewardship of game resources
the Registered Trapline System replaced the existing one year permits (which carried the right to renew), with more
secure licenses which could be passed on by inheritance or sold. The system also placed an emphasis on
establishing metes and bounds descriptions of trapline boundaries to reduce conflicts between trappers.
40 Some Native trappers in the Hazelton area refused to register their traplines, claiming that the Government had no
right to regulate what was an Native ancestral right. But according to the DIA agent in charge of Indian trapping
many Natives in north-central British Columbia found the Registered Trapline System “agreeable” as it provided
much needed security and “reinforces tribal customs.” This was probably far from an objective opinion. See
Inspector of Indian Agencies to Provincial Game Board. August 5, 1925. RG 10, Volume 6735, File 420-3A.
Tl’azt’en NROC.
Native trapper and non-native trapper had similar resource uses but appear to have had different perceptions of what constituted well regulated and lawful use of the land: “On the one hand, the non-native settlers, preoccupied with European notions of homesteading that ‘legally’ defined land-use boundaries according to exclusive individual ‘ownership’ titles, were confronted by the Carrier-Sekani Indian system of land use ‘ownership’ and ‘title’ that was based on different ‘clan related’ rights of access, flexible usage and rotational harvesting patterns to ensure species conservation.”\(^{41}\)

As a consequence of the existence of two systems of land usage, ownership, social structure and wildlife management, conflict between Native and non-native trappers was common in the Nechako plateau.\(^{42}\) I found no evidence of clashes between Tl'atz'en and white trappers, either before or after 1926. But because of problems elsewhere in the Province, the Registered Trapline system was instituted to bring order by more clearly mapping traplines and by creating a mechanism of control and administration for fur harvesting. The registration of traplines in 1926 was an undeniable sign of ever expanding Provincial Government presence in Tl'atz'en territory. Yet, when the Tl'atz'en applied to register their traplines, they in essence applied to inscribe the boundaries of their keyohs within the Government’s new management of the territory. The registered traplines did not carry the rights to all game, fish and plant resources as did the Tl'atz'en keyohs. It is also clear that, though the Tl'atz'en influenced the location of the boundaries, they did not have a large influence on the rules which would govern fur harvesting, nor have the ability to keep timber harvesting from taking place in their traplines.

But the traplines were passed down through inheritance similar to keyohs, and the registered

\(^{41}\) Dimitrov, “Carrier-Sekani Registered Trapline System,” 19.
\(^{42}\) Dimitrov, “Carrier-Sekani Registered Trapline System,” 20.
trapline areas are the most obvious example of how Tl’azt’en spatiality was expressed within the Euro-Canadian production of space in the territory. Even today the Tl’azt’en use the terms ‘keyoh’ and ‘trapline’ interchangeably, and recognize each other’s keyohs based on the boundaries of their registered traplines.43

There are currently only a few non-Tl’azt’en traplines in Tl’azt’en territory. This points to the limited nature of non-native activity in Tl’azt’en territory in the late 1920s when traplines were registered. It also shows that the Tl’azt’en were unwilling to sell their traplines because trapping remained an important activity for them well into the 1970s, and also because the traplines carried more meaning for the Tl’azt’en than just the right to trap.44

Forest Development and Wage Labour

The Tl’azt’en economy has undergone several changes since the 1800s. After the arrival of Europeans the Tl’azt’en incorporated the fur trade into their existing fishing and hunting economy. Later they added gardening and animal husbandry to produce products which could be sold to non-natives and which could be used to supplement their own consumption of fish and game. But in the 1940s, a reduction in the amount of salmon and a decline in fur prices caused the Tl’azt’en to turn more to seasonal wage labour.45 Opportunities to be employed in logging also arrived in the 1940s. From this time on Tl’azt’en families supported themselves with a combination of wage labour, trapping, and subsistence.

43 More research is required to piece together the history of changes to trapline boundaries before and after 1926. Map 2.2 shows the current Registered Trapline License boundaries in Tl’azt’en territory to represent Tl’azt’en keyohs in the 1800s.
44 See Hudson for more information concerning the extent and nature of Tl’azt’en trapping activity from the 1800s to 1980.
45 Hudson, “Traplines and Timber,” 140.
In the 1940s, several Tl’azt’en who had their own horse teams worked as falling and skidding contractors for the two mills in Fort St. James. This harvesting took place at a few locations on the west side of Stuart Lake (see Map 2.4). Between 1940 and 1944 many Tl’azt’en also cut cordwood for the Pinche Lake mercury mine. By the mid 1950s horses had been replaced by machinery, and timber farther in from the lake shores could be harvested. Motorized boats made timber farther up Stuart Lake, and eventually on Trembleur Lake, accessible. While the amount of land affected by logging increased, the intensity of the operations remained relatively low. At this time logging was selective and also slow. It took decades to complete all the harvesting shown on Map 2.4; for example, the block on the East bank of the Tache River took six years to harvest. This was because of low technology and because harvesting operations were still seasonal.

None of the Tl’azt’en that I interviewed felt that the logging that took place in the 1950s and 60s significantly damaged hunting, fishing and trapping land. It is also important that no logging took place above Trembleur Lake on the Middle River – the most important moose hunting and beaver trapping area for the Tl’azt’en. Tl’azt’en men were involved at every stage of forestry activity in their territory: falling, skidding, driving logs down the Tache River, and

46 Cinnabar deposits located on the North side of Pinche Lake were developed by Cominco in 1940 to supply mercury to make fuses and precision instruments for the Allied war effort. The cordwood cut by the Tl’azt’en fueled a crusher, kiln and condenser used in processing the ore. The trees were harvested by Tl’azt’en in an area east of the mine (See Map 2.4). They skidded the logs to the shore of Pinche Lake with horses. The wood was sawn into the required lengths, and from there a short, narrow gauge railway transported the cordwood to the mine site. The Tl’azt’en people who worked there stayed in scattered camps near the logging operations. (Interviews with Johnny Anatole [June 16, 1998], Jimmy Monk [June 12, 1998], Russell Alec [May 28, 1998], Pierre John [June 1, 1998]). A small settlement was also established next to the mine for the non-native mine employees - it was the first non-native townsite in Tl’azt’en territory. The mine ceased production in 1944 when the Allies re-secured sources of mercury in Spain and Italy. “The Pinchi Lake Story.” Cominco Magazine, October 1965:22-25. Northwest Collection, BCARS.

47 See, e.g., interviews with Robert Hanson (June 1 and 4, 1998), Johnny Anatole (June 16, 1998), Jimmy Monk (June 12, 1998), Russel Alec (May 28, 1998), and Norman Prince (June 19, 1998).
Development in Tl'azt'en Territory 1940s - 1960s

Map 2.4

Legend
- Tl'azt'en Reserve
- Selective Logging (1940s)
- Selective Logging (1950s)
- Selective Logging (1960s)
- Mercury Mine
- Portable Sawmill
- Recreation Lodge
- Trembluer Trail
- Logging Trail
- Road

Scale 1: 220,000
towing log booms down Stuart Lake to the mills at Fort St. James. Tl’azt’en men formed at least fifty percent of the labour force for forestry operations in Tl’azt’en territory. Many Tl’azt’en were also employed at the mills in Fort St. James and at portable sawmills. The locations of some of these mills are shown on Map 2.4.

Wage labour did not replace, but was integrated into, the Tl’azt’en’s seasonal round. Generally logging was done in the winter and saw milling in the summer, but the harvest of fur, game and salmon remained central to Tl’azt’en culture and economy. The expansion of timber harvesting into the area was a sign of the power of the Government to allocate the resources of Tl’azt’en territory. But timber harvesting was not perceived by the Tl’azt’en as a threat to the hunting and trapping economy, but as an opportunity to supplement the bush economy with wage earnings. Tl’azt’en men have pride in the work they did along side non-native loggers. These areas of timber harvesting were not simply ‘spaces of non-native development’, but were very much Tl’azt’en spaces as well. Though the Tl’azt’en may no longer have had ultimate administrative control in their territory, they continued to be the main users of their territory. The areas of timber harvesting shown on Map 2.4 are best described as ‘shared spaces’.

Non-native Recreation

Non-native recreation in the region increased exponentially in the mid part of the Century.

Several recreational lodges were constructed in Tl’azt’en territory (see Map 2.5). As with timber harvesting, these were not spaces of exclusion but spaces of opportunity for the Tl’azt’en.

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48 Interview with Bob and Doug Hoy (June 25, 1998).
49 Hudson, ("Traplines and Timber," 141) states that portable mills were located along the Tache river, Trembleur Lake and Stuart Lake. Yet several Tl’azt’en told me that bush mills were only set up in the Tezzeron-Pinche area, as shown on the Map 2.4. The data for the map came from a Ministry of Forests report that did not cover the Tache River/Trembleur Lake area.
According to a DIA official, “at one time or another most of the Tl’azt’en male population” found work as guides for non-native fisherman and hunters at these lodges.\(^50\) Tl’azt’en women were also employed in housekeeping duties and in serving food at the lodges. Justa Monk, spoke of Nakalat Lodge, at the north end of Stuart Lake, in this way:

> What a role it has played in the life of our family! For sixteen years my dad worked there for part of every year. My brothers and sisters worked there, and I worked there for years after I quit the mill. Very often when my dad was there our whole family would join him, if not right at the lodge, then in our cabin just across the bay from Nakalat. Nakalat Lodge is on the edge of our hunting and fishing territory and our trapline, so at the same time that some of us were working at the lodge, we were also able to live off the land. That was very important to our family life.\(^51\)

**Land Sales**

The nature of non-native ownership of land in the territory changed in the mid part of the Twentieth Century. The number of privately owned lots went from forty-five in 1926 to fifty-three in 1955 (see Map 2.5). But twenty-four of these lots were small islands in Stuart Lake that were bought by non-natives as locations for summer cabins. (The scale of the map prevented me from being able to show the islands. Most are located in the area of the lake between Pinche IR2 and Tache IR1, and between Carsoosat IR5 and Nancut IR3.) As described earlier, part of the Tl’azt’en seasonal round involved netting char each fall at the rock shelves surrounding the many islands in Stuart lake. Families camped out on the islands for two or three weeks in the early fall to catch and smoke fish for winter. Despite evidence of Native use and the presence of Tl’azt’en smokehouses, beginning in the 1940s several of the islands were sold by the Crown.\(^52\)

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\(^51\) Moran, Justa: A First Nations Leader, 63-64.

\(^52\) See “Islands in Stuart Lake.” Tl’azt’en NROC.
were built by non-natives in some cases on the very site where the Tl’azt’en had a smokehouse or camp.53

More research is required to determine how many Tl’azt’en were displaced in this way, and how much the purchase of an island curtailed a Band member’s ability to use the island or the reefs around them. In the period up to 1969 the alienation of the Tl’azt’en’s islands was the most significant case where the Tl’azt’en have been disrupted and displaced by non-native actions. Yet the Tl’azt’en still fish around the islands, and many of the islands are still referred to as ‘belonging’ to Band members – the Tl’azt’en visualization, administration and use of these spaces has not yet been totally erased.

**Camp 24**

With the establishment of sawmills in Fort St. James many Tl’azt’en began spending the summers there working in the mills. With the permission of the Catholic Church in 1950 the Tl’azt’en built and occupied a group of 15-20 shelters on Mission lands. Some Tl’azt’en also began to live there year round. The place became known as Camp 24 (see Map 2.5). In 1957 health concerns and complaints from the non-native Village of Fort St. James prompted DIA to consider purchasing land for a reserve on which the Tl’azt’en who wanted to live in Fort St. James could build proper houses.

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53 Interview with Jimmy Monk and Frank Duncan (September 17, 1998).
Plans to create a reserve for the Tl'azt'en required that the five bands – Portage, Tache, Pinche, Grand Rapids, and Middle River – be amalgamated so that one reserve could be purchased for them all. The amalgamation took place in 1959, and the Tl'azt'en became known as the Stuart-Trembleur Lakes Band. The purchase of the portion of the Mission's land on which Camp 24 was situated was approved in principal by the Deputy Minister of DIA in 1959. Yet in 1960 the purchase was postponed, and by 1964 DIA decided that they would no longer consider purchasing land for the Tl'azt'en. In 1965 the Tl'azt'en resolved to purchase a 20 acre piece of property just south of Fort St. James on their own (see Map 2.5). The purchase did not take place, though it is not clear why. Camp 24 was torn down and burned by order of the Village of Fort St. James in April 1968.

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55 The purchase was delayed and eventually canceled due to three issues: opposition by non-native residents of Fort St. James to creating a reserve so close to the town; the fact that DIA was investigating the potential of creating an off-reserve arrangement; and the announcement that a railway would be built through Fort St. James to Takla Lake made DIA officials believe that the Tl'azt'en people would find work north of Fort St. James and the reserve in town would no longer be required. W.E. Grant (Superintendent, Stuart Lake Agency, DIA) to Regional Office (DIA). March 22, 1960. DIA Surveys and Reserves File 985/20-26-1, Vol.1 1948-1969. Tl'azt'en NROC.
Applications for New Reserves

In the 1940s the Tl’atz’en received four new parcels of reserves land (see Map 2.5 and Figure 2.3). These were lands which were being used by the Tl’atz’en, but it is not known exactly why the Government decided to grant the Band more land at this point.\(^{57}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tl’atz’en Reserves</th>
<th>1926 Survey</th>
<th>1940s Allotments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tache IR1</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>2019.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinche IR2</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancut IR3</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ucausley IR4</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carsoosat IR5</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitefish Lake IR6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinche IR7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinche IR7A</td>
<td></td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tezzeron IR8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinche Lake IR10</td>
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<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cunningham IR11</td>
<td>9.82</td>
<td>9.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinche IR12</td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanson IR13</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelangle IR1</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soyandostar IR2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teesslee IR3</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevan IR4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Rapids IR5</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle Creek IR6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,346.52</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,044.32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{57}\) For information concerning Tl’atz’en use of these lands see DIA File 985/30-26-1, Vol.1 1948-1969. Tl’atz’en NROC.

In the 1960s the Tl’atz’en also made several attempts to secure other lands which they used (see Map 2.5). In 1960 the Band requested that lands near to Tache IR1, Nancut IR3 and Whitefish Lake IR6 which they used for hay, grazing and gardening be granted to them as reserves.\(^{58}\) The

1926 Reserves
1940's Allocations
1950's Applications
Private Land 1955
Surveyed Crown Land

Scale 1 : 200,000

TL'az't'en Reserves

1940's - 1960's

Map 2.5

LEGEND

1926 Reserves
1940's Allocations
1950's Applications
Private Land 1955
Surveyed Crown Land

Scale 1 : 200,000

TL'az't'en Reserves

1940's - 1960's

Map 2.5

LEGEND
requests were unsuccessful. In 1968 the Band requested that a reserve that they found little use for (Tezzeron Lake IR8) be exchanged for a more useful parcel of land on the south side of Pinche Lake. DIA supported the proposal but it appears that the Province refused the request, and the transaction did not take place. The Band was also considering an exchange of Hanson IR13 for an adjacent parcel that had more desirable frontage on Babine Lake. When the Tl'azt'en learned that the legal title to the shore line would be retained by the Province they decided not to complete the exchange.

Their applications for new reserves and their attempts to exchange existing reserves for more useful and valuable lands show that the Tl'azt'en’s strategy continued to be to create legal spaces for themselves within the new production of space. This strategy was adopted even though encroachment and competition in Tl'azt'en territory were relatively minor compared to the experience of other Bands. Despite the fact that their spatiality was more extensive than could ever be captured by Indian reserves, the Tl'azt'en lacked the political power to influence the Government’s allocation of lands and resources to any greater extent.

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59 DIA agreed that, because of the Band’s low figure for per capita acreage, additional land should be obtained for the Tl’azt’en. Yet it was learned that, though it might consider land exchanges, the Provincial Government would not sell more land to DIA. DIA therefore recommended that Band members apply to lease the land they required, or obtain hay cutting permits. See Mr. Arneil (Indian Commissioner for British Columbia) to Grant (DIA). January 26, 1960. DIA File 985/30-26, 1960-1968. Tl’azt’en NROC; and Government Agent to Grant (DIA). February 3, 1960. DIA File 985/30-26, 1960-1968. Tl’azt’en NROC.

60 Stuart-Trembleur Lakes Band Council Resolution. March 27, 1968. DIA File 985/30-26. Tl’azt’en NROC. The parcel the Tl’azt’en desired was on the west bank of Pinche Creek as it left Pinche Lake (see Map 2.5). It is not known why the Tl’azt’en wanted this land.

61 This exchange was proposed by the owner of the land on both sides of Hanson IR13. The old Hudson’s Bay Company portage trail crossed the front of the property and was claimed by the Province as a public road. For more information see DIA File 985/30-26. Tl’azt’en NROC.
2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted some of the significant steps in the introduction of a new spatial order in Tl’atz’en territory. At some point in the history of the region there was a shift from a Tl’atz’en production of space influenced by non-Tl’atz’en, to a Euro-Canadian production of space influenced by the Tl’atz’en. But determining when that shift happened may not be as important as recognizing that both groups participated in the re-production of space. Tl’atz’en ability to dominate the production of space in their territory was eroded over time, but the interaction of the Tl’atz’en and non-natives produced a landscape made up of hybrid spaces, negotiated spaces, and shared spaces.

Elsewhere in the Province the reserve system turned “Indian Nations into proprietary enclaves of the modern state.” Yet, for the Tl’atz’en, the creation of reserves did not immediately result in physical separation from the resources of their territory. Only a very few parcels of private land were not de facto Tl’atz’en space, and non-native activity in the territory to a great extent did not dislocate or disrupt Tl’atz’en off-reserve resource use. In fact, the areas of forestry and recreation activity were spaces that the Tl’atz’en shared with non-natives.

The Tl’atz’en also adopted a strategy of attempting to have their land and resource use recognized by Government institutions. In this period their power and ability to achieve this seems to have been connected to opportunities created by the Government (for e.g., the Barricade Treaty negotiations, the Reserve Commissions, and the Registration of Traplines). However in the 1960s the Tl’atz’en increased their capacity to consider reserve land issues, and took the initiative in trying to increase their land rights.

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62 Brealey, “Mapping them out,” 150.
The Tl'azt'en became involved in what some have called 'non-native activities' such as farming, logging, and saw milling. Though the importance of the bush economy remained high, their participation in the wage labour economy meant that the spatial dimension of Tl'azt'en lives changed over time. But a strong and distinct Tl'azt'en spatiality still existed which, if given the political power and opportunity, could influence and negotiate the production of space in Tl'azt'en territory.

There had been many changes in Tl'azt'en territory but, up to the 1960s, it appears that not having absolute legal control of their territory was not immediately devastating for the Tl'azt'en. Yet, because the Tl'azt'en's off-reserve resource use was not recognized in law to any significant extent, there was a precondition for future conflict. Should incompatible development enter those spaces that had value to the Tl'azt'en but were not protected for them by the Government, it would seriously threaten the Tl'azt'en.

**Spaces of Incompatibility**

In the late 1960s the economy of the region began to shift out of the reach of the Tl'azt'en. A number of developments resulted in the Tl'azt'en finding that their off reserve space—both their bush economy space and their wage labour space—was becoming smaller. An increase in the world demand for mercury made production again feasible at the Pinchi Lake mine. However, when it re-opened in 1968, opportunities for the Tl'azt'en were few as the operations used technology requiring considerable training and experience. Also the new ore processing plant was
powered by electricity, and therefore Tl’azt’en labour was no longer required to supply the mine with cordwood.\(^{63}\)

When pulp mills were built in Prince George in the mid 1960s, large forestry corporations took over the small companies operating in the Stuart Lake region. The pulp mills could utilize smaller diameter timber and eventually clear cut harvesting replaced selective harvesting. Logging operations also became year round, and the amount of timber being removed increased substantially, but because operations increasingly used more machinery and ran year round the Tl’azt’en found their opportunities for wage labour decreasing. In the mid 1960s six sawmills were in operation in Fort St. James, but by this time the type of work the Tl’azt’en had previously been able to get was disappearing.\(^{64}\) The mills were becoming less labour intensive and positions required increasing levels of training. Also the mills began operating year round and required their employees to work year round as well. This interfered with the pattern of many Tl’azt’en people’s lives and “an expanding non-Indian labour force displaced seasonal Indian labour.”\(^{65}\)

One of the most significant changes in Tl’azt’en territory since contact was the construction of the Tache-Fort St. James road. As early as 1954 the Tl’azt’en had tried to have a road built from Tache to Fort St. James. In 1965 DIA and the Province agreed to jointly pay for the road to be built. The motivation for the Province was that it needed a road to access the timber in Tl’azt’en territory, as the Department of Fisheries had ordered that transport of logs by water should be phased out. The Tache road was completed to all season standard in 1969.

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\(^{63}\) “How We Do It At Pinchi Lake, B.C.” Cominco Ltd. Information Pamphlet. Northwest Collection, BCARS.


\(^{65}\) Hudson, “Traplines and Timber,” 146.
For the Tl’azt’en it was an exciting project—until then they had traveled to Fort St. James by boat in the summer, or by sleigh in the winter. The road was a development the Tl’azt’en wanted, yet it also had negative consequences, such as increased non-native access to their territory for both recreation and logging. The improved access to Fort St. James also caused significant changes within the Tl’azt’en communities:

In 1971 there will still very few cars in the village and more often than not the trip to the Fort was made by boat or, in winter, by skidoo. The old days of teams of horses and meadows and haying were just about finished. By the early 1970s I only remember one team of horses in Tachie and a few head of cattle, owned by Za Williams. Year by year as the road to the Fort became more passable, and as more villagers owned vehicles, gardens were disappearing too.\(^{66}\)

With the building of the road and the change in the law allowing Natives access to alcohol, villages like Tachie and Portage and Pinchi seemed to change overnight. Years before, people were working at hides and drying fish and preparing for winter; now the settlements were quiet as people jumped into their cars and trucks and headed into town. The centre of life was no longer our villages; it had shifted to the hotels and grocery stores in the Fort and Vanderhoof.\(^{67}\)

Today the Tl’azt’en characterize their earlier history as a time when they were isolated and independent. They believe their independence stemmed from the ability to live off the land unimpaired by non-native settlement and development. From that spatial and socio-economic centre, the Tl’azt’en were able to benefit from interaction with non-native activities. The Tl’azt’en’s isolation was increasingly altered by the gradual increase of non-native access in the territory and the development of forest resources, but even in the late 1960s the core of their territory was still very much Tl’azt’en space. In 1969 the road to Tache began to alter this somewhat, but it would be a railroad that would most change the nature of both their isolation and their independence.

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\(^{66}\) Moran, Justa: A First Nations Leader, 103.

\(^{67}\) Moran, Justa: A First Nations Leader, 137-138.

3.0 **Introduction**

In 1968 the Pacific Great Eastern Railway Company, a Crown corporation, began construction of a rail line through the heart of Tl’azt’en territory. The railway was built through seven of the Tl’azt’en’s reserves prior to the finalization of a right-of-way agreement. Early on the Tl’azt’en decided that they wanted compensation in the form of a land exchange for the reserve right-of-ways needed by the railway, and they identified several parcels of land that they wanted to be reserved for them. However, as construction proceeded, the Tl’azt’en found that activities related to the construction of the railway had impacted their hunting and trapping success. They also began to realize that the railway was opening up their territory to intensive forestry, which would further undermine the security of their bush economy but provided fewer opportunities for employment. The Tl’azt’en, therefore, re-opened the negotiations and then expanded the scope of the negotiations to include compensation for ecological damage, and the provision of economic development opportunities for the Tl’azt’en community. Their ability to resist the Government’s production of an incompatible space in their territory resulted from their determination, the empowerment of Native people throughout North America, and the power of their rights to the Reserve land on which the railway had been built. This chapter will give an account of the Tl’azt’en’s efforts between 1969 and 1974 to gain recognition for their existing Reserve rights, to create new Reserves which reflected their spatiality, and to engage the Government in negotiations which would re-affirm and re-inscribe the place of the Tl’azt’en community in their territory.
3.1 Railway Development and Native People in British Columbia

Transportation infrastructure plays a significant role in the production of space. By altering distance and accessibility, roads and railways are powerful tools which can be employed to reconfigure an isolated territory into a hinterland. More efficient transportation pushes back the frontier, stimulating economic activity and permitting increased government surveillance and administration. New modes of economic production are introduced through increases in exchange and interaction, and through the resultant changes in the value and importance of land and resources in the region. In these ways the construction of transportation routes actuate governments' and industrial capital's visualizations of space, but as their use in British Columbia shows, railways have also proven to be dislocating and disruptive to those who inhabit the regions they enter.

Native people have often suffered from the social, economic and environmental changes resulting from railway development. Jim MacDonald has described how the construction and operation of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway caused the Tsimshian, an independent community that took advantage of new economic options, to fall into a state of economic dependency and political subordination.¹ Hugh Brody has laid out the connection between railroad development and settlement and industrial expansion in Northeastern British Columbia, and how this resulted in the erosion of Native ability to use traditional lands.² Frank Leonard has pointed out how, in the midst of the cut-throat business of

railway construction and operation, managers of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway paid little attention to the impact of the railway on native people. Railroads have been characterized by Harris as agents of disruption and dislocation in the Native communities in the Fraser Canyon. Railroads were major land users/holders and their construction fragmented and colonized Native life-worlds. The 1914 slide caused by construction along the Canadian National rail line in the Fraser Canyon blocked the passage of migrating salmon for many years, causing significant suffering to Native people throughout the entire Fraser River watershed. The railways, along with other non-native impositions, were also reminders that “power in the canyon resided elsewhere.”

It seems clear that "[t]he Native Indians of British Columbia can hardly be expected to look on the railroads in the same light as a person who lives within the fabric of today’s industrial society." Yet, like most social encounters, the experience of Native people with railway construction also has an element of ambiguity. It is inaccurate to say that railway development has been wholly detrimental to Native people. Many Native people benefited from the wage labour provided by railway construction. This includes those Tl’azt’en who worked as labourers in the construction of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway and the Pacific Great Eastern Railway. It is also interesting to note that, in the first half of this century,

railways facilitated greater Native political activity by increasing the ability to travel, communicate, and coordinate on both provincial and regional scales.8 The railways of British Columbia may be one of the clearest representations of the relative dominance of capital and government over Native people, but they have also been sites of Native protest and resistance, and of negotiations and even legal victories. Yet railways have been overwhelmingly negative for Native people because they cause rapid and radical changes to the spaces they enter, with little opportunity for Native people to influence, or benefit from, the development. The case of the Tl'azt'en and Pacific Great Eastern Railway illustrates that railways are a powerful agent of change, but also that the less empowered can take an active role in the production of space.

3.2 The Pacific Great Eastern Railway

The expansion of Pacific Great Eastern Railway (PGE) was a “major preoccupation of the W.A.C. Bennett government.”9 In the late 1950s the crown corporation’s tracks were extended from their northern terminus at Prince George to Dawson Creek and Fort St. John. Further construction began in the 1960s on extensions to Mackenzie, Fort Nelson, Fort St. James and Dease Lake (see Map 3.1). Several motivations have been identified for the expansion of the PGE. Tomblin has argued that the rationale was found in ‘defensive expansionism’.10 It has also been suggested that the PGE was part of Bennett’s plan to make

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PGE Extensions in Northern B.C.

Map 3.1

Legend

- Fort St. James Extension 1963-68
- Takla Extension 1968-73
- Dease Lake Extension 1969-
- Other PGE Extensions:
  - Fort St. John/Dawson Creek 1952-58
  - Fort Nelson Extension 1968-71
  - McKenzie Spur 1966
- Canadian National Railway
- Tl'azt'en Territory
the Yukon Territory part of British Columbia. However, it appears that more than anything else the PGE was a development tool: “[i]n effect, Bennett handed the PGE a pioneering role reminiscent of the early years of the CPR – it was to open the north as the CPR had once opened the west.”

The forest industry in the Fort St. James area had remained small, not for want of forest resources, but because of a lack of adequate transportation. In 1960 the Government decided that a railway should be built to Fort St. James. It would provide a transportation link to ship out the lumber processed at mills in Fort St. James, and to transport pulp wood and wood chips to the new pulp mills to Prince George. Construction began in 1963 from a junction in the Fort St. John line just north of Prince George, and the PGE reached Fort St. James in 1968. While the Fort St. James Extension was still under construction the Government announced its intention to continue the line north from Fort St. James to Takla Landing to access the large tracts of forest land not presently economically or practically accessible. A year later the Government announced that the line would continue past Takla Landing across very remote territory to Dease Lake. The Takla and Dease Lake extensions would greatly increase the size of the hinterland for the Fort St.

14 Government studies had predicted that the Dease Lake Extension would result in the construction of sawmills at Dease Lake, Takla Landing, and in the Groundhog Valley, and a pulp mill at Stikine Crossing. The studies also foresaw traffic originating from the Cassiar Asbestos mine and from future development of the Groundhog coal fields. There were other motives as well. CNR also had ideas about building north either from Hazelton or Terrace. There is evidence that the Dease Lake Extension was an effort to build ahead of the CNR and capture all the future resource development traffic in the Northwest corner of the Province. The Government also saw the Dease Lake Extension as a project that would bring them one step closer to the dream of having PGE reach into the Yukon and eventually connect with the Alaska railway. Wedley, “A Development Tool,” 45; and Ruppenthal and Keast, A Railway Derailed, 3.
James and Prince George mills. And though the Dease Lake Extension was never completed, the Fort St. James and Takla Extensions were to be a major boost to the industry in Fort St. James, facilitating the beginning of the modern forest industry in the region.

Whether from the office of the Premier, the offices of the Ministry of Forests, or from the mills in Fort St. James and Prince George, Tl'azt'en territory was generally viewed as unused and vacant land. The Takla Extension was, therefore, designed to implement an industrial vision for the territory. The only possible contradictions to this vision were a handful of Indian Reserves along the proposed route, but to those planning the project these were not perceived as obstacles. Nor did the planners pay attention to the fact that the Tl'azt'en lived there and used the resources of the territory outside the reserves. Yet the Tl'azt'en would challenge the Government's and industry's vision of that space, and the plans to reproduce the territory according to that vision. The Tl'azt'en would engage the Railway and Government in negotiations first to try to receive some reparation for the use of reserve lands by PGE, and later to position themselves to deal with the economic and environmental changes brought about by the railway.

3.3 Negotiations Between PGE and Tl'azt'en, Winter 1968/69.

In May 1967, PGE informed the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIA) that the route proposed for the Takla Extension went through six Tl'azt'en reserves. PGE did not submit a formal request for the required right-of-ways until November 6 of 1968, by which time crews were already at work clearing the right-of-way north of Fort St.

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It was certainly technically feasible to build the railway without touching the Band’s lands but there is no evidence that PGE had any alternate route plans if they were unable to make an agreement with the Band for the use of their lands. What is clear is that PGE did not consider that the Band had the ability to prevent the railway from going through the reserves, and never considered taking anything but the best route. The Indian Reserves, or the Tl’azt’en themselves, were not perceived as obstacles which should deflect its intentions. The comment of a DIA official in response to the complaint of a Band member suggests what may have been both a DIA and a PGE perspective on the use Indian reserve land for right-of-ways - that is, that PGE was doing the Band a favour by crossing their reserves:

While the route chosen is advisable for the Railway Company, the railway line might be built outside of Reserve lands and should that happen, the effect on your way of life would still be considerable without any possibility of gaining the benefits [of a compensation agreement].

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16 DIA formally informed the Band of PGE’s plans on November 15th. However, according to Harry Pierre, the Tl’azt’en had first found out about the railway when a Band member found metal tags on trees marking out the route through Tache IR1. A.C. Roach (Superintendent, Stuart Lake Indian Agency, DIA) to Chief Harry Pierre. November 15, 1968. DIA Surveys and Reserves File 985/31-2-26, 1968-1972. Tl’azt’en NROC; Interviews with Harry Pierre, March 4, 1998 and January 27, 1999.

17 Order in Council 1036/1938 and Privy Council Order 208/1930, which enacted the transfer of the Indian Reserve lands in British Columbia to the Dominion, contain clauses permitting the resumption of one-twentieth of the reserve lands for the making of roads or other works of public utility or convenience. The Provincial policy was to attempt to negotiate a compensation agreement for the surrender of lands required for public purposes. However, there is a provision in Section 35 of the Indian Act which permits the imposition of Provincial expropriation of Indian Land without an agreement. In that case, compensation would be determined by a board of arbitration. D.I.F. MacSweeen, 1985. "Order-in-Council 1036 - The Remnants of Colonial Rule." Indians and the Law II. - A Continuing Legal Education Seminar, January 1985, Vancouver.

18 MacDonald has stated that right-of-ways are so prevalent on Indian lands that reserves appear to be “powerful magnets” which attract every road, rail, pipe and power line (MacDonald, “Bleeding Day and Night,” 60). As Blomley points out, “[t]he official position is that, in many cases, there was no way around the reserve... A more cynical reading might suggest that the expropriation of reserve land, as opposed to privately held land, offered the path of least resistance.” Nicholas Blomley, 1996. “Shut the Province Down': First Nations Blockades in British Columbia 1984-1995.” BC Studies 111:19.

In early December DIA officials at the Stuart Lake Agency asked the Band to consider what form of compensation it would like for the surrender of the land required for by the Railway. There was a sense of urgency as construction would be delayed if the crews reached the first reserve and a deal was not yet in place, but the Band Council replied that it was not prepared to make a deal “on such short notice, or give authority to the railway to enter the reserves for the purpose of carrying out surveys, clearing or construction of the railway...until the Band has determined what they consider to be fair compensation for the land required by the Pacific Great Eastern Railway Company.”20 The Band Council indicated that it would not make any decisions until after Christmas when more Band members would be available to participate in the discussion. The Band Council also told DIA that it would handle the negotiations with PGE on its own.21 Independence from DIA and a commitment to community discussion and decision making were the pattern that the Band followed for the duration of the negotiations.

Through December crews continued to clear the right-of-way towards Tache IR1. DIA claimed to have been monitoring the situation to ensure that the work crews did not do any clearing on reserve lands.22 However, given the total absence of discussions between

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21 C.S. Johnston-Watson (Assistant Superintendent, Stuart Lake Indian Agency, DIA) to J.W. Churchman (DIA). March 31, 1969. DIA Surveys and Reserves File 985/31-2-26, 1968-1972. Tl'azt'en NROC. In this same spirit, in August 1969 the Band Council informed DIA that it did not feel that the land exchange should be conducted under Section 35 of the Indian Act. It was concerned about “the broad powers of decision Section 35 gives to the Minister to conduct the exchange on the Band’s behalf.” It seems that the Band was satisfied after DIA assured it that, despite the way Section 35 reads, the Minister merely approves the decision of the Band - “the final decision as to what exact exchange parcels of land are to be acceptable in exchange rests entirely in the Band Council and no one else.” See J.H. MacAdams (Administrator of Lands, DIA) to Regional Director (DIA). September 3, 1969. Land Claims Second Copies, File STB vs. BCRail. Tl'azt'en BOBC.
PGE and the Band, it is not hard to understand that the community was concerned that PGE would not stop at the reserve boundary. In early January Band Councilor Augustine Joseph fired a rifle into the air to get the attention of the crew as they worked close to the reserve. Though he was charged and sentenced to a jail term for his action, work on the right-of-way was halted until PGE and the Band could meet to negotiate a deal.²³

The Tl’azt’en did not have a say in whether or not the railway would be built through their territory, nor any influence on its exact route. But by establishing that it would decide what it wanted as compensation, that it would negotiate independently with PGE, and by taking its time in making a deal with PGE, the Band asserted its authority over the reserves. The reserves were sites of ‘difference’ and Native power within the Provincial Government’s production of space, and the Tl’azt’en’s reserve rights gave them the ability to delay construction, and leverage in the negotiations over compensation.

PGE officials finally sat down with the Chief and Council on January 15, 1969. PGE stated that the railway would now go through Eagle Creek IR6 as well. The Chief and Council came to the meeting knowing what they wanted from PGE - the option not only to trade the land needed for the rights-of-way but also the portions of the reserves that the rights-of-way would ‘cut off’ from the main part of the reserves. A DIA official reported: “PGE did not want to include the fractions... but the Indian people insisted that these be included in the trade because they would be very small isolated parcels of land with little value.”²⁴ The Tl’azt’en wanted to increase their legal land rights; in trading the cut-offs, they could make a larger deal.

²³ Augustine Joseph served two of his nine month sentence in a Prince George jail and then was released. Interview with Ed John, February 9, 1998, and with Harry Pierre January 27, 1999.
3.4 The January 1969 Agreement

A second meeting was held with PGE on January 25th. Band members came prepared to make a deal. They decided to surrender the cut-offs on each of the reserves except for one - Grand Rapids IR5, because the railway passed through the centre of the reserve and they felt that too much land would be lost. They chose to surrender the whole of Soyandostar IR2 because the tracks would be laid so close to the shore of Trembleur Lake that it would cease to be a suitable place for Za Williams’ hunting, fishing and trapping camp. As shown in Figure 3.1a, the Band members voted to surrender the 57.1 acres required by PGE for the rights-of-way on the seven reserves and an additional 321 acres in cut-offs, for a total of 378.1 acres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tl’azt’en Reserves Affected by PGE</th>
<th>Original Acreage</th>
<th>Approximate Acreage of Right-of-Way</th>
<th>Approximate Acreage of Cut-Off</th>
<th>Total to be Surrendered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tache IR1</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>163.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Rapids IR5</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevan IR4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teeslee IR3</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soyandostar IR2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelangle IR1</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle Creek IR6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>-</strong></td>
<td><strong>57.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>321</strong></td>
<td><strong>378.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.1a Surrender Lands, 1969

Once the acreages to be surrendered were known, the Council met in another room to decide the terms of the proposal that would be put to PGE. After an hour, Chief Harry Pierre proposed to PGE that the Band receive three acres for every one the used, or cut-off, by the

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railway. Under these terms the Band would receive 1,134.3 acres of new reserve lands.

Harry Pierre also presented the five parcels the Band would like to receive (See Figure 3.2a and Map 3.3). PGE stated that the request was reasonable, but the deal could only be approved by the Minister of Lands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tl'azt'en Land Selections</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Rationale for Selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Parcel at west end of Trembleur Lake</td>
<td>50*</td>
<td>A favourite hunting and fishing campsite.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lot 3022, 3022A, 2023 adjacent to Pinche IR2</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>Lake shore property suitable for development into summer home sites to provide lease revenue. Also medicine and berry picking area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Parcel on Kuzkwa river, at outlet of Tezzeron Lake</td>
<td>120*</td>
<td>Hunting and fishing campsite, a favourite spot of the Pierre family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Parcel at east end of Trembleur Lake</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>A cabin site for Za Williams and his family, to replace the one which had been on the surrendered Soyandostar IR2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lot 2371 and easterly portion of 2370</td>
<td>468*</td>
<td>Probably for development for lease lots and/or Hunting and Fishing Lodge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1134</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*approximate

Figure 3.1b. Compensation Lands, 1969

Though the Band had concerns about the railway, it did not appear to have the option to not grant the right-of-ways:

It was felt by the Indian people and expressed by Mr. Pierre that the Railway will greatly affect those resources, particularly wildlife resources, used extensively by the Indian people for food. The Middle River along which the PGE travels is considered to be one of the finest moose hunting areas in British Columbia. The game will definitely be affected in the future by the railway and this to them, the Indian people, was a matter of great concern. Other points of inconvenience ranging from access to noise were mentioned by Mr. Pierre and he informed the PGE officials that as soon as he received a commitment from them in writing or, to use his own words 'in black and white', the PGE would be permitted to pass through the Reserves.

January 1969 Agreement

Map 3.3

LEGEND
Tl'ax'en Reserve
Surrendered Land
Compensation Land
Proposed Railway Route

Scale 1 : 350,000

Eagle Creek IR6
Tache IR1
Teesie IR3
Soyandostar IR2
Stevan IR4

Fort St. James
The speed at which the Band completed these negotiations may seem surprising given the significant change it represented, the size of the construction project, and the fact that it impacted so many of the Band’s reserves. But at this time, the Band could only try to make best of the situation by using the opportunity to secure as much new reserve lands as possible. The apparent efficiency with which they conducted the negotiations and chose the compensation lands can be attributed to the capacity of Chief Harry Pierre, the confidence that the Band membership had in him, and the fact that the Tl’azt’en were experienced in considering exchanges and other land transactions. Most importantly, it seems clear that the Band wanted to secure more land for reserves and, therefore, needed little time to consider the deal with PGE, and were even excited to have the opportunity to do so.

The Tl’azt’en’s choices in the January 1969 Agreement are a reflection of the economic, political and spatial strategies of the community. Their decision to surrender the cut-offs shows that the Tl’azt’en wished to enlarge their legal land base, and were willing to trade lands they perceived as less valuable. At this time neither the Federal or Provincial Governments recognized the existence of Aboriginal title but the Tl’azt’en did not attempt to question their jurisdiction in Tl’azt’en territory. Nor did the Tl’azt’en try to contest the Provincial Government’s land administration; rather they strove to negotiate their place within it. However much the Tl’azt’en’s efforts to trade and acquire parcels of land suggest that they had adopted the Euro-Canadian visualization of land as a commodity, their land selections also illustrate that they still placed a high priority on the traditional economy. At this point the Tl’azt’en appear to not have the power, nor the need to protect off-reserve

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28 In 1965 the Tl’azt’en considered purchasing land in Fort St. James. In 1968 they were considering land exchanges involving Hanson IR13 and Tezzeron IR8. In the early 1960s the Band had also formally requested several new reserves – see Chapter Two. For comments praising the capacity of Chief Harry Pierre see C.S. Johnston-Watson (DIA) to File. January 28, 1969. DIA Surveys and Reserves File 985/31-2-26, 1968-1972. Tl’azt’en NROC.
hunting territories. The strategy behind selecting Parcels One, Three, and Four was to secure bases from which they could access traditional resources of the territory. These selections show the Tl'azt'en's lives had never been contained or dictated by their original reserve allotment, and that Band members continued to use many off-reserve sites.

The location of reserves at sites already used by certain families may also reflect who within the community had the power to influence the decision on land selections. The land selections do not reflect the fact that many Tl'azt'en worked part of the year as wage labourers for the forest industry. The choice of Parcels Two and Five do show that the Tl'azt'en were seeking new ways to bring in revenues. The Tl'azt'en had goals and strategies, (some which were unique to Native society, some not) that they sought to inscribe in space when they had the opportunity to secure lands within the Government production of space.

3.5 Relations Between PGE and the Tl'azt'en During Construction

On January 31st, PGE advised that the proposal had been approved in principle by the Minister of Lands. The speed with which the Band's terms traveled from their tiny isolated village to the people in power in Victoria reveals how very anxious PGE and the Provincial Government were to proceed with the clearing and construction of the railway. PGE requested that it be given "timely confirmation that the Railway could proceed," adding that "the small details as to the variable acreages will need to be decided after a legal survey." In fact, what was meant was that the details of the agreement could be worked out after the railroad was constructed. This manner of haste would mean first, that the right-

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29 Two days after the meeting in Tache the Band’s terms were presented to the Director of Lands, and the next day to Ray Williston, Minister of Lands. G.L. Ritchie (PGE) to A.C. Roach (DIA). January 31, 1969. Box: Land Claims Second Copies, File: STB vs. BCRail. Tl'azt'en BOBC.

of-way would be cleared prior to its exact location being known, and second, that the line would be constructed prior to a signed agreement. These would both have important consequences.

The Band did oblige PGE’s desire to re-start the project and quickly issued a Band Council Resolution on February 2, 1969 permitting the PGE to proceed. The Band did so because it did not want to unnecessarily antagonize PGE, and also because it wanted the land exchange to be completed as soon as possible. It was especially anxious to be able to develop the lands it had chosen adjacent to Pinche IR2 into cottage lease lots to bring in revenue. The Band was already working towards leasing fifty shorefront lots on Pinche IR2, and was aware that it could take months or years to develop its new lands even after the land was in its possession.

PGE completed clearing the right-of-way in mid-March 1969. The Band requested that PGE determine the exact acreages involved so that the land exchange could proceed.31 There would be no quick conclusion to the land deal, however. First, the approval of the Minister of Indian Affairs would be required. Yet in the spring of 1969, as DIA’s Stuart Lake Agency was reporting on the proposed exchange to several levels within the Federal Department, the Minister’s office in Ottawa was receiving letters from Band member David Joseph of Middle River Village. He had various questions and comments on the deal the Band had negotiated.32 Thorough briefings to Ottawa had to be written by local DIA officials to explain David Joseph’s dissent and to reassure Departmental Headquarters that the deal

32 In three letters that Spring Joseph requested compensation from PGE for the important Trembleur Trail which would be blocked by the steep railway grade. The railway was also built right on top of the trail for long stretches. He was also generally dissatisfied with the deal the Band had made and pointed out that only two people from Middle River Village (Gelangle IR1) had attended the January 25, 1969 negotiation meeting. DIA informed Chief Harry Pierre of the complaints, but was satisfied that Camille Joseph, (hereditary chief of Middle River Village) had represented the interests of that village at the meeting. The Band later requested that PGE build level crossings of the railway grade at strategic locations to make travel across the right-of-way on foot or snowmobile easier.
was in the best interests of the whole Band. Though there is no written record of such, it is very likely that discussion and deliberation about the deal also continued within the Band.

Further delay was also caused by the Federal Surveyor General’s office, which had not yet issued survey instructions to PGE. Concerned that nothing had happened since January, and sensing that both federal departments needed every encouragement to be expedient, in late May the Band made it clear that it would “cancel the whole proposal unless Ottawa acts immediately.” That the Band knew it had that power would become even more significant two years later.

Though survey instructions were issued a short time later, PGE decided to postpone the surveys until fall. In the fall PGE said the surveys would be done in the spring. When spring came it said they would be done in summer. The delays in completing the surveys continued and were the major reason that the land exchange took many years longer to complete than it should have. The delays caused the Band to be frustrated, wary, and to eventually reconsider the deal.

Other irritations also strained relations between PGE and the Band. PGE had originally indicated that the right-of-way through Gelangle IR1 would cut off only a small corner of the reserve. However, these plans were altered by PGE without consultation and the right-of-way was cut right through the centre of the reserve. If PGE thought that the

34 The Band viewed the failure of PGE to complete the surveys with much suspicion: “BCR promised on July 22, 1970 that the survey would be completed before the end of 1970, promised on July 7, 1971 that the survey would be completed for October of 1971, and promised on September 1 of 1971 that the survey would be completed for 1972. In fact, the survey work was only completed in October of 1973... Estimates from a legal surveyor indicated that the necessary surveys could have been completed in one to two months.” (Stuart Trembleur Lakes Band Press Release. August 15, 1975. Land Claims Second Copies, File STB v. BCRail. Ti'azt'en BOBC) At times PGE stated that its delays would allow the Band time to settle on which lands it desired in the exchange, but this was never the reason the surveys were delayed. Rather PGE had only one survey crew to do all its work across the Province. If the delays had some strategic purpose for PGE or the Provincial Government, it was a ill-advised strategy given that a signed agreement did not exist between the parties. The delays allowed the Band significant time to reconsider the deal it had made.
Band would not notice or care, it was mistaken. On July 10, 1969, Roach (DIA) reported:

I attended a meeting yesterday with the Tache Band Council...[they] are of the opinion that 200 acres have been severed by the location of the railway line rather than the 32 suggested. They are quite incensed about this as they feel the Railway should have had the courtesy to approach them before proceeding. Would you please contact Mr. Ritchie of the Pacific Great Eastern Railway immediately for an explanation as this whole thing could be blown sky high.35

There is no documentation of the Band’s discussions with PGE about this issue; however the end result was that the additional acres cut-off at Gelangle IR1 were factored into the land exchange according to the original 3-for-1 exchange formula. Later the Band decided to not surrender the cut-off at Gelangle IR1, to delete its request for Compensation Lands Number Five,36 and to add four new parcels to their land requests.37 The shuffling of parcels of land clearly show the Band operating within Euro-Canadian modes of visualization and administration of space, yet their land selections show a mix of traditional and capitalist economic goals. The Band was attempting to find the best land strategies to deal with, and benefit from, the gradual encroachment of non-native activities in their territory.

There remained some uncertainty about the exact location of all the Compensation Lands because PGE had still not completed the survey of the right-of-way and cut-offs, and therefore the acreages could not yet be calculated. Apart from a juggling of some the acreages, there were no other changes to the Band’s land selections until 1976. However,

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36 Parcel 5 was taken out of the Band’s land request in the spring of 1969. The Band had realized that the land was generally boggy and unsuitable for development. In November 1970, the Band also decided to not surrender the 200 acres cut-off at Gelangle IR1. The size of the cut-off had dramatically increased and the Band was not comfortable giving up that much land at Middle River. The combination of these two decisions resulted in a reduction of 112 acres from the total acres the Band would get from the land exchange.
37 The four new parcels selected were: Lot 1471, adjacent to Nancut IR3 (the old homestead of Band member Tom Monk); a 20 acre parcel within Lot 4952 (desired for its frontage on Whitefish Lake and because it contained hay meadows used by Band members); 300-500 acres in either Lot 4111 or 3111 (desired for their proximity to Fort St. James); and the southern half of Lot 3608 adjacent to Tache IR1. The Band was considering adding these lands after they were aware of the increase in the cut-off at Gelangle IR1 and after deciding not to acquire Parcel 5. However, when it was later decided to not surrender the cut-off at Gelangle IR1, the acreages of many of the exchange lands had to be adjusted to fit the four new parcels into their request.
another issue arose that caused the Tl’azt’en to begin to question whether the land exchange was the appropriate form of compensation.

3.6 Concerns about the Impact of the Railway on Wildlife

Those in the Tl’azt’en community most involved in traditional activities began to notice a significant reduction in wildlife in their hunting grounds along the railway route. In 1970 and 1971 Camille Joseph sent six letters to PGE and DIA calling attention to his reduced trapping and hunting success. He blamed the railway and requested that he be compensated directly by PGE with an annual payment so that he could buy food to replace what he could no longer get from the bush: “Please help me out with the money I ask for...The PGE went thru our reserve and ruin our traplines [and] beaver dams and that is where I make my living for my family, that’s why I ask for a reward from you which I hope I get.”

He was not the only Band member claiming that railway had threatened his ability to provide food for his family, and in August 1971 DIA requested that Chief Harry Pierre supply a list of people requesting compensation for impacts on wildlife and for the fact that the steep and high right-of-way grade impaired access on their traplines. Letters

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39 The requests for money from PGE materialized partly because PGE had paid Za Williams $500 as compensation for the displacement of his cabin on Soyandostar IR2. Also, all the letters to DIA should be understood in the context that prior to amalgamation in 1959, each village had dealt directly with DIA through its own Chief, not through the Chief at Tache. Further, though Chief Harry Pierre was making efforts to encourage Band members otherwise, many among the Band membership still looked to DIA to handle their affairs and make important decisions. While there were some significant underlying issues about the structure of the Band following amalgamation which are still a factor in the politics of the Band today, the letters to DIA and PGE were not a sign that the Band members were dissatisfied with Chief and Council, or that Chief and Council was ignoring their concerns. As Band members became aware of the impact of the railway on wildlife, the deal the Band had made made less sense. Band members did not blame Tache; they blamed PGE. For a discussion of the legacy of amalgamation and the dependence of Band members on DIA see C.S. Johnston-Watson (DIA) to J.W. Churchman (DIA). March 31, 1969. DIA Surveys and Reserves File 985/31-2-26, 1968-1972. Tl’azt’en NROC; and Interview with Harry Pierre, January 27, 1999.
requesting compensation for the loss of wildlife continued through 1972 and 1973. Band members also wrote to DIA about including some parcels in the land exchange, though these were ones that were already part of the Band’s current requests.

By the spring of 1973 the construction of the railway was complete as far as Takla Landing and trains began running. This underscored the fact that the Band had not yet received any compensation for the right-of-ways through their reserves. Officials at PGE were indeed “seriously concerned with relations with the Stuart-Trembleur Band.” Yet while PGE continued to receive letters alleging that the railway had impacted wildlife, was aware that the Band viewed it with increasing suspicion, and acknowledged that there “might be difficulty in finalizing the agreement,” PGE believed that the difficulty only lay in the Tl’azt’en deciding what lands they wanted. In fact, though some final acreages and boundaries still needed to be worked out, in July 1973, the Band Council was ready to request that the exchange be completed as shown in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b, and on Map 3.4.

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41 People in Portage Village requested that DIA include in the exchange land adjacent to Nancut IR3 and a parcel of hayland on Whitefish Lake (see Note 37). Though they knew that the Chief had agreed with them to request these parcels, these Band members directed their petitions to DIA because, as discussed in Note 39, these Band members had the impression that DIA was the authority which would ultimately decide what lands were included in the land exchange.
42 L.F. Swannell to J.D. Hartley (Canadian Executive Service Overseas). March 26, 1973. DIA Railway Right-of-Way File 985/31-2-26-1, Vol.1, 1971-1976. Tl’azt’en NROC. Swannel, the former Chief Forester for B.C, was hired by DIA to assist the Band in the land exchange. He helped the Band by getting them maps and doing field checks of the lands involved, but he did not have to help the Band decide which lands it wanted. His main role was to report to DIA whether the Band’s decisions were sound.
The decision to not surrender the cut-off at Gelangle IR1, and differences in the estimated
and surveyed acreages of the right-of-ways and cut-offs, resulted in a significant decrease in

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The Land Exchange in July 1973

Map 3.4

LEGEND

Tr'az't'en Reserve
Surrendered Land
Compensation Land
PGE Railway

Scale 1 : 350,000
the amount of land the Tl'azt'en would receive in the land exchange (1134 acres vs 918 acres). Parcels One through Four remained substantially the same. But, despite having over two hundred less acres to work with, the Tl'azt'en decided to add several new parcels to their land request. Further internal discussions had led to further diversity in their spatial and economic strategies. Parcels Five and Six were chosen to assist the farming activities of the people of Portage Village. Parcel Seven was chosen for the benefit of Tl'azt'en people living and working at the sawmills in Fort St. James, while Parcel Eight was for those who chose to continue to live in Tache.

The Tl'azt'en would have benefited from acquiring these lands, especially those that provided opportunities outside of the bush economy. A majority of the Tl'azt'en, however, still relied on game meat and other resources found off-reserve; merely securing more reserve land began to appear to be a losing strategy when it was the larger tracts of wildlife habitat that had always provided the Tl'azt'en their security and independence. It was those wildlife resources that the railway had threatened. The land exchange did not provide a solution to this problem, and the Band, therefore, started thinking about re-opening the negotiations.

Neither DIA nor PGE were aware that the Band was considering this - it was actually even a sudden turn around for the Band leadership, as they were so near to finalizing the land exchange. Yet Band members had not ceased suggesting to DIA or PGE that the decrease of wildlife resources would be catastrophic. However, the consistent response to their petitions was: “Your Band Council has already agreed on a land exchange with the railway as the means of compensation for the reserve lands taken. No money is to be paid to any
Band member according to the agreement.” After hearing the words “according to the agreement” every time they approached PGE or DIA, it is not surprising that eventually the Tl’azt’en took a look at whether they had, in fact, ever entered into an agreement.

3.7 TIl’azt’en Re-open the Negotiations

The early 1970s in British Columbia saw increased communication between Bands, and the growth of Native political organizations. By forging links across the Province between Native people these organizations contested the division and separation which colonial and Department of Indian Affairs administration had created with the ‘Indian Band’ and ‘Indian Reserve’ systems. British Columbia’s political space was effectively reconfigured as communication between Bands increased. Empowered by a sense of collective struggle and by knowledge of other Band’s actions, Native people found a space from which they could more effectively mount resistance against a variety of concerns and, “[i]n 1973 the contemporary era of British Columbia Indian political protest began.”

The TIl’azt’en influenced and were influenced by the development of Native organizations and the general empowerment experienced by Native people at this time. On August 9, 1973 Chief Harry Pierre asked DIA to forward all information on the 1969

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46 “By 1972 the political environment of British Columbia Indians was radically different from what it had ever been in the past. The British Columbia Association of Non-Status Indians and the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs were now the dominant elements in Indian politics, each having some two hundred full-time employees and an annual budget in excess of $2 million.” (Tennant 1990:165). When the New Democratic Party defeated the Social Credit Party in the August 1972 provincial election, Native people were optimistic that the new government would recognize Aboriginal title and begin negotiating land claim settlements. There was also now a “thriving set of Indian publications ...[that] provided much political information, not only about organizations, issues, and the leaders within the province, but also about events and developments elsewhere in Canada and in the United States. ... For the first time political ideas and information circulated widely and quickly among British Columbia Indians.” Paul Tennant, 1990. Aboriginal People and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia 1849-1989. page 165.
47 Tennant, Aboriginal People and Politics, 171. See also Pages 174-175.
agreement reached with PGE to the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs. In mid-August Chief Harry Pierre met with Harry Crosby of the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs in Vancouver to discuss whether the Band had ever made a binding agreement with PGE.48 Then, on August 30, 1973, the Band issued three Band Council Resolutions (Figure 3.3):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Stuart Trembleur Band Council Resolutions, August 30, 1973.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. That any land exchange acceded to in 1969 be held in abeyance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Whereas the Pacific Great Eastern Railroad has built a road bed, laid tracks, and is running trains in the right-of-way which we gave permission for the Railroad to survey and clear; and whereas the Pacific Great Eastern Railroad (now called British Columbia Railroad) has failed to complete the trading of land; and whereas the trains have disrupted our way of life and the game on the reservation, we do hereby resolve that the negotiations be re-opened with the Railroad with the demand that $7,000,000 plus a 3 for 1 trade of land can be recovered from the British Columbia Railroad as compensation for the land, the use of the land, and the loss of game.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. That if British Columbia Railroad (BCR) fails to enter into negotiations with the Band within two months, that the Band will take action towards stopping the passage of trains through reserve land or towards levying a toll on all trains which pass through the private right-of-way on reserve lands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first British Columbia Railway (BCR) waited to see whether DIA would endorse the Band’s actions by approving the Band Council Resolutions as per normal procedure, but BCR eventually decided to meet with the Band and discuss its new claim. Harry Crosby, who had now been retained by the Band to represent them, met with BCR in Vancouver on November 1st – the very day the Band had said the blockade would go up if BCR did not come to the table.50 Crosby explained that the Band felt that the negotiations in January 1969 had not resulted in an enforceable contract, only an agreement to make an agreement.

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48 Harry Crosby had also assisted the Fort St. John Band in a dispute with PGE concerning right-of-ways on their reserves in 1971-72.
50 Harry Crosby had worked for the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, but when he was hired by the Band his title changed to ‘student at law’ with the firm of Shore and Helsing, Vancouver. In later years he refers to himself as a barrister and solicitor.
He pointed out that the Band only gave permission to the Railway to survey and clear land on the reserves, not to construct the roadbed and lay tracks, and therefore every time trains ran through the reserves a trespass was committed. He explained that the Band felt that it had the right to proceed against the railway for trespass, and a right to prevent further trespasses. He also said that the Band felt that it had a possible action against the Railway under the tort of nuisance for the disruption it had caused to trapping, fishing and Band members’ way of life. It was made clear to BCR that the Band’s claim was not based on Aboriginal rights, but on property rights and the ecological and social impact of the railway. This is significant because the Tl’azt’en did not seek, at this time, to challenge the authority of the Provincial Government to administer the lands and resources of their territory outside their reserves. This meeting and later correspondence made it clear that the Band did not seek to prevent the railway from using the line it had built, but sought to negotiate a new agreement concerning compensation.

At another meeting two days later in Tache, Band members told BCR of a significant decline in hunting success and of damage to fishing streams caused by railway. While the railway went through only ten of the Tl’azt’en’s traplines, it affected the whole community. The Tache and Middle Rivers along which the railway ran were considered communal hunting areas even though they were within particular Band members’ traplines. These

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52 The Tl’azt’en deliberately decided not to base their claims on Aboriginal rights. This was because, at the time, the recognition and definition of Aboriginal rights was anything but certain. See Michael Asch, 1989. “To Negotiate into Confederation: Canadian Aboriginal Views on Their Political Rights.” We Are Here: Politics of Aboriginal Land Tenure. E. Wilmse (ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. Page 119.

53 At the November 3, 1973 meeting were representatives from BCR and DIA, the Minister of Transportation and Highways, two MLAs, the Executive Assistant to the Premier, Harry Crosby, Chief Harry Pierre, the Band Council, and 60 band members. Notes by DIA Official of Meeting in Tache November 3, 1973. DIA Railway Right-of-Way File 985/31-2-26, Vol.2. 1970-1974. Tl’azt’en NROC.

rivers were in fact where most Band members obtained their moose and beaver, and because of this the railway had a widespread effect on the community. Chief Harry Pierre said that the land exchange discussed in 1969 was compensation for lost reserve land, but not for loss of hunting and trapping resources. The Band and BCR agreed that a study be done to investigate the impact of the railway; further negotiations would be carried out after completion of the study. BCR agreed to pay for the study and to pay the Band $5,000 as a permit fee for use of the right-of-ways while the study was being carried out. But the Railway stated that regardless of the results of the study the $7 million asked for by the Band was too much. BCR hired a consultant, and the impact study started in December 1973.

On April 9, 1974 the results of the impact study were presented at a meeting in Tache. The report concluded that:

The Indian People have suffered damages over the years 1969 to the present. These damages have been in the form of reductions in monetary income from trapping, plus a reduction in real incomes from the use of moose and fish as a source of food. In addition they have suffered considerable anxiety and concern over the potential impact of the railway in permanently impairing their ability to utilize the fish and wildlife resources of the country.55

The consultants made the following observations: 1) Between 1969 and 1973 moose seemed to have abruptly disappeared from areas around Tache and Middle Rivers and Trembleur Lake, and Band members had had to either forego obtaining moose during the fall, or hunt more intensely in new areas; 2) Trapping revenue appeared to have declined drastically over the same period despite a marked increase in fur prices. The most significant declines were in harvest of muskrat and beaver; 3) There was no evidence of a decline in salmon but,

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because of salmon's four year spawning cycle, effects of the railway construction could not be truly determined until after 1977. The total monetary damages caused by the construction and operation of the railway were estimated to be $251,000 (damages to trapping were estimated at $70,000, to hunting $176,000 and to fishing $5,000).\(^{56}\) The report pointed out that these estimates only included the cash value of these activities, not the cultural, social, and spiritual value of the resources and of hunting, fishing and trapping activities. It was emphasized that "[w]ere the decreased effectiveness of these traditional activities to continue, it might be expected that they would either be eventually abandoned, or would cease to represent meaningful and valuable activities. The significance of these activities in maintaining the social structure of the Indian community has been established. Loss of these activities would have profound consequences."\(^{57}\) The consultants concluded that the disturbance of wildlife had arisen as a result of the construction, not the operation of the railway. The report therefore recommended that if BCR completed the remedial recommendations contained in the report that the effect of the BCR on the Band would not continue in the future.\(^{58}\)

Though the Tl'azt'en had already made their concerns very clear, the impact study did give their claims an articulation that could not be dismissed easily by BCR. In particular

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\(^{56}\) The study also found that "during the period of 1969-1973 it would appear that the level of government assistance payments increased significantly, although it would be difficult to determine the extent of and reasons for this increase." "The Socio-Economic Effects," 25.

\(^{57}\) "The Socio-Economic Effects," 76.

\(^{58}\) The remedial actions recommended by the report were: terminate boat and barge traffic on Tache and Middle Rivers; move railway construction crew camps away from water bodies; remove oil drums, batteries, and pilings from streams; make culverts passable for fish; seed cut banks which were close to water bodies; reconstruct the Trembleur Trail which connected Tache, Grand Rapids and Middle River Villages and was used by Band members to access traplines; and make crossings of the railway grade where needed. "The Socio-Economic Effects," 73.
the report captured how significantly the railway had impacted the Tl’azt’en’s security:

“Many Band members feel that their use of the land and its resources has been seriously threatened by the railway line, and that the future of the Band is uncertain as a result of this threat.”\textsuperscript{59} Yet, while the report validated the allegations and complaints of the Band, DIA officials present at the April 9th meeting stated that “most of the Band members disagreed with the findings.”\textsuperscript{60} The Band objected to the report’s recommendation that if the Railway undertook the remediations, paid $251,000 in damages, and completed the land exchange that the Band would be adequately compensated.

The Tl’azt’en had lost their security - the wildlife resources of their territory - and until those resources were returned to an adequate level or were replaced with some other means of income, they would not feel compensated. The desire to develop a new economic base was the rationale behind requesting $7 million, and though the Band eventually dropped the demand for money, it continued to seek compensation in the form of a new economic base for the community. BCR did not agree to the recommendations of the report either. It agreed to repair damages related to the construction of the railway but would not commit to paying further compensation. The meeting was adjourned with only an agreement to continue the negotiations.

3.8 Expanding the Scope of the Negotiations

The railway, however, was no longer the only source of change that the Tl’azt’en felt threatened by. They were becoming aware that more and more non-Tl’azt’en were using their territory. The impact study, for example, pointed out that an increase in sales of

\textsuperscript{59}“The Socio-Economic Effects,” 26.
private lots on both Trembleur and Stuart Lakes was expected, and that use of the Stuart-Trembleur Lakes system and its fish and wildlife resources by white sport-fishers was expected to increase substantially. Awareness of these issues caused the Band to recommend, at the April 9th meeting, that moose hunting by non-natives be closed in the entire area between Pinche Creek (which runs through Pinche IR2) and the south end of Takla Lake. The construction of new roads in the territory also added to the concern of the Band that for the first time its use of wildlife resources was threatened by competition with non-natives. Band members also expressed concern about the number of agricultural and recreational leases being granted to non-natives within their traplines.61

More importantly, the railway and new road construction had made the timber in the heart of Tl’azt’en territory economically accessible. In 1974, the Ministry of Forests divided the territory into Company Operating Areas, and companies were allocated timber quotas in the area opened up by the railway (see Map 3.5). Two mills and a town site were built at Leo Creek as a result of the increase in forest development in Tl’azt’en territory.62 After generations of relative isolation with only a gradual increase in non-native presence, development was now entering Tl’azt’en territory very rapidly. More intensive industrial timber harvesting, now year round and in the heart of the territory, would bring ecological changes that would further threaten Band members’ abilities to supply their families with food. Yet the forestry industry no longer offered the wage earning opportunities the earlier forest industry had. Opportunities for employment were fewer because of structural and technical changes in the industry. The labour force was now unionized, and Native people

62 William Young (District Forester, Prince George District, MOF) to Chief Forester (MOF). December 3, 1973. Box: 37, Stuart Lake PSYU, File: 239, GR 1110 BCARS. The only other non-native settlement which had ever existed in Tl’azt’en territory was the one built to house workers at Pinchi Mine. It was occupied only from 1944-49.
The Reconfiguration of Tl'azt'en Territory 1974

Map 3.5

Legend:

- Tri'az' ten Reserve
- Road
- PGE Railway
- Recreation Lodge
- Private Land
- Surveyed Crown Land
- Licensee Operating Areas
- Undeveloped Forest Land

Scale 1 : 350,000
were passed over for jobs because of their race, their lack of education, and because most
Tl’azt’en chose not to work year round. Tl’azt’en territory was being reconfigured by
increasing non-native access and use, and by increasing Government administration of the
territory. The Tl’azt’en found their off-reserve space – both their bush economy space and
their wage labour space – becoming smaller.

The Band was well aware of the changes represented by Map 3.5, and in the spring
of 1974 they altered their negotiation strategy. In particular, the Band now felt it needed to
challenge the Government’s administration of its territory, and the Tl’azt’en decided that
their negotiations over the railway should be expanded to include their other issues of
concern: “The Band’s traditional territory is being assigned to other uses by the Provincial
Government. The Band should be consulted regarding land use in the area, decisions
regarding land use have been detrimental to the Band. ...The Band wishes to negotiate these
issues with the Provincial Government.”

Further reasons why the Tl’azt’en needed to expand the negotiations beyond their grievance with the railroad were suggested to them by
Crosby on May 27, 1974:

The effects of the BCR upon the Stuart Trembleur Lakes Band’s way of life will seem
very mild when compared to the damage which will be brought about by this North
West Development Plan. In my opinion the only way in which you can control
the effect of the North West Development Plan upon your way of life is to

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64 McCullum described the North West Development Plan in this way: “The flames of discord are being
fanned in Northwest British Columbia by an enormous $500 million secretly planned agreement between the
federal and provincial governments, announced in 1973 and 1974, that would create more than 20,000 new
jobs for the economically unstable North - railways, highways, instant towns, mines, hydro schemes, super
sawmills, increased logging, and even a steel mill poured out of the febrile imaginations of the federal and
provincial civil service... There were no impact studies on the environment, the social structure, the economic
benefits, or how the residents of the Northwest quarter felt about this massive influx of capital.” (Page 133) The
Plan hoped that with improved infrastructure, private capital would bring smelters, pulp and paper mills, and
mining development to the north. “The development project then, once announced with such fanfare, has
gone underground, which scares the Natives and permanent residents in the North perhaps more than the
grandiose plans. Accustomed, as many of them are, to boom-and-bust dreams, they took the instant town and
super sawmills with a grain of salt, but the planning behind closed doors and the known road and rail
surveying before land claims were settled, leaves all Northerners uneasy.” Hugh McCullum, 1975. This
control the developments in Stuart-Trembleur Lake area yourselves. I am afraid that if you do not act now, or very soon, it will be too late for the Band to control development, and you will be left with nothing to do but complain about the damages.\textsuperscript{65}

Late that Spring, Crosby attempted to get Government ministers to agree to sit down with the Band. Reinforced with threats of blockades, the Band’s efforts to expand the scope of the negotiations and to access the decision makers within the Government were successful. Crosby advised the Band that “the B.C. Government appears to be prepared to negotiate the Stuart Trembleur Band’s claim.”\textsuperscript{66} However, some momentum was lost when Chief Harry Pierre resigned in July, 1974. It was mid-August before the new Chief and Council were elected, and it was August 30th before the Band had put together a negotiating committee.\textsuperscript{67}

In October, the Band’s negotiating committee (Chief John Alexis, Ed John, Sebastian Anatole, and Harry Pierre) went to Victoria to meet with the Government. Prior to leaving for Victoria, the community advised the committee on what to negotiate for. Comments made at the meeting are shown in Figure 3.4.


- "The railway damaged trapline, blocked creeks, blocked skidoo trail, damaged trees. No moose. Trains go by everyday and make money while we lose out in every way." Frederick William.

- "BCR chased away moose and fur bearing animals - hence traplines are no good to us. If no deal then blockade for sure." Louie John.

- "It's our land and we want fair compensation. Tell the whiteman he took our land and he's bossing us around. They should at least listen to us this once in the BCR deal." Eugene Joseph.

- "Grand Rapids reserve belongs to my family - if there is no compensation to her family I will help in the blockade." Agnes Mattess.

- "Make sure it's $7 million otherwise we'll blockade the railway." Jimmy Monk.

- "There were no treaties in B.C. The land still belongs to Indians. Indians were pushed onto reserves and whiteman took the land without paying us for it. If no deal then BCR can take their railway somewhere else." Ed John.

Figure 3.4a

3.9 Conclusion

Between 1968 and 1974 Tl'azt'en territory was significantly changed. What had still been largely Tl'azt'en space was reconfigured by the construction of a railway which changed wildlife patterns so significantly that many Tl'azt'en lost their economic independence. The railway opened up the territory to intensive forestry and resulted in the allocation of timber rights to forest companies. Road construction to access the timber also threatened to greatly increase other non-native activities in the area. Yet this would not become another typical 'railroading' of Native people.

The very fact that the railway ran through the Tl'azt'en's reserve lands ironically gave them the opportunity to benefit somewhat from the railway. At first, the Tl'azt'en

68 These comments were taken from the meeting notes; they are not verbatim. I have edited them for clarity. Notes of October 13, 1974 Band Meeting. Box: Self Government Files 1974-1986. Tl'azt'en BOBC.
chose compensation in the form of new reserves. The negotiated right-of-way agreement gave the Tl’azt’en a chance to make land selections which reflected the mixed economy and internal diversity of their communities. This was a moment when Tl’azt’en land use and economic goals emerged to influence the production of space in their territory. Securing lands within the Government administration of space had been the strategy of the Tl’azt’en for almost a century – a way of placing themselves within the new society in British Columbia. But, as they became aware of the consequences of the reconfiguration of their territory by non-native social practices, and as they were more aware of other Native struggles in the Province, the Tl’azt’en decided to directly challenge the new definition, administration and use of their traditional space.

Through assertions of property rights which were created and recognized by the Government production of space, the Tl’azt’en opened up a political space where they could approach the Government and use leverage to get it to negotiate the issues they were concerned about. The Tl’azt’en would contest the vision of Government and industry that the territory outside Indian reserves was non-native space. The Tl’azt’en would contest the allocation and use of the territory’s resources without consultation with those who would be most affected by the changes. At this point the Tl’azt’en had not yet fully developed their own vision of what to negotiate for. But in the years to come they would articulate their own social and economic goals to the Government in an attempt to modify the Government’s vision and administration of the territory. The Tl’azt’en would have to continually recreate the space of negotiation, but now that the Tl’azt’en had brought the Provincial Government to the table, negotiations over the production of space in Tl’azt’en territory had truly begun.
Four. Tl’azt’en Negotiations with the Provincial Government, 1975-1984

4.0 Introduction

A majority of the Tl’azt’en’s energy and time during the fifteen years of negotiations was spent trying to get the Government recognize their concerns and to be willing to discuss solutions. A significant achievement was made in the summer of 1974 when the Government promised to enter into negotiations over more comprehensive issues than just the right-of-ways through the seven reserves. However, relations between the parties deteriorated quickly thereafter and the Band erected a blockade on the railway in April 1975 to force the Government back to the table. The Tl’azt’en eventually removed the blockade, but continued for many years to use the threat of a blockade to keep the negotiations from stalling.

When discussions did occur they centred around creating a new economic base for the Tl’azt’en community. In 1976, the Tl’azt’en decided that securing rights to timber would be the most promising way of coping with the spatial and economic change occurring in their territory. In 1978, the parties agreed on the components of a settlement: a land exchange, monetary compensation, and timber rights. The details of this settlement, however, took several more years to work out. The Band did not get everything it had desired from the negotiations, and many of the particulars concerning the timber rights were dictated by the Government, not negotiated. However, the reserves the Tl’azt’en chose and the Tree Farm License they received were hybrid products of interaction and compromise between the economic, political and spatial strategies of different actors within society.
4.1 Native Blockades - Contesting the Production of Space

Space, as the product of social processes, can reflect the influence of multiple voices present within a society. To influence or bring about change in the visualization, administration, and use of space less empowered groups may resort to protest and active resistance. The blockade, for example, is a spatial tactic that has been used by groups to exert power over the mobility of people and resources in an effort to gain leverage in political relations.

If Native people view non-native transportation systems as “the capillaries of colonial appropriation,” then the blockade can be seen as an attempt to challenge that appropriation of their traditional space. It is a challenge to government control and ownership of land and an assertion of Native spatiality. The blockade is designed to reconfigure the Euro-Canadian vision of space which would otherwise confine Native people to reserves or deny them a voice in what happens in their territories: “[a]s a statement concerning sovereignty and place, a blockade must be of profound importance for people who have been denied them.”

The “highly particularized nature” of blockades is often ignored, and insufficient attention has been given to “underlying grievances, local contexts, and Aboriginal histories.” However, some generalizations can be made. Native blockades in the 1970s were predominantly about reserve lands, either loss of land through recent expropriation or

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3 Blomley, “Shut the Province Down,” 11.
through the McKenna-McBride Commission ‘cut-offs’. In those cases the blockade was used to protest the lack of consultation or adequate compensation concerning lands to which Bands had recognized rights. In contrast, in the 1980s most Native activism was related to land outside reserves for which comprehensive claims had been submitted. Blockades were a strategy used to stop the exogenous development of traditional territories in the absence of treaties. Blockades have been a significant tactic for Native people especially since 1975 and they have forever changed the way the government and citizens of British Columbia perceive their space. This in turn has affected the administration and use of lands and resources in British Columbia.

The blockade is generally employed when less confrontational methods have failed. Yet while its use can contest and resist the production of space by the Government and non-native economy, in itself the blockade does not necessarily result in a reproduction of that

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4 ‘Cut-offs’ were lands which had alienated from Indian Reserves in the 1920s in the southern part British Columbia by the Federal and Provincial governments without consultation or compensation. Tennant, Aboriginal People and Politics: the Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 207.
6 Though Frideres seems to imply that conflict is always effective and overstates its potential for equalizing power relations, the following statement does give some insight into the blockade as a last resort tactic. I believe this captures the way the Tl’azt’en approach issues: “Aboriginals prefer (as a cultural attribute) to solve problems without resorting to direct confrontation or overt conflict. Their preference is to discuss the issue, evaluate a range of alternative solutions, and then attempt to achieve near consensus, on the accepted solution. [But when they have exhausted less confrontational methods] Aboriginals have found that they can use conflict as a strategy to achieve their goals and objectives. ... conflict forces the opposition parties to directly negotiate with the aggrieved parties. In doing so, dominant parties are forced to deal with the minorities as equals. In short, the dominant-subordinate relationship changes to one of equals ... the dominant group may be forced to change its policies, attitudes, and behaviour toward the group initiating the conflict.” James S. Frideres, 1998. Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: Contemporary Conflicts. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, Allyn and Bacon. Page 333.
space. The outcomes are often blurred and ambiguous, but a blockade is rarely meant to create permanent material spaces. Instead, like any other political tactic, the blockade is intended to change the existing power relations of a society in order to open up a space of negotiation.

4.2 The Tl’atz’en Exercise Their Property Rights

The Tl’atz’en negotiating committee met with Government representatives several times in the fall of 1974. At these meetings the Tl’atz’en made it clear that they sought a new economic base for their communities as the viability of their mixed economy of hunting and fishing and wage labour had been threatened by the construction of the railway and the changes in the forest industry. In response, the Government agreed to fund a study to look at economic development options for the Tl’atz’en. This was a significant concession by the Provincial Government because it indicated that it was willing to at least consider compensation additional to the land exchange. However, any optimism built up during the fall that a resolution to the dispute was in sight soon faded. On January 3, 1975, Crosby informed the Band that Norman Levi (Minister of Human Resources) had failed to keep his commitment to make arrangements for the economic development study. He said that “negotiations are not proceeding properly”, and the Tl’atz’en “should consider enforcing their property rights on their reserves by preventing a trespass by the BCR. ... This action should have the limited purpose of bringing the Government into negotiations with you.”

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The Band decided, however, not to block the railway but to exercise patience. It would be three and a half months until the Tl’azt’en could get the Government to attend a negotiation meeting. At that meeting, on March 21, 1975, several issues were discussed in general terms but little progress was made. The Band said it would consider compensation in the form of an annual rent for the use of the right-of-ways, but the Government refused to consider this option. The Tl’azt’en also expressed an interest in becoming involved in forestry and in starting a sawmill, and suggested that they be given an area for hunting and trapping “that will be untouched by the white people.” This meeting failed to produce anything more than superficial discussion, but the parties did agree to meet again on April 28th.

It had been over five years since the Railway had begun construction through the Band’s reserves. The Band felt that the Government had never properly responded to its demand for $7 million, nor offered anything more than vague promises of assistance. It also seemed that once the railway was operational, BCR and the government failed to give the negotiations with the Band a high priority. Tl’azt’en saw this as disrespect for their people and a lack of recognition of their concerns. School children’s letters, shown in Figure 4.1, are the voices of a community that felt it had been patient, and that its claims were reasonable, even common sense.

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Letters to BCR from Tl'azt'en Children, early April 1975

- "I think our people are just getting tired to have people taking their land for free - what about paying for it once in a while?" Dolores Mattess, Grade 5

- "It certainly upset the animal community in the area. The older people say that it reduces their trapping to more than half of what it was before. I think that if the BCR cannot pay for the damage they shouldn't build more railroads." Corinna Pierre, Grade 5.

- "I am just wondering why our people have to fight so much for the money that your company owe them. 'Thou shalt not steal.' Does this not apply to the BCR?" Beverly Anatole, Grade 6.

- "We would like you to realize that the land you took away to pass your railway was in fact our property. How would you like the Indian people do the same to your own property and, of course, not paying the damage done?" Rosaline Monk, Grade 7.

- "I hope you realize the number of traplines you have been spoiling." George Pierre, Grade 7.

Figure 4.1

It is interesting to note how central the concept of property rights (i.e. trapline and reserve rights) are to the children's comments. Though it is often assumed otherwise, Native communities do not necessarily have difficulty in understanding and adopting a foreign property rights system because they have always possessed their own. From the beginning, the Tl'azt'en avoided formulating their claims in terms such as 'Aboriginal rights,' which were as yet undefined in Canadian legal discourse, but chose to use well established Euro-Canadian legal concepts. And that is perhaps why the Band grew increasingly frustrated with the way the Government ignored its claims – claims that were based solely on non-native law. The Tl'azt'en were not challenging Government jurisdiction, but they were challenging the Government to administer the territory in such a way that the needs of the local inhabitants were considered. The Band's task was not small. The Tl'azt'en were

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attempting to negotiate land and resource issues with a Province which generally did not give much recognition to Native off-reserve land use, and was still hoping that the issue of Aboriginal title to traditional territories would disappear.

There had been very little progress since the Tl’azt’en re-opened the negotiations in the summer of 1973, and for this they blamed the Government’s unwillingness to offer them something substantial and tangible. The Government appeared content with the status quo and in no hurry to bring the negotiations to a close. The Band, therefore, resolved to try another tactic to force the Government to take them seriously and work towards a resolution. On April 28, 1975 the Tl’azt’en blockaded the railway on Tache IR. Figure 4.2 contains the Band’s explanation for erecting the blockade.

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**TI’AZT’EN REASONS FOR BLOCKADING BCR, APRIL 28, 1975**

“Our Band has tried to negotiate with the B.C. Government for economic development, but we have been met with delays, failure to attend meetings, and being shuffled from one government department to another. The Band approached the Government about economic development in July 1974, and it was not until October that Mr. Levi, Minister of Human Resources, arranged a meeting with the Band. At that meeting the Minister agreed to consider economic development, and it was also agreed that the Minister Without Portfolio [Alf Nunweiler] would assist in working out details of the economic development plan.

Nunweiler planned a meeting for April 28, 1975 but on the day of the meeting asked to be excused. At this time the Band decided they had enough of the Government’s delaying tactics, failure to attend mutually arranged meetings, the Government’s refusal at times to deal with the Band’s lawyer, and the shuffling from one Government department to another - so the blockade went up immediately - in anticipation that they might enter into serious negotiations with the Band.”

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The Band did not take pleasure in blockading the railway, and apologized to those who were laid off or were otherwise affected by it. The three and a half month blockade caused three

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12 “Our Band realizes the serious economic hardships the blockade has produced for the Takla Lake Band, the sawmills, the logging companies, proprietors and other groups and individuals. To those people and the organizations we humbly apologize. Our fight is not with them.” Stuart Trembleur Lakes Band Press Release. August 15, 1975. Box: Land Claims Second Copies, File: STB v. BCRail. Tl’azt’en BOBC.
mills to shut down, and another to cut production in half. At least 320 employees of sawmills and logging companies were laid off.\textsuperscript{13} The blockade also halted construction of the Dease Lake Extension, and stopped the transport of supplies to the communities on Takla Lake. Being able to block the railway might have been a small victory but stopping the trains and holding up the economy was never the goal; getting the Government to negotiate with the Band was the goal. The Tl’azt’en desired an opportunity to engage the Government and industry in dialogue about how they and non-native people could co-exist. This primarily meant coming to an agreement over the organization and allocation of the space valued by both parties.

At the beginning of relations with PGE the Band had asserted its authority over its reserves, and created a space from which to negotiate. With the blockade the Tl’azt’en exerted control over their whole territory, and over the economy which was dependent on the territory. In fact the purpose of the blockade could be said to have been to extend Tl’azt’en control from the reserve out. Even though the blockade was on-reserve, it created a material and political Tl’azt’en space off-reserve. It materially reconfigured the territory by impeding the flow of resources and preventing access. It also created a political ‘space of negotiation’ – a terrain which did not conform to typical encounters between Native people and development, and a space where the power discrepancy between the Tl’azt’en and the Government was decreased. The Tl’azt’en had created a space of negotiation in 1969 in the course of discussions about reserve lands. But with threats of a blockade in the summers of

\textsuperscript{13} Silvican Resources’ Lovell Cove mill on Takia Lake, and Netherland Overseas’ Prince George and Leo Creek mills were shut down shortly after the blockade was put in place. P&T Mills Ltd. in Williams Lake was forced to reduce its production and laid off 60 workers. Several logging contractor companies in Fort St. James laid off employees. See \textit{The Province}, July 21, 1975, “Indians Vote to Lift BCR Blockade but...”; and Steve Whipp, July 21, 1975. “Railway Blockade Proves Costly.” \textit{The Prince George Citizen}. 
1973 and 1974, and with the actual blockade in 1975 the Tl’azt’en had pushed open a space of negotiation concerning off-reserve issues. The purpose of the blockade was not to reclaim the whole territory, but to create a situation where negotiations would occur.

The Band did not, however, define negotiations as meetings. Negotiation to the Tl’azt’en meant genuine information exchange and discussion, tangible proposals, and a mutual willingness to compromise. Since the Provincial Government had been brought into the negotiations in 1974, the Band had come to view meetings with suspicion. To them meetings that accomplished nothing were a delay tactic of the Government, as frustrating as the way the Railway had continually put-off completing the surveys. On May 22, 1975 the Band even turned down an offer to meet with the Premier:

Unfortunately there have been so many exploratory talks and discussions that [we] are getting tired of meetings. Your offer of discussion with the Premier does not contain any suggested agenda. Is the Premier prepared to discuss the Band’s position, to present a proposal, or merely to demand that the blockade be lifted. ... the Band is reluctant to set a meeting unless the Government has some proposal to make about their claims.\[14\]

This event shows the confidence the Tl’azt’en had in the leverage which their property rights and the blockade gave them. They were not so desperate as to take any opportunity the Provincial Government offered. In a letter to Alf Nunweiler in July the Band made it clear that it would only meet with ministers of the Government who had the authority to negotiate on behalf of BCR and the Provincial Government, and that it would only meet if the ministers had an offer that was specific and in writing. The Band also demanded that the

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government give it a detailed written report of the plans for development in its territory.**15**

The Government responded that it would not negotiate while the blockade was still in place.

The summer of 1975 brought a new round of Native protests in British Columbia.**16**

Blomley states that in May and June of that year there were at least thirteen Native blockades in British Columbia: “[t]he upsurge of activism that occasioned blockades – as well as other modes of protests – was due partly to a growing Native radicalism in the United States and partly to a deepening dissatisfaction with the Province’s continued dismissal of Aboriginal title.”**17** In the summer of 1975 the Mount Currie Indian Band set up a blockade to protest of the expropriation of reserve land for a public road. The Neskonlith Band blocked a logging road to prevent non-Natives access to the fish and game resources Band members depended on for food. The Ohiat Band closed a hiking trail through its reserve complaining that too many tourist were using its land and were leaving garbage. Nimpkish Band members set up a toll on a bridge to demand that the Government negotiate cut-off claims and land claims. The Mowachat Band blocked a road on its reserve that led to a pulp mill and wharf to protest the expropriation of reserve lands by the Ministry of Highways.**18**

The Provincial Government was aware that its actions in the dispute with the Tl’azt’en would have ramifications for dealing with the other Native blockades in the Province. It feared giving any sign that blockades were an effective avenue for getting it to

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address grievances. The Tl’azt’en seemed to recognize the Government’s dilemma and conceded that they would lift the blockade on the day the Government renewed negotiations with them. The Band even provided specific dates for such a meeting to take place.¹⁹

However the Province did not respond to this gesture. It was no longer willing to negotiate with the Tl’azt’en and, by way of letter on July 30, 1975, made what it called a “final offer”. According to the offer the Band would be granted the 3-for-1 land exchange and $50,000, and “if the Band does not choose to accept this offer, and to take down the blockade by August 15, 1975, the Railway will consider other courses of action.”²⁰ The Tl’azt’en did not appear willing to see if BCR was bluffing, and though they had considered launching their own court action, they apparently felt the best solution to the dispute would not come through litigation.²¹ Thus, on August 15th the Tl’azt’en removed the blockade and issued the statement shown in Figure 4.3:

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²¹ As early as 1974 and also during the blockade the Band asked DIA for advice and financial support should it decide to pursue legal action against BCR. These requests caused much debate within DIA about whether the Band had a strong case. I did not find record of any advice DIA gave to the Band in this regard or concerning BCR’s own threat of legal action, but it is possible that such advice might have influenced the Band to take down the blockade on August 15th to avoid having the dispute go to the courts. In January 1976 the Federal Department of Justice did issue an opinion to DIA that said “the Band cannot make a successful case in court.” Assistant Deputy Minister (DIA) to Regional Assistant Director General (DIA). DIA Railway Right-of-Way File 985/31-2-26-1, Vol. 1 1971-1976. Tl’azt’en NROC.
"The Band does not accept the final package offer. The Band feels that [BCR and the B.C. Government] have no rights to threaten or offer final settlements on their terms - since it indicates a lack of seriousness and a lack of good faith in negotiating a settlement. ...Keeping in mind that the Band has already made a concession [that it would lift the blockade when the Government met with the Band] we agree to give a further concession - in hopes that we will get the BCR and B.C. Government to the negotiating table.

Our Band realizes the serious economic hardships the blockade has produced for the Takla Lake Band, the sawmills, logging contractors, proprietors and other groups and individuals, and to these people and the organizations we humbly apologize. ...We agree to give the BCR permission to use the tracks which it has constructed across the seven reserves of the Stuart Trembleur Lakes Band for two months, in return for serious and meaningful negotiations with the BCR and the B.C. Government. ...They are on our land, and they are trespassing and they must pay the price. We hope the Government realizes our sincerity and determination in settling this dispute. We wish to see that same sincerity and determination on their part also."

**Figure 4.3**

### 4.3 Negotiations Resume Concerning Economic Development Options

Native protests in the summer of 1975 appeared to result in progress on some issues of Native concern. In early September, for example, the provincial government announced that an agreement had been reached with the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs to establish a joint Indian-Government Committee to examine the entire subject of the 'cut-offs'. The Tl'azt'en's negotiations also took a significant step forward in September. The parties met in Fort St. James on September 13th for the first time since March. At this meeting the Provincial negotiators told the Band's negotiating committee that they had been given the authority to make a deal without going back to cabinet. This was seen as significant by the Tl'azt'en, because for the first time the people with whom they were negotiating could no longer be evasive or stall by saying that someone else had to make the decisions. This was

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24 The Provincial representatives were Alf Nunweiler (the new Minister of Human Resources), and N.C. Norris (Vice President, BCR). The Band's Negotiation Committee was Chief John Alexis, Harry Crosby, Ed John, Sebastian Anatole, Duncan Joseph, Danny Alexis, and Amelia Felix.
the type of negotiations the Band had hoped for when it first expanded the scope of the negotiations in 1973. The Tl’azt’en had succeeded in creating a space of negotiation on the issue of their community’s co-existence with non-native society. Ed John clarified that the Band’s negotiating committee was not the decision maker: “we do have to go back to the Band for an OK.”

The Tl’azt’en’s basic position had not changed since the summer of 1973. They wanted to go ahead with the land exchange, but wanted that to be only part of an economic development package that would give them security and opportunity. The Band’s negotiating committee was still under instructions from the Band membership to pursue the $7 million. The purpose of the money was to “develop some sort of income ... We would like our people to work instead of living on social assistance.” The package the Band wanted would also consider that there were diverse needs within the community: “[t]he trappers have to be protected against the loggers, ... and another thing we should be looking at is how we can look after the old people. They will not be able to work for the money like the rest of us. So we have to sort of compensate them because they are part of the Band members.”

When he was clear about the Band’s goals Alf Nunweiler, who had replaced Norman Levi as the Province’s negotiator, was sympathetic and willing to discuss ways of bringing income to the Band. At the September 13th meeting the Government asked about the possibility of minerals on the Tl’azt’en’s reserves, and the Band expressed an interest in having a sawmill. The Government once again promised to finance a study of the Band’s economic development options.

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At a subsequent meeting on October 18, the Government presented the current forest development plans in the Band’s territory. Crosby said that this information “was helpful in allowing the Band to understand what the future holds in store for them.” The Government also offered to give the Band information it had requested on bidding for silviculture contracts. The Band also felt that the Government had indicated at this meeting that the Band would be included in future economic development planning processes, and that the government would attempt to sort out some of the problems Tl’azt’en trappers were experiencing because of new logging in the area. There was much reason for optimism as good progress had been made in the two months since the blockade had been taken down. The Government seemed to have significantly changed its view of the situation and now treated Tl’azt’en with respect, listened to their concerns, and was trying to work out solutions.

The results of the economic development study were presented at a meeting of Band members on January 30, 1976. Also present was Allan Williams, the Minister of Labour and Minister Responsible for Indian Affairs. He had replaced Alf Nunweiler as the Province’s lead in the negotiations with the Tl’azt’en. The consultant reported on various options which had been investigated to bring income and employment to the Band, including a shopping centre, mining, guiding businesses, and a sawmill. The consultants did not consider any of these options to be feasible, but suggested that Band members could set up three small logging contracting companies – two based in Tache and one based in Portage.

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4.4 **TL'azt'en Decide to Negotiate for Timber Rights**

The consultant’s suggestion was not the solution the TL’azt’en were hoping for. Working as contractors for other companies would not bring them the revenue, the security, the autonomy, nor the number of jobs they wanted. Not long after this meeting the Band resolved to negotiate for something that neither the Government, nor its economic development report had suggested—timber rights. The TL’azt’en’s experience since the early 1900s and especially since the beginning of the railway negotiations had shown them that legal rights to lands and resources were necessary to have any power to participate in the production of space. With few rights to off-reserve resources and, therefore, limited ability to protect their bush economy from advancing forest development, the TL’azt’en began to search for an alternative economic base. They decided that having timber rights was a way to benefit from the forest industry, which had come to dominate their territory and the region’s economy.

Securing timber rights seemed to be a promising direction, but it would only directly benefit the portion of the TL’azt’en community who were experienced or interested in logging. Because the Band’s negotiating committee wanted to spread the benefits of the settlement with BCR throughout the community, they now began discussing how they could bring tangible benefits to those in the band who engaged in more traditional economy. Trappers and those most dependent on fish and wildlife resources were the ones in the community who had suffered the most from the railway and the intensification of logging, yet how could they be compensated and/or protected?

As early as 1973 Band members had expressed a desire to secure rights to the lands along their traplines or at favourite hunting and fishing locations where they had cabins. It
was felt that much would be gained by creating reserves for their cabins because some cabins had recently been destroyed by logging companies, and because of the difficulty (if not the mere requirement) of acquiring a Provincial permit for the cabin sites. The Band would continue to negotiate for an exclusive hunting and trapping area, but in the mean time it was decided to attempt to get rights to land around the cabins of Band members. This became part of the Band’s strategy in the Spring of 1976. Though it did not protect wildlife habitat, it offered the knowledge that at least the cabins would be safe from destruction.

The Band did not plan on making room for the cabin parcels by reducing the acreage of the other lands already chosen, but by increasing the total acres that it would request. In May the Band was considering 25 parcels, 12 of which were trap line cabin parcels but it appears that deliberations over their land selections continued through the summer. The Band did not give the Government its lands request until October 1976.

I have not been able to find what the October 1976 land selections were, and it is also unclear why it took seven months for the Band to submit the request. There may well have been lengthy deliberations within the Band about who should get a reserve for their cabin, and perhaps some Band members had to go through the process of picking a site on which they would like to build a cabin in the future. It is also not clear why the Government failed

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30 According to the *Prince George Citizen*, MOF had said that partial blame for destruction of trappers’ cabins and traps by logging operations lay with the Indians “for not making adequate maps” to show the locations of their improvements. Band members complained that “Indians are unable to even lease enough land to protect their cabins. We’re not trying to take the whole forest, we just want enough land to build a cabin on.” Some Band members had received Special Use Permits for their cabin sites as the result of meetings held with the Department of Recreation and Conservation in the late 1970s, but wanted their cabin sites to have reserve status so would not have to pay the annual fee which cost up to $40/year. See Bill Graham, “Didn’t Make Maps” *Prince George Citizen*, December 10, 1975; Chief John Alexis to Don Grant (MOF, Prince George Region). August 22, 1980. Box: Land Claims Second Copies, File: STB v. BCRail. Tl’azt’en BOBC; and Interview with Harry Pierre, January 27, 1999.

to fulfill a promise it had made in the Spring to make the counter-offer once it had received the Tl'azt'en’s land request. It is likely partly due to the fact that at the time BCR was experiencing major labour and economic problems.

The Dease Lake Extension was “launched with insufficient prior planning and with no better than a superficial knowledge of potential resources and traffic.”32 By 1976, the British Columbia Railway was plagued with “construction problems, planning problems, [and] money problems. There were labour problems, managerial problems and political problems. Some problems resulted from inadequate planning, the hurried constructions of branch lines, and over reliance on borrowed money. Other problems resulted from political interference, inadequate staffing, and labour-management myopia.”33 These issues eventually led to the shut down of the construction of the Dease Lake Extension in late 1976. The grade had been completed almost to Dease Lake, but the tracks were only operational to a point just north of Takla Lake. The project was $120 million over-budget, and it was estimated that another $135 million would be required to complete the line to Dease Lake. Provincially BCR was also operating at a substantial loss (about $150,000 /day) and on February 7, 1977, the Government appointed a Royal Commission of Inquiry into all aspects of the management of the Railway.

The Commissions report was made public on November 17, 1978. It recommended that the Railway not be operated beyond Fort St. James unless shippers were willing to assume all of the real costs.34 However, the Takla Extension continued to operate through

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34 For more on the Royal Commission see Ruppenthal and Keast, A Railway Derailed.
Tl’azt’en territory, as it had since the summer of 1973, as a logging railroad for the mills at Lovel Cove, Leo Creek, Fort St. James and Prince George.

4.5 Provincial Offer/ Tl’azt’en Counter-Offer/ Provincial Offer

The problems with BCR operations seriously set back the negotiations between the Provincial Government and the Tl’azt’en. In January 1977, after two scheduled meetings had been canceled by the Province, the Band warned the local forest companies and the Takla Band that it had set a deadline of mid-February for Government to come to a meeting or the blockade would be set up again. This threat did bring the Government to the table, possibly because BCR and the Government could not politically or economically afford another blockade of the Takla Extension.

On February 19th to a gathering of one hundred fifty Band members, Allan Williams announced that the Province was prepared to proceed with the land exchange as proposed by the Tl’azt’en in October 1976. The announcement was not received as positively as he might have wanted, and Williams seemed disappointed when the Tl’azt’en reminded him that its demand was still for seven million dollars in addition to the land exchange. Williams replied in frustration that the Province would not pay more than $50,000, but added that his Government was interested in making economic development opportunities.


available “to the Native people throughout this part of the Province if that is the wish of the Native people.”

This was the sort of vague proposal that Band members were tired of hearing. Figure 4.3 shows some of the comments Band members made in response to Allan Williams’ offer. Another year had passed, and yet not much had changed. The Government still had not offered the Band what it considered a satisfactory solution, and the Band continued to ask for one. These comments also convey the impression that the Tl’azt’en had hoped that non-native people would have made a place/space for them within the new set of opportunities presented by the forest industry which had brought change to the territory. Instead, the Tl’azt’en had found that they had to fight to modify the production of space to more fully include them. The dialogues that took place over the course of the negotiations were the components of an interactive process that resulted in the production of a hybrid social space. Lefebvre would have classified the Tl’azt’en’s voices as “lesser movements” which occur within a society when two spatialities “interpenetrate” and influence one another.

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38 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 86-87.
Band Members’ Statements to the Minister - February 17, 1977.

- “Things were pretty good around here, there’s not too many difficulties in success that [we] have had with the government, Whiteman, loggers and mines, but as time has been going on ... the only thing we been getting from Government is a hard time. ... We don’t like to be forced to be put in positions like this where we cannot rely on resources of the land as we have done in the past.” Ed John.

- “Each time the white man came there’s more. They come on our land and spoil everything and as a result we Indians suffer more. We no longer can hunt as before for there is so little game left. Long ago my home used to be where ever I hunt, now I am only allowed to have one home and that home has to be on the reserve. ... they have no right whatsoever to build a railway through our reserve without our consent which we did not give them. ... they took our land, as much of it as they wanted. What land I have they spoil - our trapline.” Justa Hanson.

- “Where you get the idea of offering $50,000? There’s a population of 500 people in Tache alone. If you give them a $100 a piece it wouldn’t be enough.” Alec Thomas.

- “Mr. Allan Williams and representatives of BCR you have heard my people’s feelings now, ... You understand their way of thinking and that the livelihood, the way of livelihood, for the native people that you have destroyed. And I’m pretty sure you must realize it. Their land that you make a boundary around for them and said, ‘Now look, you Indians, you stay inside the boundary line, and if any white trespasses us you charge them’. ...but the $50,000, like the young girl said it, it’s more like dropping in a bucket. You making a lot of money with this ... but we are losing every way, that’s what my people think. Like Louie John said, I might be the last Indian to be stepped on. ... That’s my people’s feelings.” Chief Justa Monk.

Figure 4.4

After this meeting, a DIA official said that the Provincial Government felt like it was “being held ransom. It is not prepared to back down, and therefore expects that the Band is likely, once again, to blockade the line. ...In the event of another blockade, ...BCR will request expropriation of the rail right-of-way under Section 35 of the Indian Act.” However, DIA would not have proceeded with expropriation in these circumstances and therefore, the

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39 A transcript was produced from a recording of the meeting. I have changed some of the punctuation. Transcript of Meeting at Tache, February 19, 1977. Box: Land Claims Second Copies, File: STB v. BCRail. Tl’azt’en BOBC.
Province’s threat to expropriate was not as powerful as the Band’s to blockade.\textsuperscript{41} Thus on March 16th, the Government asked the Band to submit a counter proposal to the Government’s February 17th offer of the land exchange plus $50,000.\textsuperscript{42}

The Band presented its counter-offer in July. It replaced the claim for $7 million with the proposal shown in Figure 4.4. “The basic philosophy behind these requests” the proposal reads, “is to ensure that our Band has the economic base necessary to sustain the community and to provide the facilities necessary to ensure that the Reserves will develop as an attractive place for Stuart Trembleur People to live.”\textsuperscript{43} The Band had asked for $7 million in 1973 because it was not yet sure what would be best to negotiate for. But after considering the issue for several years the Band now was able to articulate a more well developed strategy for adapting to the changing circumstances. One of the Tl’atz’en’s main goals was to continue to live in their villages and in their territory. Land and resource rights constituted the main part of their strategy to reconfigure the territory to re-establish the viability of their communities. They asked for 10 acres for every acre surrendered to the railway, the right to harvest 141,600 cubic metres of timber annually on Provincial land, and an exclusive hunting area. As an expression of Tl’atz’en goals, the July 1977 Counter Offer was a manifestation of ‘difference’ which when voiced to the Government had the potential to effect the production of space in Tl’atz’en territory.

\textsuperscript{41} The fact that DIA would not allow the Province to expropriate gave the Band tremendous power to get the Province to address its demands. But the Band was not necessarily always aware of DIA’s position. BCR’s threat to expropriate was still an issue in August 1978, and the Band wrote to DIA to determine if the Province had made application under Section 35 to expropriate the railway right-of-ways. DIA officials met with the Band and stated that no such application was “on file.” They also clarified that DIA policy was that land cannot be taken without consent of the Band and that in this case that policy was “in force.” See Band Councilor to C.E. Riach (DIA) August 9, 1978; Regional Special Projects (DIA) to Headquarters Special Projects (DIA) September 1, 1978; and response September 14, 1978. DIA Railway Right-of-Way File 985/31-2-617-1, Vol.2, 1976-1980. Tl’atz’en NROC.


Preamble: "In the early 1970s the frontier finally passed beyond the traditional territory of the Stuart-Trembleur Lakes Band. Both a road and a railroad were extended beyond Pinchi and Tache Villages. Coincidental with the arrival of the Railway, our Band members started to experience a decrease in their subsistence income. ...For the first time the management of resources in the Stuart Trembleur Territory has become an issue for the Band. Of primary concern is the management of resources for compatible use."44

"Band members question why development of timber resources should be allocated to corporate interests from outside the community, removing all resource management and development opportunities from the original inhabitants. When trapping and hunting opportunities are destroyed, these opportunities must be replaced by other opportunities managed by the community. For this reason we wish to continue the negotiations for a timber harvest license commenced in October 1975."

The Band will consider as compensation, the following:

1) The 944 acres presently agreed upon, plus an island in Cunningham Lake known as Skooby Island. The island is presently being leased by the Joseph brothers (band members) and is used as a base for their guiding outfit.

2) Further to the 944 we have selected, we request an additional 7 acres of land for every acre we are giving up. This would amount to an additional 2,142.56 acreage. The total land exchange would amount to 3,086.56 acres. Our band strongly feels that a greater land base would be most beneficial to us.

3) The Provincial Order in Council 1036 not apply to the present and future reserve lands of the Stuart Trembleur Band, [so that their reserves would be exempt from future expropriation].

4) 8 years rent for use of reserve lands: $15,000/year = $144,000.

5) A resource base as follows:
   a) Timber cutting rights at 50,000 cubic units [141,600 cubic metres] for next 30 years. These will be located within area now called the Stuart Lake Pulp Harvesting Forest. This timber will be the basis of a logging operation to provide employment and revenue for Band.
   b) Exclusive hunting rights within the area bordered by the Stuart, Cunningham, Trembleur and Tezzeron Lakes. These hunting privileges will be for our people who are dependent on hunting to provide subsistence for themselves.

6) Provincial Government grants sufficient to develop and make viable 5(a). Including machinery and equipment required for a logging operation. Also the Band would like to establish an operation that would manufacture materials for log houses – both for commercial purposes and for our own housing program.

7) Provincial Government grants to help off-set costs for community sewage systems.

8) Housing for elders. There are 35-40 elders, many have inadequate housing, many need constant care.

9) A Recreation and cultural complex.

10) Maintenance of roads in villages of Tache and Binche, and in the future, in Portage.

Figure 4.4

The counter-offer was presented to the Government at a meeting in Victoria on August 4, 1977. The Government did not respond quickly to the Band’s proposal, and by late August

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44 This statement supports the argument I presented in Chapter Two, that the Tl'azt'en had not felt that they were negatively impacted by non-native activity in their territory prior to the railway.
the Band again felt that it may have to set up the blockade to make any progress in the negotiations.\(^{45}\) However, though it would be several months before the next face to face negotiations took place, a blockade did not go up.

When the Government did sit down with the Band on December 5, 1977 it made an offer of \$100,000 for use of the right-of-way and as partial compensation for ecological impact. The Government said no to Points 3, and 6 to 10. Points 6 to 10 were said to be outside of the realm of Provincial jurisdiction because they were community projects on Federal land. In response to Point 3 Allan Williams said: "It will remain ...OIC 1036 was agreed on in 1929 by the two Governments." Chief Justa Monk then asked: “Was there any Indian input?”\(^{46}\) The answer, of course, was no. This dialogue exemplifies how much things had changed since 1929 when native people had relatively little role in the reconfiguration of land. In the 1970s, though it took tremendous effort, the Tl'atz'en were able to get the Government to some degree to negotiate the terms of spatial production with them.

The Province did agree to give the Band Scooby Island, but was not prepared to consider adding significant acreage to the land exchange.\(^{47}\) However, in a move that would

\(^{45}\) This is reflected in a September 14, 1977 letter from new Chief Justa Monk to Chief of the Takla Band "I would advise you and your people to be prepare with supplies they might need. Since the Government and the BC Railway will not stop playing games with us, I feel, and so do my people, that we should blockade the railway until this is finalized.” Justa Monk to William George (Chief of the Takla Band). September 14, 1977. Box: Land Claims Second Copies, File: STB v. BCRail. Tl'atz'en BOBC.


\(^{47}\) John Alexis and Russel Alec, the Band's economic development staff, had begun to identify additional lands should the government agree to the 10 to 1 exchange formula. The substantial land gains would have made it possible to consider agricultural operations as a economic development option. For example, the people in Portage Village had voiced an interest in securing the land surrounding Whitefish and Cunningham Lakes, and Nancut and Whitefish Creeks as a land base for their existing cattle raising operations and to also start larger scale farming. While the Portage area may be suitable to these activities the rest of Tl'atz'en territory is not. See “Proposal put forward by the people of Portage,” March 1976. DIA Railway Right-of-Way File 985/31-2-26 Vol.2. Tl'atz'en NROC.
eventually bring a resolution to the negotiations, the Province agreed to grant the Tl’azt’en’s request for rights to 141,600 cubic metres of timber. The Tl’azt’en questioned how the Government would be able to allocate timber to them when other companies seemed to already have all the timber rights in it territory. The Government responded that it would find a way.

4.6 The 1984 Agreement

At the meeting in December representatives from the Ministry of Forests (MOF) had already suggested that the means of giving the Tl’azt’en timber rights should be a Tree Farm License (TFL). The TFL is the most secure form of tenure in the Province, and the only major license which grants exclusive harvesting rights to a specific area. Both of these characteristics were highly valued by the Band.48

According to the new Forest Act (1978) the Government could not directly award a TFL but had to advertise the proposed license and invite applications. While the Government had promised to grant the Band access to timber the legislated process for the granting of TFLs would have to be followed. One of the unique aspects of a TFL is that it combines the license holder’s private lands and Provincial forest land. MOF saw that if the

48 Today some Band members question whether it would have been better to have been allocated a Forest License which has fewer management responsibilities for a similar profit margin. Interviews with Ed John (February 9, 1998), and Harry Pierre (March 4, 1998).
Band could offer its reserve lands in its bid for the license it would have a clear advantage over other applicants.  

MOF proposed that the TFL be located in the area between Stuart and Trembleur Lakes west of the Tache River. Since the discontinuation of water-based logging in the mid-1970s, the area had remained inaccessible and unallocated because there was as yet no bridge across the Tache River. The location of the TFL was seen as favourable by part of the Tl'azt'en leadership because it was very close to the community, had good natural boundaries, and had some very high quality timber. Some Band members expressed concern about the proposed location because the area contained some of the most difficult and expensive logging terrain in the Fort St. James region. Today, some Band members continue to question why the Band agreed to the location of the TFL. The Band’s July 1977 proposal had suggested that the timber rights be in Stuart Lake Pulp Harvesting Forest, east of the Tache river, and Band members also discussed trying to get timber in the Middle River area. But when MOF suggested the Band be given a TFL in the Tanizul Lake area the Band agreed.

In December 1978 the parties had agreed that the settlement would include a land exchange, some monetary compensation and 141,600 cubic metres annually in timber rights. While the TFL was being set up, the surveying of the exchange parcels progressed...
and in July 1980 Crosby advised Allan Williams that “the Stuart Trembleur Band has reached agreement in principle on most points in its negotiations with the B.C. Government and B.C. Railway. The last item is settlement of the terms of the Tree Farm License. ...It is proposed that the meeting focus mainly on the economic viability of the Tree Farm License.”

The main issue was the amount of timber available in the proposed area. It had been determined that the area only was capable of supplying approximately 85,000 cubic metres annually, far below the figure agreed to in 1978. The Band proposed expanding the area of the TFL to include more timber, but the Government adopted the position that the settlement would now be on basis of the Tanizul area, not a certain volume of timber.

The TFL was advertised on May 7, 1981. In anticipation of preparing a bid the Band had incorporated Tanizul Timber Ltd. earlier that Spring. Shares in Tanizul are held in trust for all Band members by six Board of Directors. The Band also voted to allow the Band’s reserves to be included in Tanizul’s application for a TFL. By the closing date,
July 18, 1981, applications from Netherlands Overseas Mills Ltd, East Fraser Logging Ltd, and Tanizul Timber had been submitted.

Applications for TFLs are judged on three criteria: potential social benefits, potential revenue to the Government, and the potential to incorporate private land into forest management. The fact that it had twenty reserves which it could include in the TFL, and that it intended to hire local employees, meant that the Band’s proposal would be difficult to contest. On September 9 and 10 the Ministry of Forests held a public hearing in Fort St. James to review the three applications. Shortly after, the Minister of Forests indicated to the Band and DIA that he would grant the license to the Tl’azt’en as soon as the Federal Government issued the Order in Council required to have the Federal Indian reserve lands come under Provincial jurisdiction for the purpose of forest management. Lawyers from DIA and MOF worked throughout the fall on the means to overcome the regulatory and jurisdictional obstacles presented by this unprecedented integration of Provincial and Federal land. In January the Federal Privy Council issued “The Stuart Trembleur Lake Band (Tanizul Timber Ltd.) Timber Regulations”, which made the all timber grown on the specified reserves subject not to DIA’s Indian Timber Regulations but to the Provincial Forest Act, Ministry of Forests Act, and Range Act.

57 Dennis Novak (DIA) to F. Walchli (Regional Director General, DIA). September 14, 1981. DIA Forestry File 5820-617 Vol.1, 1968-1981; Binder: Tanizul Timber Ltd.- DIA Correspondence. Tl’azt’en NROC.
The Ministry of Forests awarded TFL 42 to The Tl’azt’en in February 1982. The actual signing of the License occurred a year later in April 1983, because the Band could not be granted the license prior to the preparation and approval of a management and working plan. With the granting of the TFL the Band received a 25 year renewable license with exclusive right to harvest timber on 54,000 hectares of Provincial land.

Once the Tl’azt’en had secured timber rights, the land exchange and monetary compensation could be finalized. DIA produced the first draft of the agreement in December 1984, but it took several more years to make the document acceptable to the Federal Department of Justice and the Province’s legal advisors. The agreement was finally executed by the parties on June 3, 1988. The Band received $207,370 and the promise of gravel resources as compensation for BCR having taken gravel from several reserves during the construction of the railway. The Tl’azt’en also surrendered 306.1 acres of reserve land (as in July 1973, see map 3.4 and table 3.2a), and in return the Tl’azt’en were granted 1,115.768 acres of land (approximately 3.64 acres received per acre surrendered). The Band selected 34 parcels of Provincial Crown land. Another ten acre parcel belonging to BCR at the Leo Creek town site was added into the agreement in 1987. The TFL and the 1984 Agreement reserves were new Tl’azt’en spaces within the negotiated configuration of space. The hybrid

58 The Government awarded the TFL to the Tl’azt’en despite “vigorous protests” from the unsuccessful applicants. Ron Goodwin (Assistant Deputy Minister, DIA) to Deputy Minister (DIA). March 5, 1982. DIA Forestry File 5820-617 Vol.1, 1968-1981. Binder: Tanizul Timber Ltd.- DIA Correspondence. Tl’azt’en NROC. The application by Netherlands Overseas Mills Limited was rejected early in the review process. It lacked detail, and it “did not successfully dispute a probable conflict of interest between ownership of processing plants and the license condition that the harvest be directed to the open log market.” East Fraser Logging Company’s proposal was adequate but MOF objected to its transportation and marketing scheme, and to the fact that most of profits would be withdrawn from the local area. East Fraser also did not propose to emphasize local hiring, or the hiring of Native people, and anticipated creating 20 jobs fewer than Tanizul’s proposal. “Evaluation of Applicants for Tree Farm License 42.” Cabinet Submission by Ministry of Forests, October 27, 1981. File: 870-2-1-42A TTB.
space of Tl’azt’en territory which was made up of the TFL, the 1984 Agreement reserves and the remainder of the territory will be described in Chapter Five.

4.7 Conclusion

In 1974 the Tl’azt’en expanded the scope of the railway negotiations beyond the issue of right-of-ways on their reserves. In doing so the Tl’azt’en extended their influence in the production of space out from their reserves to the whole territory. Through threats of blockades, a three month blockade, and by demanding the right to a voice in shaping development which affected them, the Tl’azt’en opened up a space of negotiation with the Provincial Government. This space of negotiation was a place where a small Native community could sit across the table from a Government minister and have an effect on how the territory was viewed, administered, and used. Between 1969 and 1983 the Tl’azt’en’s geopolitical actions had only resulted in the creation of this space of negotiation. But with the granting of the TFL in 1983 and the later acquisition of the 35 new reserves the Tl’azt’en had created negotiated spaces – visible signs of the influence of the Tl’azt’en in the production of space in their territory.
5.0 Negotiated Spaces: The Space Created by the 1984 Agreement

Through the opportunity presented by the railway negotiations, Tl'azt'en economic and social goals influenced the production of space in the territory to the most significant degree since the early 1900s. The negotiations resulted in the creation of new legal spaces which can be conceptualized as hybrid spaces – ones which reflect the non-native mode of production, but also the spatiality of the Tl'azt'en community.

Tree Farm License 42

A Tree Farm License is an organization of space conceived of by Euro-Canadian society, but the Tl'azt'en chose to use it to meet their economic goals. Because of this the Tl'azt'en’s TFL is different from other TFLs in the Province. First, the most unique aspect of TFL 42 is that Federal Indian Reserve land and Provincial land are combined into one unit for the purpose of forest management. Thirteen Tl'azt'en reserves make up part of the land base of the license (see Figure 5.1 and Map 5.1). This integration of Federal Indian Reserve land and Provincial land was unprecedented and points to how the Tl'azt'en’s geopolitical efforts had changed the way both Governments were willing to administer their lands. The negotiations truly created a hybrid space – in the sense that the TFL was shaped by multiple influences, and in the sense that it was something new produced from their interaction.
The Provincial Government saw the inclusion of reserve lands in the TFL as desirable because it would improve the management of the timber normally out of its reach. MOF felt that forests on Indian reserve land throughout British Columbia were not adequately managed. The grafting of Tl’atz’en lands onto the TFL land base would improve the management of those reserve lands and therefore decrease the potential for infestations and fire on reserve land to impact adjacent Provincial timber resources. The Provincial Government also felt that the utilization of Reserve timber would contribute to the forest industry of the region. A small TFL in central B.C. was also seen by Tom Waterland, the Minister of Forests as an opportunity “to begin the introduction of an Interior log market, and would show that small or non-integrated companies could manage the forest as well as the larger or integrated companies, two long-standing Waterland beliefs.” The Federal Government was also enthusiastic to see this new jurisdictional arrangement occur because

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2 Mike Sasges, “Contest of tree license, 15 year first.” *The Vancouver Sun*, September 1, 1981.
of the obvious benefits that would accrue to the Tl’azt’en from the TFL, and also because it believed it would open the way for other creative arrangements with Indian lands in British Columbia.

When the idea of the TFL was originally proposed during the negotiations, the Province had stated that the Tl’azt’en would be allowed to export a volume of timber equal to the volume produced by the Reserve lands included in the TFL (approx. 3,300 cubic metres). Export of timber from Provincial lands prior to manufacture is prohibited, but Bands in British Columbia have benefited from the fact that their reserves, which are Federal land, are not subject to this law. However, MOF later decided that it would not allow the export of volumes of timber equal to the reserve volumes because it would undermine the export policy and appear to show favoritism. But, as stated in Chapter Four, MOF seemed especially anxious to incorporate the Tl’azt’en’s reserves into the TFL because it was the Tl’azt’en’s biggest advantage over the other applicants. The Tl’azt’en agreed that if MOF paid for the bridge and main access road they would remove their request that timber from reserves be exportable.

The second difference about the TFL is that it is held by a community company. At the time it was large forestry corporations which normally received timber rights from the

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2 The Provincial government felt that there was “extreme danger in appearing to give a special benefit to the Indian Band.” There was also concern that giving the Tanizul the right to export timber “might produce a backlash in a particular case” and would “seriously affect subsequent TFL applications.” Allan Williams (Attorney General) to Tom Waterland (Minister of Forests). April 24, 1981. File: 870-3-2, TTB.

3 Allan Williams (Attorney General) to Tom Waterland (Minister of Forests). April 24, 1981. File: 870-3-2, TTB. MOF chose to pay for the bridge and the main road into the TFL because Tanizul could not afford it, but also so that the Tl’azt’en would not have any right to claim control over access to the TFL or to the area west of the TFL. “In no way can we let the Indians assume that this TFL, if awarded, gives any control to areas behind. Their only control may be within their Indian Reserves, but certainly they cannot be permitted to control access through and across Provincial Lands.” L.W. Lehrle (Director, Timber Management Branch, MOF) to W.G. Bishop and R.W. Robbins (Assistant Deputy Ministers, MOF). March 3, 1980. File: 870-3-2, TTB.
Province. The Tl'azt'en's argument that benefits from resource development should accrue to local people modified, at least in this case, the Ministry of Forests' normal allocation of space. Giving a TFL to a community marked a different approach to resource management for that time. Yet, not only was the timber granted to a community, it was granted to a Native community – and this was a striking sign of a change in the way the Provincial Government viewed the place of Native people in British Columbian society.

Unlike other forest companies which are run by distant, profit seeking share-holders, Tanizul Timber Ltd. is run by a community appointed Board of Directors. Since operations began Tanizul has attempted to manage the TFL to meet the community’s goals. This has meant that to some extent the TFL is a space produced by the Tl'azt'en. Recently the Tl’azt’en have begun to consider modifying the Tanizul Timber’s decision making process so that it better reflects traditional Tl’azt’en social structures such as clans and keyohs. The Tl’azt’en saw the TFL as an opportunity to gain back a measure of control over a portion of their traditional territory. For example, in its application for the TFL the Band informed the Government that it intended to implement a management scheme which would recognize the community’s wildlife, plant gathering, hunting and trapping activities in the TFL area, and it emphasized that: “[t]he Band would decide what (and where) trade-offs would take place in the Band’s best interest, with no outside interference.”

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5 Interview with Ed John, February 9, 1998. For more information on the community aspects of the operation of TFL 42 see the report and video being produced by the research project entitled: “Linking Forestry and Community in the Tl'azt'en Nation: Lessons for Aboriginal Forestry.” Principal Investigator, Dr. Annie Booth (Environmental Studies Program, UNBC).
6 Tanizul Information Sheet. April 1983. Tl'azt'en NROC.
7 D.T. Grant (Regional Manager, Prince George MOF) to L.W. Lehrle (Director, Timber Management Branch, Victoria MOF). May 5, 1980. File: 870-3-1-42, TTB.
However, though the TFL is certainly a Tl’azt’en space, it is still very much Provincial land. As the following comment by an MOF official shows, the Provincial Government did not agree with the Tl’azt’en having the power to manage the TFL as their exclusive space: “This is all very nice...[but] all demands on the area cannot be met without jeopardizing the Public Sustained Yield Unit Allowable Annual Cut if non-normal practices and priorities are allowed to proceed. This should be stressed to the Natives. This is still a Provincial Resource, not a land exchange proposition. The area cannot be managed differently than other tracts of land due to the philosophies of the licensee.”

The TFL gave the Tl’azt’en the exclusive right to harvest timber on Crown land, but when they accepted the license the Tl’azt’en had to agree to manage the land according to Provincial regulations. The Province had its own designs for the space of the TFL. It wanted to see the forest resources on the land brought into use in a manner similar to that of other timber harvesting areas in the province. MOF realized that it would make the production of an industrial landscape smoother if the Natives were doing it themselves: “Any protests or concerns about resource use conflicts or environmental problems on the area would most likely be originated by the Indians. These would be minimized and would be readily resolved if the Indians obtain the TFL.” As the Tl’azt’en themselves have learned, though they manage the TFL, this tenure is but a component within a larger landscape produced by the Provincial Government, the forest industry, and Canadian society.

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8 Grant to Lehrle, May 5, 1980. File: 870-3-1-42, TTB.
9 J.A.K. Reid (Staff Consultant, MOF) to A.C. MacPherson (Assistant Deputy Minister, MOF). September 23, 1981. File:870-3-2, TTB.
The Tl'azt'en have had to manage the TFL within the parameters for annual cut, stumpage rate, and environmental protection set by MOF, and within the limits of the log market and regional economy. The Tl'azt'en’s ‘differences’ (their social and economic goals, and their strategies for resource management), have been constrained by these external factors. The Tl'azt'en had enough political power to get the Government to grant them timber rights, but their power to shape the production of space within the TFL has been limited. Yet, when it was originally established, and year by year as it was managed, the Tl'azt'en and the Government created the space of the TFL - it is a hybrid space resulting from the interaction, negotiation and compromise of both parties’ goals and spatial strategies.

**New Reserve Lands**

In the final agreement the Tl'azt'en also received 1,115 acres of new reserve land which they used to create 35 new reserves (see Map 5.1 and Figure 5.2). Seven of the eight parcels selected by the Tl'azt'en in July 1973 appear in the final agreement. Parcels 1, 3 and 4 were chosen as bases from which Band members could hunt, trap and fish. Parcels 2 and 34 provided lands which could be developed into lease lots to bring in revenue for the Band. Parcels 5 and 6 were farm and hay lands used by the people of Portage Village. And Parcel 7 was chosen for the benefit of Tl'azt'en people who needed a place to live when working at the sawmills in Fort St. James.

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10 There were changes to some of these parcels. The land known as Parcel 2 in 1973 was listed as two parcels in the final agreement (I have numbered them Parcel 2 and Parcel 34). Parcel 3 was moved farther downstream on the Kuzkwa River and reduced in size from 120 acres to 40. Parcel 4, which was intended to replace Soyandostar IR2 where Za Williams had had his cabin, was reduced to one acre and moved from the shore of Trembleur Lake to Kazchek Lake to be closer to his trapline.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Description</th>
<th>Reserve Name</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Rationale for Selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1. Block A, Lot 3022, Block A, Lot 3022A</td>
<td>Dzin Tl'at IR46</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base. Also potential for development into Lease Lots</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Block A, Lot 1471</td>
<td>Addition to Pinche IR2</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>Extension of Pinche IR2, potential for development into Lease Lots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lot 3023</td>
<td>Chundoo Lhtan la IR45</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>Medicine and berry gathering site and potential for development into Lease Lots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Lot 1957</td>
<td>Tl'o Ba IR22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Block A, Lot 4952</td>
<td>Addition to Nuncut IR3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Extension of Nuncut IR3 for Farming</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Block B, Lot 4111</td>
<td>Bih K'a Chah IR20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hay/Pasture Land, and Hunting/Fishing Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Block B, Lot 3604</td>
<td>North Road IR19</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Home Site for Band members in Fort St. James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Block B, Lot 1465, Block A, Lot 1466, Block A, Lot 1468</td>
<td>Ichh'az Uz Ta Tsog IR44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Farming/Pasture Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Block C, Lot 3613, Block B, Lot 904, Block C &amp; D, Lot 330, Block B, C &amp; D, Lot 331</td>
<td>Skooby Island IR48</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>Used as Base for a Guiding Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Lot 2520</td>
<td>Stsiul Tl'o K'ut IR21</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>Future Sawmill Site, formerly hay meadows used by Band members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Block C, Lot 3611, Block A, Lot 967</td>
<td>Stsiul Tl'o K'ut IR14</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>Rationale not known</td>
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<td>12. Lot 1959</td>
<td>Tsaz Cheh IR28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<td>13. Lot 1961</td>
<td>Lhoh Cho IR29</td>
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<td>14. Lot 1965</td>
<td>Camshel Lake IR30</td>
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<td>15. Lot 2505</td>
<td>Dlah Koh IR31</td>
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<td>16. Lot 1967</td>
<td>Jus T'ay Tl'o IR32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Lot 2500</td>
<td>Tantziul IR43</td>
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<td>18. Lot 2501</td>
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<td>19. Block A, Lot 4686</td>
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<td>K'ay Noo IR47</td>
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<td>21. Lot 2067</td>
<td>La Tse Cho Diz I IR48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>22. Block A, Lot 1491</td>
<td>Tse Bay Ha Tine IR34</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Lot 2068</td>
<td>Shas Dzuhl Koh IR 35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. Block A, Lot 1491</td>
<td>Tsun Tsn Ah IR37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>25. Lot 2069</td>
<td>Ta Duhl IR36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Lot 2501</td>
<td>Keem Cho IR38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>27. Block A, Lot 3599</td>
<td>Nak'a Lat IR39</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>28. Block A, Lot 3611</td>
<td>Wah T'a Noo IR40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>29. Block A, Lot 3611</td>
<td>Chuz Tseenlee IR41</td>
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<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>30. Lot 2072</td>
<td>Noo Kat IR42</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Hunting, Fishing &amp; Trapping Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>31. Lot 2072</td>
<td>The Noo'n Che IR49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>BCR property at Leo Creek townsite</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1115.7</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.2
Final Agreement
1984
Map 5.1

LEGEND
T'az'ten Reserve  T.F.L. 42
Surrendered Land  PGE Railway
Compensation Land  Road

Scale 1 : 250,000

Fort St. James
After July 1973 the Tl’azt’en had decreased the size of some of these parcels and had deleted Parcel 8. It also appears that in 1977 the Government agreed to grant 3.6 acres for every acre of reserve land used or cut off by the railway. These two factors meant that when the Tl’azt’en were selecting lands to include in the land exchange in the late 1970s they had 474.7 acres more to work with than in 1973.

The Tl’azt’en therefore added several other parcels to their land requests. The Band moved to secure land adjacent to the north boundary of Tache reserve where the new sewage lagoon had been built partially off-reserve (Parcel 8). Parcel 9 was selected to secure more hay and farm land near Portage. A small Island in Cunningham Lake (Parcel 10) was added because it was the base from which two Band members ran a guiding business. The Tl’azt’en also chose to secure a large piece of land close to Tache Village (Parcel 11). It was hayland which had been used for many years by the Tl’azt’en, but it was mainly chosen to be the site of the sawmill the Tl’azt’en were planning to build to utilize the timber from the TFL.

The Tl’azt’en’s land use had never been contained or dictated by the boundaries of their original reserve allotment, and even though many of their activities were largely unrecognized by the Government administration of space, Band members had continued to use the whole territory for gathering, trapping, hunting and fishing. In the negotiations the Tl’azt’en were not able to get Government to agree to creating an exclusive hunting area for them, so they decided that one way that they could improve the security of their hunting and trapping activities was to secure rights to lands on which Band members had cabins.
Twenty-one one acre sites were selected for this purpose (Parcel 4 and Parcels 13-33). In reviewing the Tl'azt'en’s land selections some DIA officials in Ottawa questioned these one acre sites. Their small size and scattered nature did not fit the Department’s policy for Addition to Reserves Policy. But there was a logic to the way the cabin reserves are spread throughout the territory; the sites amount to an expression (though obviously a constrained expression) of the Tl'azt'en’s family hunting and trapping territories. The Tl'azt'en remained cognizant of their own spatial organization and use of the territory and, with the opportunity presented by the railway negotiations, sought to secure spaces within the new production of space which reflected their spatiality.

We must also note that a political process was at work within the Tl'azt'en community as they selected the 35 new reserves, and the selection of sites used by certain families may reflect who within the community had the power to influence where the Tl'azt'en community would create new spaces. But it does appear that the selection of lands was done through an open community process, and that the lands selected represent well the diversity of interests within the community.

It is important to point out that the new reserves were an expression not of pre-contact, but mid-Twentieth Century Tl'azt'en spatiality. The selection of farming/hay lands, bases for hunting and fishing, a site for a sawmill, a site for homes in Fort St. James, lands which could be leased, and land for a guiding business speak of the community’s desire to hold on to traditional activities and to be integrated with the outside economy. It was the Tl'azt'en, not DIA or a Reserve Commissioner, who created these reserves, and they reflect

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the Tl'azt'en community—a community with its own economic, social and, therefore, spatial identity. Though the Tl’azt’en were constrained by the limit on the number of acres they could choose, by the Government’s survey grid and, in a few cases, by the presence of other land holders, the land selections were an expression of the spatial dimension of Tl’azt’en lives. This spatiality emerged to create new legal spaces within Tl’azt’en territory.

The Remainder of the Territory

Through the railway negotiations, the Tl’azt’en influenced the Government production of space, but only for a moment and only to a limited degree. Though they were able to get the Government to allocate them rights to timber and certain lands, the Tl’azt’en did not permanently alter the way the territory was administered, and two things which the Tl’azt’en sought were not part of the final agreement they made with the Provincial Government. During the negotiations the Tl’azt’en had wanted to make the Government continue to consult with them concerning non-native activities and development in the territory, but this type of provision did not make it into the written settlement. The Government also refused to create an exclusive Tl’azt’en hunting area. The Tl’azt’en’s reserves and the TFL gave some legal recognition for the Tl’azt’en’s use of lands within their territory, but with the execution of the final agreement the Tl’azt’en no longer possessed a space of negotiation in which to negotiate the allocation and administration of lands and resources in the remainder of the territory.
The issues facing Tl’azt’en hunters and trappers resulting from the intensification of forest development and other types of encroachment were not well addressed by the final agreement. The remainder of the territory essentially became the space of forest companies, and of ever increasing non-native recreational users. Band members’ off reserve bush economy space continued to be eroded, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Tl’azt’en struggled with the incompatibility of their lives and the intensive forestry that now dominates their territory. They have had little opportunity to have their concerns heard, nor have they had much success in getting jobs in the forest industry. Their Trapline Licenses are a Government recognized interest, but only offer protection against damage to the traps and trails, not against damage to wildlife habitat. In the 1980s and 1990s the Tl’azt’en have had almost no avenue of complaint concerning the impact of forestry on hunting, fishing and trapping. This is a striking change from the period of the railway negotiations when they had the Government’s attention.

The space of the 1984 Agreement was the hybrid product of negotiations. The new reserves, the TFL, and the amount of influence the Tl’azt’en community would have on the remaining spaces of the territory were all compromises. These components of the settlement were negotiated and worked out in relation to other interests and other peoples’ spatialities. The railway negotiations should be viewed as a time when the Tl’azt’en influenced the production of space to the degree possible given their political power at the time. But the power struggle over the production of space in Tl’azt’en territory continues, and the Tl’azt’en’s efforts in the 1970s to secure rights within the new system of
organization of their traditional space did not prevent them from later mounting other challenges against that system.

5.1 New Spaces of Negotiation: Continuing Tl’azt’en Geopolitical Action

Spaces of negotiation are locations within the politics, culture and discourse of a society where groups with different interests and perspectives engage in dialogue. Such social interaction, Lefebvre would suggest, can result in the combination and intertwining of the historical or diverse spatialities present within a society. In the 1970s the Tl’azt’en used the fact that BCR had not finalized a written agreement with them, and threats of blockades to open up a space of negotiation with the Provincial Government. At the negotiation table the Tl’azt’en were able to articulate their goals and their needs. At the table the Tl’azt’en were able to exert some influence on the way the Government perceived the territory, and therefore on the way lands and resources were allocated and administered. However, after the agreement was executed, their ability to access Government ministers, to get the attention of resource managers, to get legal recognition for lands which they used, and to demand a share of the benefits from resource development, disappeared. The Agreement created new legal spaces for the Tl’azt’en but it did not perpetuate the space of negotiation that had existed during the railway issue.

In the 1980s and 1990s the Tl’azt’en have undertaken new political initiatives to try to get the Government and industry to engage in dialogue over visualization, administration and use of the territory. In April 1982, a month after the TFL was granted, together with the other member Bands of the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, the Tl’azt’en submitted to the
Federal Treaty Negotiation Office a declaration which claimed ownership of their territory and expressed their desire to negotiate a treaty. By putting their traditional territory boundary on the map and asserting a spatiality as yet unrecognized by the Government, the Tlʼaztʼen embarked on another effort to re-produce the space of their territory.

The Provincial Government refused for several years to acknowledge the existence of Aboriginal title or to negotiate treaties. The Tlʼaztʼen attempted to gain political power through other initiatives: protesting against the Kemano Completion project, submitting claims concerning the size and number of the reserves they were granted in the early 1900s, and seeking recognition for Aboriginal fishing rights. Many other Native groups chose to assert their ownership of their territories and force the Government to negotiate with them about land and resource issues by setting up blockades on roads and rail lines.

Court decisions in the 1980s gradually gave more legal recognition to the existence of Aboriginal title in British Columbia. These rulings and Native blockades and other protests eventually forced the Province in 1990 to agree to begin treaty negotiations. Subsequently, some Native groups have also been given a greater role in the administration of space through fisheries and park co-management arrangements. The Courts have also ruled that Native groups must be consulted regarding development in their territories. So far this has only meant that Native people are given an opportunity to review development plans, and this mechanism has not resulted in much power for the Tlʼaztʼen to influence decisions. It is interesting to note, however, that the Tlʼaztʼen have begun to analyze forest development and pesticide use plans, on a keyoh by keyoh basis. Despite all the political and geographic change that has occurred since contact, the Tlʼaztʼenʼs keyohs continue to be their basic unit
of spatial administration. Recently the Tl'azt'en have recently undertaken a Traditional Use mapping project in order to make their historic and contemporary land use more visible to others, and thus challenge the non-native view of their territory as ‘empty space’, devoid of any culture.

Treaty negotiations have been frustratingly slow and the Tl'azt'en have had little opportunity to shape administration and use of their territory while negotiations are underway. Yet, throughout the Province, Native power has continued to grow in the late 1990s, and as Native spatiality and alternate mappings of traditional territories have been asserted, British Columbia’s official geography has been significantly destabilized. It appears that the Euro-Canadian production of space can no longer be imposed on Native territories – rather the reconciliation of the two productions of space will have to be worked out through negotiation. A recent event in Tache illustrates this.

In March, 1999 the companies holding Forest Licenses in central British Columbia produced a plan which would increase the amount of timber harvested in Tl'azt’en territory and would re-align Licensee Operating areas. The fact that this re-organization of Tl'azt’en space occurred without Tl’azt’en input while they are at the treaty table greatly disturbed the Tl’azt’en leadership. Demonstrating the significant political power the Tl’azt’en now possess, the Band convened a meeting in Tache on April 9th with the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, the Minister of Forests, Provincial and Federal treaty negotiators, representatives of the British Columbia Treaty Commission, local Mayors, and representatives from the Licensees.
On the wall of the meeting hall hung maps depicting the proposed Licensee Operating Areas. Beside these the Tl’azt’en mounted their own maps, showing Tl’azt’en place-names and Tl’azt’en traditional use sites. Reinforced by words from Tl’azt’en leaders Harry Pierre, Justa Monk, Ed John and Chief Danny Alexis, the Tl’azt’en’s maps asserted the existence of an alternate vision of the territory. Holding the meeting in Tache, having Band members in the audience, and placing these radically different mappings on the wall were a deliberate strategy to make visible Tl’azt’en spatiality, in a direct challenge to the Euro-Canadian visualization of the territory. Having done this the Tl’azt’en demanded that the Province negotiate an Interim Measures Agreement with them that would govern the way the Tl’azt’en would have input into the administration of their territory in the period until a treaty could be completed.

The politics of space in British Columbia today is probably most evident in the fact that all persons who spoke at the meeting opened their remarks by acknowledging that they were in Tl’azt’en territory. The Provincial Government has at the very least recognized that Tl’azt’en’s claim of ownership and interest in their territory is an alternate production of space that must be reckoned with. The Minister of Aboriginal Affairs agreed to the Tl’azt’en’s request for Interim Measures negotiations to commence. This was perhaps the most significant event in the Tl’azt’en’s geopolitical actions since the settlement of the railway issue. The Tl’azt’en have once again opened up a space of negotiation which will give them a direct influence on the production of space in their territory.
5.2 Conclusion

Lefebvre has suggested that through economic, cultural, or political interaction the spatialities of different groups are mixed and intertwined to produce hybrid social spaces. Detecting the nature and extent of such influences in the production of social space, however, may be difficult. Yet, the Tl'azt'en's trapline licenses, reserves, and TFL, the spaces of the fur trade and the Barricade Agreement, the geographies of Tl'azt'en hunting, trapping, fishing, and wage labour, and the space of their territorial claim are evidence that the Tl'azt'en have played a large role in the production of space.

Political power is usually a key determinant in how much one group's production of space influences another, and struggles over the definition, administration, and use of space are often an integral part of society. Certain configurations of political power between groups will mean that the production of space will be negotiated - and this was the case with the Tl'azt'en's negotiations with the Provincial Government in the 1970s. In these negotiations the Tl'azt'en, to some degree, articulated their spatiality in the land selections they made and in their arguments about how the territory's resources should be managed and allocated. This was an important time in the history of Tl'azt'en geopolitical action as their voice significantly influenced the legal and political shape of their territory. To an even greater extent however, current negotiations taking place in British Columbia concerning the reconciliation of Native title and Government title may also result in the creation of new hybrid socio-spatial arrangements.
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